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1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Subsequent to population ageing, numerous European countries are facing a serious 
threat to the financial sustainability of their pension systems. On top of factors influencing 
old age spending (e.g. increases in life expectancy1 and the massive arrival of baby boomers 
at the age of retirement) other factors affect the financing capacity of these countries, such 
as decreases in fertility and migration rates. In Belgium, it is predicted that gross public 
pension expenditure will increase by 6.6 percentage points of GDP between 2016 and 2070 
following an increase of the old-age dependency ratio from 28.4 to 45.2 percent during 
the same period of time (Federal Planning Bureau, 2017).  
In addition to these demographic trends, Belgium must cope with relatively low elderly 
employment rates and one of the earliest average effective retirement ages in the OECD. 
Indeed, though up from the record lows of 58.3 (men) and 56.4 (women) in the mid-1990’s, 
Belgium still underperforms as compared to other OECD countries with an average 
retirement age for men of 61.6 and 60.5 for women in 2018 (OECD, (2017,2019)). 
Nonetheless, concurrently to a trend observed in many developed countries, the country 
has witnessed a major transformation of its labor market environment over the last 
decades (see figure 1). The employment rate of elderly2 Belgian men exhibits a u-shaped 
curve – with a decline in the 1980’s and 1990’s and then an upward trend starting in the 
2000’s. The employment rate of elderly Belgian women is characterized by a long-term 
upward trend, reflecting a structural increase in the labor force participation of women. 
 
1 Life expectancy at age 65 is predicted to increase by 5 years for both men and women between 2016 and 
2070. Consequently, the duration of retirement is predicted to increase from 20.8 (24.4) years in 2017 to 
24.3 (27.5) years in 2070 for men (women) (Federal Planning Bureau, 2017).  
2 Unless indicated otherwise, we refer to elderly as individuals aged more than 54. Since, the majority of 
early labor force exit pathways open above age 54 and because the vast majority of individuals retire at 
age 65 (the statutory eligibility age in most cases), we refer to the elderly working population as working 
individuals aged between 55 and 64. 
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The Federal Planning Bureau (2017) forecasts that these trends will endure and predicts 
an increase in elderly labor force participation from 45.5 in 2016 to 62.4 in 2070 and an 
associated increase in total contributory period from 39.2 (34.2) years in 2017 to 40.6 (39.0) 
years in 2070 for men (women). 
Figure 1: Employment rate of elderly Belgian workers (ages 55-64) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2017) 
While these increases in employment rates show potential for improving the financial 
sustainability of the pension system, these tendencies are in no way sufficient to absorb 
the overwhelming burden of population ageing on public old age spending. Indeed, the 
evolution of the coverage ratio, the benefit ratio and the increase in elderly employment 
rates are predicted to decrease gross public pension expenditure by  2.1, 0.5 and 0.9 
percentage points, respectively (Federal Planning Bureau, 2017). Assuming unchanged 
policy, the contribution rate of workers would have to increase twofold by 2070 to 
safeguard the current level of old-age pension benefits (Hindriks, 2015).  
Confronted with predictable demographic trends, the Belgian government has 











































population ageing on the financial sustainability of the country’s pension system. 
Ultimately, the necessary reforms boil down to a combination of three measures: 
increased contributions or tax financing, lowered benefits and increases in the effective 
retirement age. Retirement reforms in Belgium have mostly been directed at the last 
option, i.e. increase in the effective retirement age, and are divided into two main streams. 
On the one hand, access to early labor force exit routes outside of the old-age pension 
system has been tightened. On the other hand, efforts have been made to reduce the 
incentives of early old-age pension benefits claiming.  
Limiting early labor force exit pathways might not be sufficient to increase workers’ 
effective retirement age. First, it is essential that older workers are encouraged to stay on 
the labor force. Some authors3 mention that allowing for phased-in retirement, in which 
a worker can gradually decrease his working hours and/or receive social security benefits, 
is one of the solutions to increase the average effective retirement age. Second, from a 
labor demand point of view, companies should be incentivized to keep their older 
workers longer. However, negative beliefs about decreases in productivity and the high 
price of older workers, limit the practicality of this second option.  
On top of addressing financial sustainability concerns, pension adequacy4 reforms remain 
an important societal challenge for many years to come (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). 
Indeed, the Pension Reform Committee (2014) finds an elderly monetary poverty 
incidence rate5 of 19.4 percent of the elderly population (65+), which is relatively higher 
than most neighboring countries. Nonetheless, were house ownership included in the 
 
3 See Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2008), Börsch-Supan et. al. (2017) and Duval (2003), among others. 
4 An adequate pension system provides a retirement income that prevents from old-age poverty and 
allows for consumption smoothing at older ages (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). 




old-age pension calculations, the incidence rate would be brought down to 13 percent 
(Pension Reform Committee (2014), Hindriks (2015)). Moreover, the elderly poverty 
intensity6 rate is relatively low in Belgium because many older individuals receive an 
income that is right below the poverty line. Overall, the Ageing Study Committee (2020) 
reports that the Belgian elderly poverty and inequality rates have been decreasing 
uninterruptedly over the period 2005-2014 and have now stabilized to a level close to that 
of the whole population. Intensified women activity rates and the continuous adaptation 
of social and minimum pensions to increases in well-being are among the factors at the 
root of such an increase. In spite of these improvements, income inequality at older ages 
persists between sexes, socio-economic status and household arrangements and there is 
still a substantial need for reforms to achieve an adequate level of pension adequacy. 
1.2 THE RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR AND THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY SYSTEM  
Following declines in elderly labor force participation and the ageing of baby boomers, 
research on the topic of the economics of retirement has grown considerably in recent 
years. In this portion of the literature, the majority of studies explore the determinants of 
the retirement decision, which is multi-faceted and is influenced by factors in both the 
microenvironment (e.g. personal and household characteristics, partner characteristics, 
income and wealth, leisure opportunities, etc.) and in the macroeconomic environment 
(e.g. job opportunities, institutional factors, etc.) (Coile, 2015).  
The concomitance of the trends in elderly labor force participation and the wave of 
reforms that tightened the coverage and generosity of the social security system has 
spawned a vast literature on the link between the retirement decision and financial 
 
6 Poverty intensity is measured as the distance between the poor’s earnings and the poverty line. 
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retirement incentives stemming from the social security system. Coile (2015) mentions 
that these studies mainly differentiate between two effects: an (i) income and a (ii) 
substitution effect.  
On the one hand, the design of old-age pension systems may generate an income effect if 
the benefits received are greater (lesser) than the contributions paid in. In particular, intra-
cohort redistribution through the minimum pension, pensionable earnings ceilings and 
floors and the household replacement rate may generate such an income effect and can 
potentially influence the retirement decision.7  
On the other hand, a substitution effect is generated if an additional year of work 
decreases (increases) the amount of net pension wealth, leading to earlier (later) 
retirement. Indeed, an additional year of work can potentially have several distinct effects 
on a worker’s expected pension wealth. First, the extra income earned will be 
incorporated in the pension benefits calculation and thus increases one’s expected 
pension wealth. Second, since life expectancy is assumed fixed, a worker will forgo the 
receipt of pension benefits for one year, which decreases his total expected pension 
wealth. Third, actuarial adjustment programs that reward late retirement (or punish early 
retirement) also lead to an increase (decrease) the worker’s expected pension wealth. The 
net effect of these factors determines if working for one extra year embodies a positive or 
a negative accrual of the worker’s expected pension wealth.  
Many studies have examined these two effects and the overall impact of the financial 
retirement incentives created by the social security system on the retirement behavior of 
older workers. The purpose of these studies is often to model the role that social security 
 
7 Inter-cohort redistribution in pay-as-you-go pension systems also generates an income effect since early 
pension beneficiaries received benefits without having contributed to the system. 
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benefits play in determining the retirement decision through reconstructing hypothetical 
retirement incentives measures using empirical data and studying their implications in 
determining retirement. While the modelling techniques differ greatly, the conclusions of 
these authors are generally similar: they find that social security rules have a large effect 
on the retirement decision  but that it cannot explain the full breadth of the evolution of 
elderly labor force participation over time (see Coile and Gruber, 2001). In particular, 
Stock and Wise (1990) find that large penalties on additional work exist in Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. Gruber and Wise (1999) are among the first to provide 
a large-scale study of financial retirement incentives across a panel of countries and also 
observe large penalties on additional work once social security benefits become accessible 
for older workers. Gruber and Wise (2004) follow up on their previous work and use an 
option-value framework developed by Stock and Wise (1990) to study the empirical link 
between individual financial retirement incentives and retirement behavior. They identify 
a strong correlation between dynamic retirement incentives and labor market behavior, 
indicating that higher marginal returns to work lead to later retirement. Moreover, they 
predict the effect of illustrative reforms in a set of developed countries (including 
Belgium) and demonstrate that changes in social security provisions would have a highly 
significant effect on the labor force participation of older workers.  
In Belgium, previous studies have pointed at the important role of social security 
incentives and institutional changes in explaining the labor force participation of the 
elderly. Dellis et. al. (2004) use administrative data over the period 1993-1995 to compute 
financial retirement incentives and estimate the impact of several old-age pension 
statutory eligibility age reforms. They note that most Belgian workers face a penalty on 
continued work at older ages, sometimes as early as 58, and they find empirical evidence 
of the link between these penalties and the retirement behavior. Desmet et. al. (2007) use 
a microsimulation model and analyse the budgetary and behavioral impact of another set 
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of social security reforms. They find that the various early labor force exit programs create 
substantial work disincentives at older ages. Jousten and Lefebvre (2013) use SHARE 
survey data and an option-value framework to test the effect of two reform scenarios: an 
increase in eligibility ages and an increase in early exit rules. They find a significant 
impact of financial incentives, health and education variables on retirement probability. 
Jousten and Tarantchenko (2014) study the link between the retirement decision and 
financial retirement incentives using an administrative dataset from the Crossroad Bank 
of Social Security and put emphasis on the analysis of an indicator of the social security 
eligibility status. They observe that the eligibility status indicator has a higher effect on 
the retirement probability compared to financial retirement incentives. Jousten and 
Lefebvre (2016) use an option-value framework to study the role of health and financial 
retirement incentives on the retirement decision and find that both variables play a 
prominent role in the retirement decision. Jousten and Lefebvre (2019) use an option value 
model to study the retirement incentives faced by singles and couples and find that 
retirement incentives differ greatly between men and women. Moreover, they find that 
augmented financial retirement incentives measures, which allow for differences between 
singles and couples, are particularly relevant in a country like Belgium, with strong 
dependent spouse benefits components.  
These studies generally corroborate the international literature and attest of a positive 
income effect – i.e. the higher the pension wealth, the earlier the retirement - and a 
negative substitution effect – i.e. the higher marginal returns to work, the later retirement. 
Belgium is a particularly interesting country case study. First, it has an advanced and 
complex set of early labor force exit pathways. Second, the government has implemented 
a large number of reforms to its social security programs in recent years, which thus 
presents a rich background for the study of reform proposals. Finally, given the relatively 
low elderly employment rate and low effective retirement age, the country presents an 
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outstanding background to explore the link between the retirement behavior and 
financial retirement incentives.  
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
The objective of the present thesis is to answer the question: “How is the retirement 
behavior of older workers influenced by the social security system?”.  In other words, we 
explore the impact of the social security system’s provisions as a driver of the retirement 
behavior of older workers, using Belgium as a case study. We aim our attention at the 
evolution of social security benefit calculation and eligibility rules and their role in 
determining financial incentives for retirement. Following rapid population ageing and 
the influx of baby boomers at the age of retirement, the financial sustainability of many 
old-age pension systems is threatened and it has become crucial that governments have a 
clear idea of how their policies influence the retirement decision. In this section, we 
present a brief overview of the chapters. 
The first chapter of the thesis comprises the general introduction. Chapter seven 
summarizes the key findings of the present work, reviews some limitations of our 
analysis, and indicates directions for further research. 
The second chapter of the thesis contains a thorough review of the Belgian social security 
landscape relevant for the study of retirement. In particular, we list the various benefit 
calculation and eligibility reforms that have occurred in the country since the 1980s in the 
four main (early) labor force exit pathways for older workers: the old-age pension 
program, the conventional early retirement program, the unemployment insurance 
program, the disability insurance program, and we also examine the time credit program. 
We illustrate the complexity and sometimes incoherency of the Belgian social security 
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system, which generates an enabling environment for intertwined effects between 
programs and reforms. As a matter of fact, such a convoluted system sometimes leads to 
specific social security reforms reverberating on the effects of other reforms and even on 
the take-up of other programs and even on other reforms.  The lack of careful long-term 
planning and cautious ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the effect of social security reforms 
worsen the situation even further. The analysis presented in this chapter is relevant for 
policy makers and researchers alike. On the one hand, it is crucial that decision makers 
have a good understanding of the current system as well as its evolution over time in 
order for them to pave the way for the necessary sustainability reforms that lie ahead. On 
the other hand, some trivial benefit calculation parameters are often discarded when 
computing financial retirement incentives for the analysis of the retirement behavior. 
Some of these parameters (e.g. evolution of taxation rules) are nonetheless of prime 
significance and have an important role to play in the computation of financial retirement 
incentives.  
The third chapter presents a microsimulation model aimed at assessing the evolution of 
financial retirement incentives stemming from the social security system from the 1980s 
to the present day for different subgroups of the population. Indeed, the respective 
importance of individual incentives and institutional changes in explaining observed 
labor supply and retirement patterns over the last decades remains unclear. We update 
the work of Pestieau and Stijns (1999) by using recent data and we calculate the financial 
incentives to exit employment for various typical workers, differentiated by age, year, 
income level, marital status and sex – integrating changes both in benefits and in the tax 
system. We compute financial retirement incentives that include not only instantaneous 
income but also the complete set of survival and eligibility contingent benefits streams, 
forecast all the way until the end of life. Such expected benefits streams are influenced by 
the exposure and eligibility of an individual to social security programs that work as early 
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labor force exit pathways. The model allows us to separate age and year effects, 
incidentally also permitting us to take phased reforms and grandfathering provisions into 
account. The model also permits the study of an array of scenarios in terms of earnings 
level, earnings growth, mortality, as well as a simulation of modified system parameters. 
We find that the tightening of eligibility conditions and the greater variation in the 
generosity of some benefits translate into important changes of our incentive measures to 
retire. Specifically, we find that workers above the age of 60 typically face an implicit tax 
on additional work, indicating a retirement incentive created by the social security 
system. At the macroeconomic level, the chapter concludes that retirement incentives 
from the social security system are moderately correlated with the employment rates of 
older Belgian workers. In conclusion, in this chapter, we provide an analysis of past 
financial retirement incentives, which can serve as evidence that the social security system 
may well have an important impact on the retirement decision and that careful ex-ante 
policy analysis should be realized before any significant old-age pension sustainability 
reform.   
The aim of the fourth chapter is to examine the empirical link between the financial 
retirement incentives created by the social security system and the retirement decisions 
of older Belgian workers. We update and expand the work of Dellis. et. al. (2004) in terms 
of period coverage by using a more recent panel administrative dataset and we provide 
additional simulations of reforms. From each worker’s earning history, we compute their 
expected old-age pension benefits and various financial incentive measures. We test the 
correlation between the retirement decision and our financial retirement incentive 
variables using various econometric models and specifications. Our general regression 
analysis shows a positive income effect (i.e. more generous measures induce higher 
retirement rates) and a negative substitution effect (i.e. higher returns to work lead to 
lower retirement rates). When considering men and women separately, we find a stronger 
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effect of our financial retirement incentive variables on the retirement probability of 
women. Finally, based on these regression results, we perform a series of simulations in 
which we neutralize the effect of some of the social security reforms that occurred in the 
country during our observation period. We find that the increase in the statutory 
eligibility age of women did indeed lead to an increase in the incentives to stay on the 
labor market. However, we find that the pension bonus did not have the expected effect 
of keeping workers on the labor market longer, but instead had the opposite effect by 
generating an increase in the income effect of financial incentives on retirement. In this 
chapter, we show that some of the reforms did not have the desired effect on retirement 
probability, and we demonstrate once again the relevance of careful ex-ante impact 
analysis of social security reforms and the role they can play in improving the financial 
sustainability of the pension system. 
The fifth chapter documents the dissociation of the retirement decision into a labor market 
exit and a benefit claiming decision.  In the literature and in the public debate, the decision 
to retire is frequently equalled to stop working and simultaneously claim (early) 
retirement benefits for the first time. Increasingly, however, individuals face more 
complex choice sets, that sometimes lead them to – optimally or not – disjoin these two 
decisions. We consider four different sub-statuses of individuals, based on work and 
benefit claiming statuses. Such a decomposition matters not only for the analysis of the 
retirement behavior but also from the public finance and the pension system 
sustainability points of view. First, social security reforms have the potential to influence 
both decisions differently – possibly disjoining them. Indeed, we study the determinants 
of both decisions separately and find that they are influenced by different factors. Second, 
the option of combining (part-time) work with social security benefits claiming influences 
labor market decisions at older ages, arguably encouraging some workers to stay in the 
labor force longer. In fact, we study the implications of this decomposition on the 
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evolution of macro level employment trends and find that the recent increase in elderly 
labor force participation was mostly caused by a rise in part-time work and in the 
prevalence of workers who are claiming benefits. Moreover, we show that access to social 
security benefits (such as time credit, for example) does not have the desired effect of 
keeping older workers on the labor force longer as these individuals have a higher 
tendency to retire early. Finally, in Belgium, the complex landscape of labor force exit and 
benefit claiming options, the ubiquitous nature of partial or full labor force exit options 
and the absence of penalty for early claimers of old-age pension benefits renders the short 
and the long-term fiscal stakes particularly high. In conclusion, we show that such a 
decomposition of employment and retirement trends would prove to be highly beneficial 
for both research and policy analyses concerns and in easing the progress towards a more 
sustainable pension system.   
The objective of the sixth chapter is to examine the retirement behavior of individuals in 
one-earner households, i.e. households composed of one earner and one partner who is 
financially dependent. These individuals are automatically granted a more generous 
replacement rate in the calculation of their old-age pension benefits, the so-called 
household replacement rate. In fact, the Belgian Pension Reform Committee recently 
recommended that the household replacement rate be removed for every new pensioner, 
except for those receiving the minimum pension. We provide an ex-ante impact 
evaluation of the removal of the household replacement rate on both pension 
sustainability and pension adequacy measures. Specifically, we test whether the 
household replacement rate entails a work (dis)incentive mechanism promoting 
(harming) pension sustainability and furthermore, we analyse the role of the household 
replacement rate in ensuring pension adequacy from a public policy perspective. We use 
the survey dataset SHARE and a discrete time logistic duration model to study the link 
between the retirement decision and our financial retirement incentive measures. We find 
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a positive and significant income effect, a negative and significant substitution effect, and 
a significant effect of age and social security eligibility rules on the retirement probability. 
We find no additional impact of being in a one-earner household on top of the indirect 
impact through the financial retirement incentives. Finally, we simulate the impact of 
several changes in the household replacement rate generosity on the retirement 
probability and on poverty measures of individuals in one-earner households. We find 
an important effect of the household rate on poverty measures and a rather limited 
negative impact of the program on the retirement probability through its income effect. 
However, since households with asymmetrical working arrangements are often at the 
lowest part of the income distribution, the substantial effect of the household replacement 
rate on poverty measures is a motive to use a mechanism such as a poverty alleviation 
tool. In view of these results, we advocate in favour of the recommendation of the Pension 
Reform Committee to remove the household replacement rate for every pensioner except 
for those in the lowest income deciles. Indeed, income redistribution among the elderly 
need not be targeted at a specific type of household and policies such as pensionable 
earning minima, minimum pension benefits and the inclusion of replacement income 
periods in the pension benefits calculation effectively serve the income redistribution goal 
and do not favour a certain type of household over another. In this chapter, we take a step 
further from past chapters and present an ex-ante policy reform analysis on both pension 
sustainability and adequacy measures to provide evidence of the relevance of these 
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SOCIAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE FOR OLDER 
WORKERS 







The Belgian social security system is organized in three regimes: one for wage earners, 
one for civil servants and one for self-employed workers. In this thesis, the focus is set on 
the wage-earner regime that has not only the largest enrolment8 but also represents the 
largest budgetary item in public old age spending. The scheme for civil servants (resp. 
self-employed) is characterized by higher (resp. lower) average benefits and very distinct 
contribution and benefits calculation rules. Besides, the financing of the three regimes 
differs substantially, for civil servants (resp. self-employed) all (resp. a more substantial 
share) of budgetary funds stem from general government revenues.  
Before we study the role that the social security system has played on the retirement 
behavior of older Belgian workers, we describe the main reforms of the four retirement 
programs available to wage earners since the eighties: the old-age pension, the 
conventional early retirement, the unemployment insurance and the disability insurance 
schemes.9 Additionally, we take a closer look at the system of time credits for older 
workers.  In figures 2.1 to 2.4, we summarize the major social security reforms in Belgium 
since the mid-1980’s in a timeline format.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the old-age pension system 
reforms over the past decades. Section 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 describe the conventional early 
retirement, the unemployment insurance, the disability insurance and the time credit 
programs, respectively. Section 2.8 concludes. 
 
8 In 2019, there were 2,043,902 beneficiaries in the wage-earners regime, 561,954 beneficiaries in the self-
employed regime and 250,094 beneficiaries in the civil servants regime (National Pension Office, 2019). 
9 In addition, social assistance benefits and social pensions, as well as workplace accident and professional 
disease benefits exist – but play a less prominent role in the analysis of retirement behavior. 
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Figure 2.1: Reforms of the old-age pension system in Belgium (1985-2020) 
  
Note: EEA: Early eligibility age, SEA: statutory eligibility age. 
Age eligibility conditions are in red, career length requirements are in blue. 
Source: See reference list  
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Figure 2.2: Reforms of the old-age unemployment system in Belgium (1985-2020) 
 
Note: Age eligibility conditions are in red, career length requirements are in blue. 
Source: See reference list 
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Figure 2.3: Reforms of the conventional early retirement system in Belgium (1985-2020) 
 
Note: Age eligibility conditions are in red, career length requirements are in blue. 
Source: See reference list 
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Figure 2.4: Reforms of the time credit system for older workers in Belgium (2000-2020) 
 
Note: Age eligibility conditions are in red, career length requirements are in blue. 








2.2 OLD-AGE PENSION  
The old-age pension system for wage earners consists of three pillars: the first one is a 
public pension system10, the second one is an occupational pension system and the third 
one involves voluntary private retirement savings.11 The main configuration of the public 
pension system was established after the Second World War under stable economic 
growth and encouraging demographic trends. At first, several schemes for various wage-
earners workers co-existed and the system was a mix of defined contributions and defined 
benefits. In 196712, the wage-earner old-age pension regime is created with the aim of 
establishing a system of solidarity between every wage-earner worker: blue and white-
collar workers in the private sector13, miners and marine workers.14 The system became a 
fully defined benefits system in 1955 for blue-collar workers and in 1957 for white-collar 
workers.15 Nowadays, the public pension system is essentially a mandatory pay-as-you-
go scheme that is financed by tax-deductible employer and employee contributions as 
well as public transfers.16  
 
10 Unless otherwise specified, information on old-age pension for wage earners is retrieved from the 
National Pension office website at www.sfpd.fgov.be  
11 Second pillar pensions are voluntary, provided by the employer and established among the company, the 
industry or the sector of activity. Public authorities do not have direct control over second and third pillar 
pensions but define their legal framework and encourage their use through tax incentive mechanisms. 
12 See Royal Decree 50 of the 24th of October 1967 – Arrêté Royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des 
travailleurs salariés, M.B. 24 October 1967. 
13 Blue and white-collar workers were treated separately until 1962, when the legislator aligned the rules for 
every wage earner.  
14 Specific rules still exist for miners, marine workers, journalists and civil aviation personnel. 
15 See Law of the 29th of December 1953 - Loi relative à la pension des ouvriers and the Royal Decree of the 24th 
of October 1967 - Arrêté royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des travailleurs salariés, M.B. 27 October 
1967. 
16 Employee contributions amount to 13.07 percent of gross wage, employer contribution amount to 32.5 




This section is structured as follows. Section 2.2.1 reviews the main components that enter 
the old-age pension benefits calculation and their evolution over time. Section 2.2.2 
describes the evolution of the statutory and early eligibility ages and associated career 
conditions. Section 2.2.3 describes programs that adjust the final old-age pension benefit 
amount: the minimum pension, the actuarial adjustment and the pension bonus. Finally, 
section 2.2.4 is devoted to the description of the program that allows for the combination 
of work and old-age pension benefits receipt. 
2.2.1 CALCULATION OF BENEFITS 
The determination of the old-age pension benefits amount is based on three factors: the 
career length, the level of earnings and the household situation. A household can be 
classified into two categories: (i) households in which both members earn an income 
(hereafter two-earner households) and single individuals or (ii) households with only one 
prime earner (hereafter one-earner households)17. Each calendar year of employment 
increases the pension benefits entitlements by 1/45th of 60 percent of the revalued gross 
wage in the case of two-earner or single households or 75 percent in the case of one-earner 
households.  
The pension benefits calculation formula for an individual i can be represented by 
 =  

        

  
where index i refers to the individual, index j refers to the year of career and C is the total 
career length.   refers to the nominal (in currency of the earning year) annual gross 
 
17 Households where both partners work but where the income of one of the spouse is below a certain 
threshold are also included in this group. 
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wages received in year j by individual i, subject to a set of floors and ceilings.  is the 
valorisation coefficient for year j.  is the standard career length for individual i. 

 is 
the replacement rate for individual i. We detail each of these components and their 
evolution over time in the sections below. 
2.2.1.1 WAGES  
Three types of wages are credited in the pension benefits calculation: the observed wage, 
the lump-sum wage and the assimilated wage.  
The observed wage corresponds to the nominal gross wage the individual has earned for 
effective work, for which social security contributions were paid. Before 1968, only years 
of career of more than 185 days of at least 4 hours were credited in the old-age pension 
calculation. Starting from 196818, this limitation is only applicable for years of career before 
1955.  
The lump-sum wage is fixed by year19 and replaces the observed wage for years worked 
as a blue-collar worker before 195520 or as a white-collar worker before 1958 and for 
assimilated periods (periods during which a replacement income is received) before 
1968.21  
After 196718, the assimilated wage22 is used to credit for assimilated periods in the pension 
benefits calculation: it is equivalent to the last observed wage received before the 
 
18 See Royal Decree 50 of the 24th of October 1967 – Arrêté Royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des 
travailleurs salariés, M.B. 24 October 1967. 
19 See the appendix for the historical evolution of lump-sum wages. 
20 See the Law of the 21st of May 1955 – Loi relative à la pension de retraite et de survie des ouvriers. 
21 The lump-sum wage also replaces observed wages in the case of seasonal or cross border work. 
22 See appendix for the historical evolution of the assimilated wage.  
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inactivity period. Starting from 201223, the assimilated wage is limited to the legal 
minimum wage for periods of unemployment longer than two years24 (one year from 2017 
onwards) and periods spent in the conventional early retirement program above age 58 
(every age from 2017 onwards). Besides, since 2007, there exists a differentiated ceiling 
for the assimilated wage credited in the old-age pension benefit calculation for periods 
spent receiving unemployment, conventional early retirement or time credit benefits after 
age 58.  
2.2.1.2 VALORISATION COEFFICIENT 
The aim of the valorisation coefficient25 is to adjust past earnings to the price levels of the 
retirement year by adjusting them for inflation and average wage growth.26 It is equal to 
the pivotal index27 of the retirement year R divided by the average monthly price index 
of career year j and multiplied by the growth coefficient of career year j. Below, we first 
discuss the pivotal index and then take a look at the growth coefficient. 
 =      !"  ×  $%&'ℎ )**)'   
The pivotal index is an automatic indexation mechanism of social security benefits to 
inflation: social security benefits increase by two percent if the price index reaches a 
 
23 See Law of the 28th of December 2011 - Loi portant des dispositions diverses, M.B. 30 December 2011. 
24 This period usually corresponds to the start of the 3rd period of unemployment (between 12 and 36 
months of unemployment) benefits during which benefits stop being linked to the lost wage and become a 
lump sum payment. 
25 See Law of the 28th of March 1973 - Loi majorant les pensions des travailleurs salariés et instaurant un mécanisme 
d'adaptation du montant des pensions à l'évolution du bien-être général, M.B. 30 March 1973 and Law of the 1st of 
March 1977 - Loi organisant un régime de liaison à l'indice des prix à la consommation du Royaume de certaines 
dépenses dans le secteur public, M.B. 12 March 1977. 
26 See the appendix for a list of valorisation coefficients for a person retiring in 2020 ( pivotal index 147.31). 
27 See the appendix for the historical evolution of pivotal indices. 
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threshold, the so-called pivotal index. Since 1994, the smoothed28 health index29 replaces 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the price index used in the pivotal index 
determination. The health index is equivalent to the CPI from which the prices of tobacco, 
alcohol, diesel and fuel were removed. Therefore, once the smoothed health index reaches 
the pivotal index, social security benefits increase by two percent and remain unchanged 
until the smoothed health index reaches the newly defined pivotal index (the old pivotal 
index multiplied by 1.02). On four occasions, social security benefits did not increase after 
the pivotal index was reached: in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 2015. Following each of these 
jumps, the smoothed health index that enters the pivotal index determination is 
multiplied by a factor of 0.98. 
The use of the valorisation coefficient mechanism to revalue past earnings leads to an 
underestimation of past inflation. Indeed, the health index grows slower than the CPI 
because the prices of the products that are deducted from the CPI have historically been 
growing at a faster pace than other goods (see Figure 2.5). Moreover, the use of the 
smoothed index, the pivotal index mechanism and the four index jumps are also factors 
of this undervaluation. In fact, Peeters (2016) estimates that the valorisation coefficient 
used to adjust 1980 wages to 2016 prices is 12 percent lower than a fictitious indexation 




28 Since 1983, the average of the last four months, called ‘smoothed index’ is used instead of the current 
index in order to avoid the impact of sudden fluctuations in prices on pension indexation.  
29 See Royal decree of the 24th of December 1993 - Arrêté royal portant exécution de la loi du 6 janvier 1989 de 
sauvegarde de la compétitivité du pays, M.B. 31 March 1993. The detailed evolution of the health index is 
available on https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/prix-la-consommation/indice-sante#figures.  
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The growth coefficient is the other important component of the valorisation coefficient. It 
is introduced in 197325 and is aimed at indexing old-age pensions to wage growth. For 
retirement years after 1974, earnings between 1955 and 1974 were increased by 3.6 
percent31 per year of difference between career year j and 1975.32 Starting in 1997, the base 
coefficient of 0.036 is gradually reduced by 0.004 per year. Consequently, the growth 




30 See ’Index search’, https://statbel.fgov.be/en/themes/consumer-prices/index-search 
31 See Royal Decree 50 of the 24th of October 1967 – Arrêté Royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des 
travailleurs salariés, M.B. 24 October 1967. 
32 See the appendix for the historical evolution of the growth coefficient. 
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The growth coefficient for retirement year j or k and earnings year i is therefore 
determined as follows. 
+%&'ℎ )**)' = ( 1 + 0.036)45678   
for i = 1955, …, 1974 and j= 1975, …, 1996 
+%&'ℎ )**)'9 = ( 1 + (0.036 − ;0.004 ∗ (> − 1996)@))45678      
for i = 1955, …, 1974 and k= 1997, …, 2004 
Hence, unlike many European countries, earnings that enter the old-age pension benefits 
calculation are not automatically adjusted for wage growth33. Similarly, pensions in 
payment are not automatically adjusted for wage growth but only for (incomplete) 
inflation through the pivotal index. Consequently, the welfare gap between a retired 
individual and the average employed person increases with time spent in retirement. 
Nevertheless, discretional increases in pension benefits reflecting the evolution of living 
standards are periodically implemented. In fact, since 2005 a financial package aimed at 
increasing pensioners’ well-being is formed every two years, with priority often granted 
to increases in minimum pensions. Additional payments called holiday and 
supplementary allowances are payable to pensioners once a year and are aimed at 
correcting for the lack of wage growth indexation.  
 
33 See Dekkers, Desmet and Van den Bosch (2018) for a microsimulation of the impact of introducing a 
valorisation coefficient that accounts for increases in wage growth. 
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2.2.1.3 WAGE FLOORS 
A wage floor for earnings to be credited in the old-age pension benefit calculation is 
introduced in 199634. Its objective is to avoid that gender wage inequality persists after 
retirement (Feestjens, 1997). The wage credited in the pension benefit calculation for a 
certain career year is replaced by the wage floor upon meeting three conditions: the wage 
is smaller than the wage floor, the worker has accumulated at least 104 days35 of FTE (full-
time equivalent work) during that year and the total career length is at least 15 years36. 
Between 1978 and 1991, there was an additional condition: the ratio of the observed wage 
over the wage floor multiplied by 312 had to be superior to 104. The wage floor is adjusted 
with the work intensity ratio37. 
The wage floor to be applied at retirement is adjusted for inflation through the pivotal 
index mechanism. In addition, there have been various discretional increases in the wage 
floor amount to adjust it to wage growth.38 In particular, in 200939, a substantial increase 
of the wage floor was decided to ensure that the old-age pension benefits amount of an 
individual with a career of 45 years and calculated on the basis of the wage floor was 
equal to the minimum pension. Table 2.1 and figure 2.6 display the evolution of the wage 
floor in real and nominal values.  
 
34 See Law of the 26th of July 1996 - Loi portant modernisation de la sécurité sociale et assurant la viabilité des 
régimes légaux des pensions, M.B. 1 August 1996. 
35 One-third of full-time employment (312 days). 
36 Each year of career must be constituted of at least 104 days of FTE, periods spent receiving a replacement 
income included. See Royal Decree of the 23rd of December 1996 - Arrêté royal portant exécution des articles 15, 
16 et 17 de la loi du 26 juillet 1996 portant modernisation de la sécurité sociale et assurant la viabilité des régimes 
légaux des pensions, M.B. 17 January 1997. 
37 The work intensity ratio is the total number of career years (of at least 52 days of FTE) divided by a 
complete career.  
38 At the time of writing, the wage floor is 25,833.78 euros (pivotal index 147.31). 
39 See the Royal Decree of the 16th of February 2009 - Arrêté royal portant augmentation du droit minimum par 
année de carrière et de certaines pensions dans le régime des travailleurs salariés, M.B. 13 March 2009. 
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Table 2.1: Evolution of the wage floor per year of career (in constant 1996 euros) 
Royal decree Wage floor  
23rd of December 1996  509.916 BEF (12,637.5 €) 
5th November 2002 13,151.04 € 
16th of February 2009 16,486.75€ 
6th of July 2011 16,816.49 € 
24th of June 2013 17,026.70 € 
3rd of April 2015 17,367.23 € 
21st of July 2017 17,662.47 € 
17th of May 2019 18,088.35 € 
Source: Moniteur Belge40 and the National Pension Office41 
 
Figure 2.6: Evolution of wage floor in current euros
 
 
Source: Moniteur Belge40 and the public pension official42  
 
 
40 See https://justice.belgium.be/fr/service_public_federal_justice/organisation/moniteur_belge 
41 See ‘Droit minimum par année de carrière’ on https://www.sfpd.fgov.be/fr/montant-de-la-
pension/calcul/types-de-pensions/salaries/salaires/droit-minimum 
42 See https://www.sfpd.fgov.be/fr/centre-de-connaissances/legislation/legislation-pensions-salaries 
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2.2.1.4 CEILINGS  
Observed and assimilated wages that enter the old-age pension benefit calculation are 
subject to a set of ceilings. Above the wage ceiling, an additional euro earned will not lead 
to an increase in old-age pension benefits. Similar to the wage floors, the objective of 
ceilings is to avoid the persistence of gender wage inequality into old age. Initially, the 
ceilings for pensionable earnings were introduced with contribution ceilings for white-
collar workers and there was no ceiling for blue-collar workers.43 In 1982, contribution 
ceilings and ceilings for wages in the individual pension accounts were abolished. In 1983, 
wage ceilings were introduced for blue-collar workers for career years after 1981.44   
At retirement, the wage in nominal value is compared to the ceiling for pensionable 
earnings of that year (adjusted for work intensity). If the wage is above the ceiling, the 
wage is replaced by the ceiling, adjusted for work intensity, which is subsequently 
revalued in the old-age pension calculation using the valorisation coefficient. Between 
1958 and 1972, if the pensionable wage went over the ceiling, it was replaced by the ceiling 
amount adjusted for work intensity and multiplied by 1.1.  
The ceilings are tied to a specific year and are automatically indexed to prices using the 
health index. The indexation of ceilings is therefore slightly less underestimated 
compared to that of the wage floor, which is adjusted using the pivotal index. 
Nevertheless, the use of the health index instead of the CPI still leads to an incomplete 
indexation to prices. On top of this indexation, there were several discretional increases 
of ceiling amounts in order to reflect the average wage growth. 45 However, Peeters (2016) 
 
43 See the appendix for the historical evolution of the ceilings for pensionable earnings. 
44 Marine workers and flying staff still have a different set of pensionable earnings ceilings. 
45 See Law of the 26th of July 1996 - Loi portant modernisation de la sécurité sociale et assurant la viabilité des 
régimes légaux des pensions, M.B. 1 August 1996. 
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observes that ceilings have grown at a slower pace compared to the average wage for 
most age groups. Consequently, the proportion of individuals with earnings above the 
ceiling has been increasing over the years.46 Figure 2.7 presents the evolution of the wage 
ceiling in constant 1996 euros. 
Figure 2.7: Evolution of pensionable earnings ceilings  
 
Source: Public pension official 42 
The combination of pensionable earning ceilings and the inclusion of a maximum of 
14,040 days of FTE lead to an implicit maximum pension amount (see section 2.2.1.6). The 
maximum pension for a pensioner who has a career of 14,040 days and who retires in 2019 
was 2,628.38 euros for an individual in a two-earner or single household and 3,285.48 
euros for an individual in a one-earner household.47 Peeters (2016) shows that the 
 
46 In 2008, it is estimated that 20.1 percent of pensioners saw their pensionable earnings limited because of 
the ceilings. On average, 16 years of pensionable earnings are limited for men and 11.2 years for women, 
this corresponds to an average pension benefits loss of 26.27 percent for men and 11.24 percent for women. 
(Pension Reform Committee 2020-2040, 2014) 
47 Blue-collar workers can earn a pension that is above the maximum pension because the pensionable 
earnings ceiling only applies to wages earned after 1981. 
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maximum pension has nearly doubled since 1980 following discretional increases in 
ceilings and the gradual replacement of relatively meager lump-sum rate wage that were 
included in the pension benefits calculation before 1955 for white-collar workers and 
before 1958 for blue collar workers (see section 2.1.1) instead of the observed wage. 
2.2.1.5 REPLACEMENT RATE 
Initially, the standard replacement rate for old-age pension benefits, hereafter 
referred to as the isolated replacement rate, was set at 40 percent. The household 
replacement rate of 60 percent is introduced for married workers with a financially 
dependent spouse in 195348 for blue-collar workers and in 195749 for white-collar workers. 
In 195550, the isolated replacement rate is raised to 60 percent and the household 
replacement rate is raised to 75 percent.51  
To receive an old-age pension calculated with the household replacement rate, the 
financially dependent spouse’s work income cannot go over a certain earnings threshold52 
and he or she also cannot receive any type of social security benefits, except for an old-
age pension. In the latter case, the sum of both spouses’ old-age pensions must be lower 
than the pension of the prime earner calculated at the household replacement rate. If that 
is the case, the pension benefits of the prime earner are automatically topped up to the 
 
48 See the law of the 29th of December 1953 - Loi relative à la pension des ouvriers. 
49 See the law of the 12th of July 1957 – Loi relative à la pension de retraite et de survie des employés. 
50 See the law of the 21st of May 1955 – Loi relative à la pension de retraite et de survie des ouvriers. 
51 Because past earnings are not fully adjusted for inflation and wage growth, Berghman and Peeters (2012) 
estimate the real replacement rate to be 42 percent for an individual receiving the average wage, 60.1 percent 
for an individual receiving 50 percent of the average wage because of the wage floor and the minimum 
pension and 32.7 percent for individuals earning 150 percent of the average wage because of pensionable 
earnings ceilings.  
52 The earnings threshold is similar to that for the combination of work and pension receipt. See Royal 
Decree of the 20st of January 2015 – Arrêté Royal modifiant l’article 64 de l’arrêté royal du 21 décembre 1967 portant 
règlement general du regime de pension de retraite et de survie des travailleurs salaries, M.B. 23 January 2015. 
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pension amount calculated at the household replacement rate – producing an effective 
benefit replacement rate between 60 and 75 percent. If the sum of both spouse’s old-age 
pension go over the pension of the prime earner calculated at the household replacement 
rate, the pension of the prime earner is paid at the isolated replacement rate. 
2.2.1.6 COMPLETE CAREER  
The condition for receiving a full pension is a complete career. A complete career is 
defined as a career of 45 years (of at least 104 days of FTE each) for men and 40 years for 
women since 195353 for blue-collar workers and since 195754 for white-collar workers. In 
199655, following a continuous decrease in the gender gap in total career years, complete 
career years for women are increased with the objective of harmonizing the system 
between men and women (Peeters, 2016). The transition period lasted from 1997 to 2009, 
during which complete career years for women increased from 40 to 41 in 1997, to 42 in 
2000, to 43 in 2003, to 44 in 2006 and to 45 in 2009.  
Before 2015, only the 45 years that lead to the highest pension accrual were retained in the 
pension benefits calculation (replacement income included).56 Since 201557, this 45 years 
threshold is translated into 14,04058 days. The objective of this reform is to avoid that an 
 
53 See Law of the 29th of December 1953 - Loi relative à la pension des ouvriers. 
54 See Law of the 12th of July 1957 – Loi relative à la pension de retraite et de survie des employés. 
55 See Law of the 26th of July 1996 - Loi portant modernisation de la sécurité sociale et assurant la viabilité des 
régimes légaux des pensions, M.B. 1 August 1996. 
56 In 2008, the old-age pension of 41.9 percent of men and 18.7 percent of women were reduced because of 
a career longer than the complete career length. On average, 3.6 years for men and 2.9 years for women 
were removed from their total career years (Pension Reform Committee 2020-2040, 2014). 
57 See Law of the 24th April 2014. - Loi modifiant diverses dispositions relatives au régime de pension des travailleurs 
indépendants compte tenu du principe de l'unité de carrière, M.B. 7 May 2014 and the Royal Decree of the 6th of 
October 2015 - — Arrêté royal modifiant l’article 52 de l’arrêté royal du 21 décembre 1967 portant règlement général 
du régime de pension de retraite et de survie des travailleurs salariés, MB. 21 November 2015. 
58 14,040 is the result of 45 years multiplied by 312 days. Although a five-days working week is mandatory 
since 1964, working days are still translated into a six-days working week by multiplying the effective 
number of working days by 1.2. This leads to a full-time employment year being counted as 312 days (52 
64 
 
individual with a career of 45 years of part-time work has the same work intensity ratio 
than another individual with a career of 45 years of full-time work. Therefore, since 2015, 
only the 14,040 days of work with the highest pension accrual are kept in the pension 
benefits calculation. Above 14,040 days, the assimilated wage of the conventional early 
retirement or the unemployment benefits cannot be included into the pension benefit 
calculation, even if they are more beneficial59. 
2.2.2 STATUTORY AND EARLY ELIGIBILITY AGES 
The statutory eligibility age is set at 65 for men and 60 for women in 195353 for blue-collar 
workers and in 195754 for white-collar workers. In 199760, a major pension reform 
progressively increased the statutory eligibility age of women to 65 with the aim of 
harmonizing the system between men and women and of improving the sustainability of 
the pension system. The statutory eligibility age for women increased from 60 to 61 in 
1997, 62 in 2000, 63 in 2003, 64 in 2006 and 65 in 2009. The statutory eligibility age of both 
men and women, currently fixed at 65, will increase to 66 in 2025 and to 67 in 2030.61  
The regulation regarding early retirement has been profoundly modified over the years. 
In 196762, blue-collar workers could claim their old-age pension benefits 5 years before the 
statutory eligibility age, but they were subject to a 5 percent reduction of their pension 
 
multiplied by 6) instead of the actual 260 working days (52 multiplied by 5). Therefore, with this 
administrative modification, a full career of 45 years is translated into 14,040 days and not 11,700 days 
(Peeters, 2016). 
59 Nevertheless, no more than 1,560 days of assimilated wage can be suppressed. 
60 See Royal Decree of the 23rd of December 1996 - Arrêté royal portant exécution des articles 15, 16 et 17 de la 
loi du 26 juillet 1996 portant modernisation de la sécurité sociale et assurant la viabilité des régimes légaux des 
pensions, M.B. 17 January 1997. 
61 See Law of the 10th of August 2015 -  Loi visant à relever l'âge légal de la pension de retraite et portant modification 
des conditions d'accès à la pension de retraite anticipée et de l'âge minimum de la pension de survie, M.B. 21st of 
August 2015. 
62 See Royal Decree of the 24th of October 1967 – Arrêté Royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des 
travailleurs salariés, M.B. 24 October 1967. 
65 
 
benefits per year of anticipation (see section 2.2.3.2). In 198163, a career requirement of 10 
years (of minimum 104 days of FTE each) as a wage earner is introduced to access early 
retirement. In 198764, the early eligibility age of women is increased to 60.  In 199165, a 
flexible retirement age starting at 60 without penalty is created. From 1997 to 2005, the 
career requirement for early retirement is gradually increased from 20 to 35 years by 
gradual steps of two years. From 2013 to 201666, the early eligibility age is increased by 0.5 
every year to reach 62 in 2016. From 2013 to 201566, the career conditions are increased by 
one every year to reach 40 years in 2015. Some exceptions are created for individuals with 
long career: age 60 with at least 40 years of career in 2013 and 2014, age 60 with at least 41 
years of career in 2015, age 60 with at least 42 years of career or age 61 with at least 41 
years of career in 2016. Starting in 201561, the early eligibility age is increased by 0.5 every 
year to reach 63 in 2019.  The career conditions for early retirement increase to 41 years in 
2017 and to 42 years in 2019. Some exceptions are again created for individuals who have 
long careers: age 60 with a career of at least 43 years in  2017 and 2018, age 61 with a career 
of at least 43 years in 2017 and 2018, age 60 with a career of at least 44 years in  2019 and 





63 See Law of the 10th of February 1981 - La loi de redressement relative aux pensions du secteur social du 
10.02.1981, M.B. 14 February 1981. 
64 See Royal Decree of the 16th of July 1986 - Arrêté royal modifiant certaines dispositions en matière de pensions 
pour travailleurs salariés, M.B. 30 July 1986. 
65 See Law of the 20st of July 1990 -  Loi instaurant un âge flexible de la retraite pour les travailleurs salariés et 
adaptant les pensions des travailleurs salariés à l'évolution du bien-être général, M.B. 15 August 1990. 
66 See Law of the 28th of December 2011 - Loi portant des dispositions diverses, M.B. 30 December 2011. 
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Table 2.2: Evolution of early and statutory eligibility ages and career length 
requirements 
 
Early eligibility age  
(Career requirements) 
Statutory eligibility age 
Standard rule Long career Men Women 
Before 1997 N/A N/A 65 60 
1997 60 (20) N/A 65 61 
1998 60 (22) N/A 65 61 
1999 60 (24) N/A 65 61 
2000 60 (26) N/A 65 62 
2001 60 (28) N/A 65 62 
2002 60 (30) N/A 65 62 
2003 60 (32) N/A 65 63 
2004 60 (34) N/A 65 63 
2005 60 (35) N/A 65 63 
2006 60 (35) N/A 65 64 
2007 60 (35) N/A 65 64 
2008 60 (35) N/A 65 64 
2009 60 (35) N/A 65 65 
2010 60 (35) N/A 65 65 
2011 60 (35) N/A 65 65 
2012 60 (35) N/A 65 65 
2013 60 and ½ (38) 60 (40) 65 65 
2014 61 (39) 60 (40) 65 65 
2015 61 and ½ (40) 60 (41) 65 65 
2016 62 (40) 
60 (42) or 61 
(41) 
65 65 
2017 62 and ½ (41) 
60 (43) or 61 
(42) 
65 65 
2018 63 (41) 
60 (43) or 
61(42) 
65 65 
2019 63 (42) 
60 (44) or 
61(43) 
65 65 
Source: National Pension Office (2017), Feestjens (1997), OECD (2017) 
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2.2.3 ADJUSTMENTS OF PENSION AMOUNTS 
2.2.3.1 MINIMUM PENSION 
The minimum pension is introduced in 198067 for workers with a career of at least 45 years. 
Differentiated minimum pension amounts exist for one-earner households and for 
survivor pensions. In 198168, the career length requirement for the minimum pension 
decreases to 30 years of career of at least 208 days69 of FTE each. Minimum pension 
amounts are adjusted with the work intensity ratio70 and for inflation through the pivotal 
index mechanism.71   
Introduced in 200672, the part-time minimum pension system offers more flexible 
eligibility criteria: at least 30 years of at least 156 days of FTE each.73 If such conditions are 
met, then the individual is entitled to receive the part-time minimum pension amount 
multiplied by the work intensity ratio74 expressed in days. Table 2.3 summarizes the 
 
67 See Law of the 8th of August 1980 – Loi relative aux propositions budgétaires 1979-1980, M.B. 15 August 1980. 
There also exist a means tested social pension based on residency in Belgium (called the GRAPA) 
introduced in 1970. 
68 See the Law of the 10th of February 1981 - La loi de redressement relative aux pensions du secteur social du 
10.02.1981, M.B. 14 February 1981. 
69 208 is equal to two-thirds of a full time employment equivalent (312 days). 
70 The work intensity ratio is the number of career years (of at least 52 days of FTE) divided by a complete 
career (45 years in most cases). 
71 In 2020 (pivotal index 147.31), the minimum pension (for a complete career) is 15,500.27 euros at the 
isolated replacement rate, 19,369.22 euros at the household replacement rate and 15,293.11 euros for the 
survivor pension. 
72 See Royal decree of the 28th of September 2006 - Arrêté royal portant exécution des articles 33, 33bis, 34 et 34bis 
de la loi de redressement du 10.02.1981 relative aux pensions du secteur social, M.B. 6 October 2006.  
73 Special eligibility conditions for mixed careers allow the inclusion of years worked as self-employed in 
the required 30 years of career. 
74 The work intensity ratio in days is the sum of days worked (only for career years of at least 52 days of 




discretional increases in real values (index base 1988 or 1996) of the minimum pension 
amount for the old-age pension.  

















11th of December 2001 11,113.56 € 8,893.80 € 
14th of February 2003 11,535.12 € 9,231 € 
9th of April 2007 11,765.82 € 9,415.62 € 
12th of June 2008 12,001.14 € 9,603.93 € 
16th of February 2009 12,361.17 € 9,892.05 € 
6th of April 2011 12,608.39 10,089.89 
24th of June 2013 12,765.99 € 10,216.01 € 
3rd of April 2015 13,021.31 € 10,420.33 € 
21st of July 2017 13,151.52 € 10,524.53 € 
17th of May 2019 13,283.04 € 10,629.78 € 









2.2.3.2 PENSION PENALTY 
In 196775, a reduction of 5 percent of old-age pension benefits per year of anticipation 
before the statutory eligibility age is created. In 197676, an exception is created for 
individuals who retire at age 64 and can prove a career of 45 years as wage-earner. 
Additionally, and exception was also created for individuals who worked in harsh 
conditions, they could retire at age 64 without penalty.  In 198277, the 5 percent reduction 
is removed if the worker is laid off and the employer replaces the retiring worker with an 
unemployed worker. Between 197878 and 1982, individuals who receive unemployment 
or disability benefits can claim old-age pension benefits without penalty from age 60 
onwards for men and age 55 onwards for women. In 198779, no anticipation is allowed 
below age 60. In 199180, the pension penalty is eliminated. Hence, no penalty is currently 
applied for early retirement.  
 
75 See Royal decree of the 24th of October 1967– Arrêté royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des 
travailleurs salariés, M.B. 27 October 1967.  
76 See Law of the 27th of February 1976 - Loi modifiant l'arrêté royal n°50 du 24.10.1967 relatif à la pension de 
retraite et de survie des travailleurs salariés., M.B. 9 March 1976. 
77 See Royal decree of the 28th of September 1982 – Arrêté Royal relatif à la prépension de retraite des travailleurs 
salariés, M.B.  29 September 1982. 
78 See Law of the 22nd of December 1977 - Loi relative aux propositions budgétaires 1977-1978, M.B. 24 
December 1977. 
79 See the Royal Decree of the 16th of July 1986 - Arrêté royal n° 415 modifiant certaines dispositions en 
matière de pensions pour travailleurs salariés, M.B. 30 July 1986. 
80 See the Law of the 20st of July 1990 -  Loi instaurant un âge flexible de la retraite pour les travailleurs salariés et 
adaptant les pensions des travailleurs salariés à l'évolution du bien-être général, M.B. 15 August 1990. 
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2.2.3.3 PENSION BONUS 
The pension bonus is introduced in 200781 with the objective of encouraging older workers 
to stay on the labor force longer.82 In order to benefit from the pension bonus, the worker 
must continue working above age 62 or after 44 years of career. The pension bonus is also 
granted to beneficiaries of survivor pensions if the deceased spouse fulfils the eligibility 
conditions before his or her passing. The bonus is initially set at 2 euros83 per day of 
effective full-time work (outside of assimilated periods). It is adjusted to inflation through 
the pivotal index but it is not adjusted for average wage growth.  
Thanks to its lump-sum nature, the pension bonus serves as a redistribution mechanism. 
Indeed, the financial impact of the pension bonus on old-age pensions is relatively higher 
for low earners then for high earners.84 Figure 2.8 displays the percentage increase in old-
age pension benefits with pension bonus benefits (2007 rules) for different initial pension 
amounts.  Unsurprisingly, the impact of the pension bonus is largest for the lower initial 
pension amount and the effect of longer eligibility periods is heightened for lower old-
age pension amounts. 
 
 
81 See the Law of the 23rd of December 2005 - Loi relative au pacte de solidarité entre les générations, M.B. 30 
December 2005 and the Royal Decree of the 1st of February 2007 - Arrêté royal instituant un bonus de pension, 
M.B. 9 February 2007. 
82 In 2011, there were 47,894 men and 19,794 women who received pension bonus, or 20 percent and 10 
percent of total men and women pensioners aged between 62 and 68, respectively (Conseil Supérieur des 
Finances, 2012). The gross monthly average amount of the pension bonus was 116 euros for men and 91 for 
women. It was proven that the impact of the pension bonus on the labor force participation of the elderly 
was low in comparison to reforms that increased the career requirements for early retirement (Pension 
Reform Committee 2020-2040, 2014). 
83 In 2020, the pension bonus per day is set at 2.4868 euros (index 147.31). 
84 As an example, a pension of 1000 euros in 2007 would increase by 5.2 percent with 12 months of pension 
bonus and by 15.6 percent with 36 months of pension bonus. The maximum pension in 2007 (1769.38 
monthly euros) would increase by 3.5 percent with 12 months of pension bonus and 8.8 percent with 36 
months of pension bonus. 
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Figure 2.8: Impact of the pension bonus on old-age pension benefits– 2007 rules 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations and National Public Pension Office85  
Initially, the pension bonus was set up to be a temporary measure, which had to be 
evaluated by the Pension Reform Committee before the 1st of December 2012. In view of 
its limited effect on employment rates86 and to reduce the financial burden it caused, 
pension bonus rules were modified for new pensions in 2014. Starting in 201487, the 
pension bonus amount increases with the length of the reference period (see table 4). The 
reference period starts on the first day of the 12th month after the wage-earner becomes 
eligible for early retirement or after the worker has reached the age of 65 with at least 40 
years of career. Besides, under the new regulations, only days of effective work are 
considered; thus, no assimilated periods count for the eligibility to the pension bonus. 
Finally, the pension bonus becomes a personal pension entitlement and can no longer be 
 
85 See https://www.sfpd.fgov.be/fr/montant-de-la-pension/calcul/bonus-de-pension#salarie 
86 See (Pension Reform Committee 2020-2040, 2014) for the analysis of the impact of the pension bonus on 
the retirement behavior of older Belgian workers. 
87 See the Royal Decree of the 24th of October 2013 – Arrêté Royal portant exécution, en matière de bonus de 
pension des travailleurs salariés, de l'article 7bis de la loi du 23 décembre 2005 relative au pacte de solidarité entre les 
générations., MB 6 November 2013. 
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transferred to another person in the case of the survivor pension. Since 201588, the pension 
bonus is abolished for new pensioners. However, pensioners who can prove that they 
fulfilled the 2014 eligibility criteria for pension bonus before December 1, 2014 can still 
receive pension bonus benefits. Figure 2.9 displays the percentage increase in old-age 
pension benefits (2014 rules) with pension bonus benefits for different initial pension 
amounts.  As in figure 2.8, the effect of the pension bonus decreases as the pension amount 
increases. Moreover, we observe that its impact is lower on old-age pension compared to 
2007 rules. 
Table 2.4: Pension bonus benefits amounts – 2014 rules 
Amount of pension bonus 
per day of effective work  
(pivotal index 136.09, base 
1996) 
Reference period 
€ 1.5 First 12 months 
€ 1.7 From 13th to 24th month 
€ 1.9 From 25th to 36th month 
€ 2.1 From 37th to 48th month 
€ 2.3 From 49th to 60th month 
€ 2.5 From 61st month onwards 
Source : Moniteur Belge40 and the Royal Decree of the 24th of 
October 2013 - Arrêté royal portant exécution, en matière de bonus de 
pension des travailleurs salariés, de l'article 7bis de la loi du 23 décembre 










Figure 2.9: Impact of the pension bonus on old-age pension amounts– 2014 rules 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations and the National Public Pension Office85 
 
2.2.4 COMBINATION OF WORK AND OLD-AGE PENSION 
BENEFITS  
Receiving old-age pension benefits and continuing working is possible. However, partial 
old-age pension receipt while remaining on the labor market is not. Thus, the additional 
wage earned will not lead to an increase in pension benefits. 
The earnings threshold for work after retirement is introduced in 196789. From 201390 
onwards, the earnings threshold is eliminated for workers above the age of 64 with at 
 
89 See the Royal decree of the 24th of October 1967– Arrêté royal relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des 
travailleurs salariés, M.B. 27 October 1967.  
90 See the Royal Decree of the 28th of May 2013 - Arrêté royal modifiant diverses dispositions réglementaires 
relatives au cumul d’une pension dans le régime des travailleurs salariés avec des revenus professionnels ou des 
prestations sociales, M.B. 20 June 2013. 
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least 42 years of career91. From 201592 onwards, the earnings threshold is removed for 
individuals above the age of 64 or for individuals with more than 44 years of career91. If 
the earnings exceed the threshold by less than 100 percent of the threshold, then pension 
benefits are reduced by similar percentage points. If the earnings exceed the threshold by 
more than 100 percent of the threshold, then the pension is suspended.93  
2.3 CONVENTIONAL EARLY RETIREMENT94 
The conventional early retirement program95 is introduced in 197496 with the aim of 
facilitating the restructuration of the industrial sector and the replacement of older 
workers with younger and unemployed workers. In 197597, conventional early retirees are 
granted a special unemployed status upon which they are entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits. Next to the standard conventional early retirement regime, 
numerous sector-specific or job-specific conventional early retirement regimes exist, 
whose specific rules are established through sector-specific collective bargaining 
agreements. These regimes deviate sometimes quite substantially from the standard 
regime – most notably in terms of generally looser career and claiming age conditions, 
 
91 Each year of career must be constituted of at least 104 days of FTE. 
92 See Royal decree of the 20st of January 2015 - Arrêté royal modifiant l'article 64 de l'arrêté royal du 21 décembre 
1967 portant règlement général du régime de pension de retraite et de survie des travailleurs salariés, M.B. 21 January 
2015. 
93 See the appendix for a list of the earnings test for the year 2020 (pivotal index 147.31). 
94
 Sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.7 essentially correspond to a more in-depth analysis of the programs 
presented in Fraikin, Jousten and Lefebvre (2020). 
95 Another early retirement programs co-existed with the conventional early retirement scheme, the legal 
early retirement. Contrary to the conventional early retirement, the worker had the legal right to benefit 
from this program and the supplement to unemployment benefits was paid by the State instead of the 
company. Because of its generous nature, the program quickly became too expensive and was 
discontinued in 1982.   
96 See the Collective Labor Agreement 17 of the 19th of December 1974, implemented by the Royal Decree 
of the 16th of January 1975 - Arrêté royal rendant obligatoire la convention collective de travail n° 17, M.B. 31 
January 1975. 
97 See the Royal Decree of the 19th of February 1975 – Arrêté Royal concernant le droit des travailleurs âgés aux 
allocations de chômage, M.B. 21 March 1975. 
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with an eligibility age as low as 50 in some cases.  Moreover, special rules prevail for 
workers in companies in distress, working in dangerous professions or with long careers. 
This broadening of eligibility rules led to the creation of a large pool of early retirees who 
benefitted from a generous replacement income, for sometimes more than 10 years, which 
was financially unsustainable in the long run (Gieselink, Stevens and Van Buggenhout, 
2002). In the early eighties, it became clear that the program had become too expensive 
following its growing success and did not lead to the expected result of diminishing the 
unemployment rates of younger workers. Consequently, the government initiated a wave 
of reforms that tightened the eligibility criteria of the program (detailed in the section 
below). 
From 198698 until 2011, employers were required to replace a conventional early retiree 
below age 6099 by a new worker hired off the unemployment insurance rolls. However, 
the one-for-one worker substitution rules contained many exceptions, also contributing 
to a substantially lower aggregate replacement effect at the macro level. In 2011, the 
minimum duration of the replacement obligation is set at 36 months. In 2015107, the age 
criteria of 60 is replaced by 62.   
Until 2015, conventional early retirement beneficiaries were fully exempted from job 
search and did not have to be available for the labor market. Since 2015, a new notion of 
“adapted availability” has been introduced in the applicable rules, essentially making 
numerous early retirees subject to an availability condition up until the statutory 
 
98 See Royal Decree of the 30st of August 1985 – Arrêté Royal portant nouvelle réglementation de l’octroi 
d’allocations de chômage en cas de prépension conventionnelle, M.B. 7 December 1985. 
99 No replacement obligation exists for early retirees aged more than 60. 
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eligibility age – though it remains less stringent than for regular unemployment 
benefits.100  
2.3.1 BENEFIT CALCULATION RULES 
Upon satisfying lay-off, career and claiming age conditions, conventional early retirees 
are entitled to a two-tiered early retirement benefit: an unemployment insurance benefit 
combined with a company supplement paid by the former employer. Conventional early 
retirement benefits are payable until reaching the old-age pension statutory retirement 
age – upon which beneficiaries are automatically rolled over into the old-age pension 
system. The unemployment insurance part of the benefit consists of a slightly more 
generous version of the standard unemployment insurance benefit– with the most 
noticeable deviation being a lack of a degressive function for benefit duration and a more 
favorable treatment for individuals not living alone. The company supplement 
corresponds to half the difference between the last net wage and the unemployment 
benefit. 
Until 2011, conventional early retirement benefits were included in the pension 
calculation at the same rate as the last wage received. Starting from 2012101, the 
conventional early retirement benefits that are credited the old-age pension benefits 
calculation are limited to the legal minimum wage amount for individuals below the age 
of 58 (except in the case of companies with financial constraints or in restructuration). 
 
100 More recently in 2015, the name of the scheme has been adapted to unemployment scheme with 
company supplement – mirroring this conceptual shift. 
101 See Royal decree of the 27th of February 2013 -  Arrêté royal portant exécution de l'article 122 de la loi du 28 
décembre 2011 portant des dispositions diverses et modifiant diverses dispositions en matière de périodes assimilées, 
M.B. 8 March 2013.  
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2.3.2 ELIGIBILITY AGES AND CAREER REQUIREMENTS 
The eligibility age of the conventional early retirement scheme, which is generally lower 
than the early eligibility age of the old-age pension scheme, has undergone substantial 
reforms. The conventional early retirement scheme was initially designed to give workers 
the opportunity to retire 5 years before the statutory eligibility age of the old-age pension 
system (60 for men and 55 for women). Several collective bargaining agreements rapidly 
lowered the effectively applicable eligibility ages and other eligibility conditions. As a 
result, the Belgian reality in the area of conventional early retirement has been 
characterized from the early days by the coexistence of regimes with different career 
requirements, minimum ages, etc. Though legislation in the early 1980’s tried to 
harmonize and put constraints, numerous exceptions persist with respect to the general 
rules.  
In response to the success of the program and thus the growing proportion of older 
workers retiring through the conventional early retirement scheme, the eligibility criteria 
were tightened over the years. In 1984102, the eligibility age for the conventional early 
retirement is set at 55. In 1986103, the eligibility age increases to 57 and career length 
requirements are introduced: at least 5 years in the same company, 10 years in the same 
industry and 20 years of career as a wage earner. In 1987104, the eligibility age increases to 
58. In 1990105, career length requirements are increased to 38 years for workers aged 55, 25 
years of career for workers aged 56 to 59 and 20 years for workers aged more than 59. 
 
102 See Royal Decree of the 18th of July 1983  
103 See Royal Decree of the 20st of August 1986 – Arrêté royal relative à l’octroi d’allocations de chômage en cas de 
prépension conventionnelle, M.B. 10 September 1986. 
104 See Royal Decree of the 22nd of October 1987 – Arrêté Royal portant modification de l’A.R. du 20 août 1986 
relatif à l’ctroi d’allocations de chômage en cas de prépension conventionnelle, M.B. 17 November 1987. 
105 See Royal Decree of the 16th of November 1990 – Arrêté Royal relative à l’octroi d’allocations de chômage en 
cas de prépension conventionnelle, M.B. 23 November 1990. 
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Moreover, assimilated periods can now be included in the eligibility criteria of the 
conventional early retirement scheme. In 2008106, the minimum age increases to 60 with at 
least 30 years of career for men and 26 for women. However, the Collective Bargaining 
Agreements that were in place since 1986 allowed access before 60 and remained valid 
until (at most) 2014. Therefore, the conventional early retirement program remained 
accessible in some industries at age 58 with a career of at least 35 (30) years for men 
(women), at age 56 with a career of at least 40 years (until 2011) or age 57 with a career of 
at least 40 years (until 2014). Starting from 2007106, the career length requirements have 
gradually increased over the years. At age 58, the career length requirements for men 
increased to 37 in 2010, 38 in 2012 and 40 in 2015. The career requirement for women aged 
58 increased to 33 in 2010, 35 in 2012, 38 in 2014, 39 in 2016 and 40 in 2017. At age 60, the 
career length requirement for men increased to 35 in 2012, 36 in 2013, 37 in 2014 and 40 in 
2015. The career requirement for women aged 60 increased to 28 in 2012, 31 in 2015, 32 in 
2016, 33 in 2017, 34 in 2018, 35 in 2019, 36 in 2020, 37 in 2021, 38 in 2022, 39 in 2023 and 40 
in 2024.  Therefore, by 2024 the gender disparity in eligibility criteria will have 
disappeared. Finally, in 2015107, the minimum age is raised from 60 to 62 but the program 
remains accessible at age 58 (until 2017) or age 59 with a career of at least 40 years. Figure 





106 See Royal Decree of the 3rd of May 2007 – Arrêté Royal fixant la prépension conventionnelle dans le cadre du 
Pacte de Solidarité entre les générations, M.B. 8 June 2007. 
107 See Royal Decree of the 23rd of April 2013 - Arrêté royal modifiant l'arrêté royal du 3 mai 2007 fixant le 
régime de chômage avec complément d'entreprise, M.B. 2 October 2013. 
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Figure 2.10: Historical evolution of career length requirement for the standard 
conventional early retirement scheme – by eligibility ages and gender 
    
 






2.4 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Next to the old-age pension scheme and the conventional early retirement, the 
unemployment insurance system is an important pathway to retirement. Unemployment 
benefits are available to laid-off workers (for reasons other than serious misconduct) of 
all ages under the condition of having paid contributions during at least 12 months in 
employment or having been in assimilated status (sickness, etc.) in the last 18 months. 
Under the regular system, individuals must be available for the job market and actively 
look for employment.  
The amount of unemployment benefits is based on the last gross wage108, the family 
situation, the number of contribution years and the duration of the unemployment spell. 
At the beginning of the unemployment spell, the benefits generally represent 60 percent 
of the last gross wage for unemployed with family dependents, 55 percent for single 
unemployed and 40 percent for individuals that are sharing their household with others 
(effective cohabitation). Unemployment benefits are subject to a degressive mechanism 
whereby as the unemployment duration increases, they are essentially bringing them 
down to a flat rate amount irrespectively of prior earnings. There are minimum and 
maximum unemployment benefits that also vary by household status and also decrease 
for long unemployment duration. Benefits are not time-limited and can in principle be 
payable until reaching the old-age pension statutory eligibility age – upon which 
beneficiaries are automatically rolled over into the old-age pension system109.  
 
108 The notion of last gross wage differs from the one used in the old-age pension scheme: it is the last gross 
wage received during the individual’s last continuous employment of at least 4 weeks, subject to a set of 
floor and ceilings. 




Until 2011, periods spent in the unemployment insurance scheme were credited in the 
old-age pension calculation at the rate of the last wage received for their full duration. 
Since 2012110, the credited amount of unemployment benefits that enters the pension 
benefits calculation is limited to the minimum annual credit starting from the ‘3rd period’ 
of unemployment (between 12 and 36 months).111  
2.4.1 OLD-AGE UNEMPLOYMENT  
The old age unemployment program is introduced in 1984112 with the objective of 
providing a stable and decent income to older unemployed workers who are highly 
unlikely to find a job and are thus likely to remain unemployed for an abnormally long 
period (Gieselink, Stevens and Van Buggenhout, 2002). The scheme includes a waiver of 
job search and a seniority supplement. 
2.4.1.1 WAIVER OF JOB SEARCH 
The waiver of job search is available for workers above the age of 55 or 50 for workers 
who can prove a permanent work incapacity. In 1995113, the permanent incapacity 
requirement is dropped for workers aged 50 to 55 and the waiver of job search becomes 
available for everyone above age 50. Following this reform, the number of beneficiaries 
of the old-age unemployment scheme skyrocketed and even exceeded the number of 
beneficiaries of the conventional early retirement scheme (Gieselink, Stevens and Van 
 
110 See Royal decree of the 27th of February 2013 -  Arrêté royal portant exécution de l'article 122 de la loi du 28 
décembre 2011 portant des dispositions diverses et modifiant diverses dispositions en matière de périodes assimilées, 
M.B. 8 March 2013. 
111 The 3rd period of unemployment benefits starts after [(12 + 2 + (2 x years employed)] months spent on 
unemployment benefits and corresponds to the start of lump sum unemployment benefits. 
112 See Royal Decree of the 29th of December 1984 - Arrêté royal relatif à l'emploi et au chômage, M.B. 18 
January 1985. 
113 See the Royal Decree of the 22nd of November 1995 – Arrêté Royal modifiant l’arrêté royal du 25 novembre 
1911 portant réglementation du chômage dans le cadre du plan pluriannuel pour l’emploi, M.B. 8 December 1995. 
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Buggenhout, 2002). Indeed, an increasing number of companies made use of the old-age 
unemployment scheme to lay off their older workers to decrease their operating costs, a 
practice labelled ‘Canada Dry early retirement’. Several factors are at the root of this 
practice: the relatively flexible eligibility conditions of the old-age unemployment 
program, the absence of an obligation to replace the laid off worker with an unemployed 
worker and lower social contributions. In order to decrease the use of the Canada Dry 
early retirement mechanism, the minimum age for the waiver of job search is raised to 58 
in 2004114 and to 60 in 2013115. The waiver of job search remains accessible below age 60 
for workers with a career of at least 38 years. 
2.4.1.2 SENIORITY SUPPLEMENT 
The seniority supplement is introduced in 1989116. It is granted to workers aged more than 
50 starting from their second year of unemployment if they have a wage earner career of 
at least 20 years. The supplement was introduced to replace the adaptation complement, 
paid to unemployed workers during their first year of unemployment (Gieselink, Stevens 
and Van Buggenhout, 2002). The amount of the seniority supplement is adjusted for 
inflation with the pivotal index and is differentiated between individuals according to age 
and household status (legal cohabitants with dependent family, isolated or legal 
cohabitants without family dependent).117 Seniority supplements are subject to a set of 
 
114 See Royal Decree of the 27th of May 2002 – Arrêté Royal modifiant l’arrêté Royal du 25 novembre 1991 
portant réglementation du chômage dans le cadre de l’augmentation du taux d’emploi des travailleurs âgés, M.B. 11 
June 2002.  
115 See Royal Decree of the 10th of November 2012 - Arrêté royal modifiant les articles 59bis et 89 de l' arrêté 
royal du 25 novembre 1991 portant réglementation du chômage et modifiant l'article 10 de l' arrêté royal du 4 juillet 
2004 portant modification de la réglementation du chômage à l'égard des chômeurs complets qui doivent rechercher 
activement un emploi,  M.B. 22 November 2012. 
116 See the Royal Decree of the 13th of January 1989 – Arrêté Royal relative à l’octroi d’un complement 
d’ancienneté aux chômeurs âgés, M.B. 19 January 1989. 
117 The seniority supplement for legal cohabitants with dependent family is a daily lump-sum of 3.54 euros 
(pivotal index 147.31), the supplement for isolated individuals is equal to 5 percent of the daily limited 
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floor and ceilings.118 At present, no seniority supplement subsists:  the minimum age was 
raised to 55 in 2013115 before being completely dropped in 2015.119 
2.5 DISABILITY INSURANCE 
The Disability Insurance (DI) system is the main program targeted at people withdrawing 
from the labor market for health-related reasons – though it has become an increasingly 
relevant early retirement route considering ever-tighter eligibility and benefit criteria for 
the conventional early retirement and unemployment systems (Jousten, Lefebvre and 
Perelman, 2011). The disability insurance provides disabled workers with a replacement 
income if they show evidence of a minimum of 66 percent loss of their earning capacity 
for at least 12 consecutive months. During the first 12 months of work incapacity, disabled 
workers are eligible for sickness benefits payable by the employer and the sick pay 
insurance. Both the sickness and the disability benefits enter the old-age pension formula 
at the same rate as the last gross wage received before the start of the incapacity period. 
Sickness benefits take the form of a 60 percent replacement rate of the last gross wage 
received.122 Starting from the seventh month sickness, the household situation120 and the 
 
wage and the supplement for legal cohabitants without family dependent is equal to 10 percent of the 
daily limited wage before age 58 and 15 percent after age 57. 
118 In 2020 (pivotal index 147.31), the minimum daily amount of unemployment benefits and the seniority 
supplement is 54.1 in the case of dependent family, 48.52 for isolated individuals, 39.42 for legal 
cohabitants without family dependent and below age 58 and 43.3 for legal cohabitants without family 
dependent above age 57. The corresponding maximum daily amount is 60.43, 55.37, 46.14 and 50.75, 
respectively. 
119 See Royal Decree of the 1st of June 2015 - Arrêté royal modifiant l'article 89 de l'arrêté royal du 25 novembre 
1991 portant réglementation du chômage et insérant un article 89/1 dans le même arrêté royal, M.B. 10 June 2015. 
120 The definition of dependent differs from the definition of one-earner households in the old-age pension 





status of regular worker determines the guaranteed minimum sickness benefits.121 The 
disability benefits are calculated as 55 percent of the worker’s last gross income.122 The 
replacement rate of the disability benefits increases to 65 percent if the individual is legally 
cohabitating with a partner and has dependent family-members120 and decreases to 40 
percent for singles and legally cohabitating individuals without family dependent. Both 
sickness and disability benefits are subject to a set of floors and ceilings.123  
To be eligible for the benefit, the worker must meet a series of conditions. First, there is a 
condition in terms of the loss of earnings capacity in the usual job. In order to be eligible, 
the worker must suffer from a loss of earnings capacity of 66 percent over a period of at 
least twelve months. After first benefit entitlement, continued eligibility is periodically 
validated using medical and administrative controls. Second, workers also must satisfy 
minimum contributory requirements to qualify for benefits. The coverage under the 
system prior to the onset of the disability must be assured for at least two quarters, 
combined with at least 120 days of actual or assimilated work (or 400 hours for -part-time 
workers) before the covered event occurs. 
As for the unemployment and conventional early retirement systems, disability benefits 
are payable up to the statutory eligibility age. Contrary to other social insurance 
 
121 In 2020 (pivotal index 147.31), the daily minimum sickness pay is 62.08 for a regular worker with a 
dependent spouse or a dependent child, 49.68 for a regular worker who is isolated, 42.6 for a legally 
cohabitating regular worker, 49.84 for an irregular worker with dependents and 36.88 for an irregular 
worker without dependent. The benefits are paid on the basis of a 6-days week. (see ‘Montant minimal de 
votre indemnité à partir du 7e mois d’incapacité de travail’, 
https://www.inami.fgov.be/fr/themes/incapacite-travail/montants/salaries-chomeurs/Pages/indemnite-7e-
mois-min-salarie.aspx).  
122 The last gross wage taken into account in the sickness and disability benefits calculation is the gross wage 
of the last day of the second quarter of the year before the inactivity period.  
123 See the appendix for a list of ceilings for sickness or disability benefits. 
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replacement income programs, periods of benefit receipt continue to fully count toward 
the build-up of pension rights at the value of the last observed wage to this date. 
No major reforms have affected the disability benefits calculation scheme over the last 
decades.  
2.6 TIME CREDIT 
The old-age time credit scheme is created in 2002124 for workers aged 50 and over125 and 
allows for part time work and the receipt of a partial replacement income paid by the 
unemployment insurance system. Two types of time credit plans exist: one that allows for 
a work interruption of one-half of total work time and the other that allows for a work 
interruption of one-fifth of total work time. While the latter is rather generally accessible 
as of age 55, the former requires additional eligibility conditions including a minimum 
total number of career years. The time credit benefit consists in a lump-sum amount that 
varies according to type of work interruption (one half or one-fifth), and the household 
situation (isolated or legal cohabitants, with or without dependent children).126 
In view of its growing success, the eligibility criteria of the time credit program were 
tightened over the years. In 2012127, the minimum eligibility age increases to 55 with at 
least 25 years of career (assimilated periods included) and 24 continued months working 
 
124 See Royal Decree of the 12th of December 2001 - Arrêté royal pris en exécution du chapitre IV de la loi du 10 
août 2001 relative à la conciliation entre l'emploi et la qualité de vie concernant le système du crédit-temps, la 
diminution de carrière et la réduction des prestations de travail à mi-temps, M.B. 18 December 2001. 
125 Derogatory eligibility conditions exist for workers in companies in distress, dangerous professions or 
with long careers. 
126 See the appendix for the historical evolution of time credit benefits. 
127 See Royal Decree of the 28th of December 2011 – Arrêté Royal modifiant l’arrêté royal du 12 décembre 2001 
pris en exécution du chapitre IV de la loi du 10 août 2001 relative à la conciliation entre l’emploi et la qualité de vie 
concernant le système du crédit-temps, la diminution de carrière et la réduction des prestations de travail à mi-
temps, M.B. 30 December 2011. 
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for the same employer. The minimum age for the receipt of the allowance gradually 
increased from 55 to 60128 from 2016 to 2019.129 However, it is still possible to benefit from 
time credit benefits at age 57 in the case of one-half work interruption and at age 55 for 
one-fifth work interruption if the worker has at least 35 years of career. Since 2003130, 
periods spent receiving time credit benefits are included in the pension benefit calculation 
as assimilated periods. Starting from 2012131, only one year spent in the time credit 
program can be included as an assimilated period in the old-age pension benefits 
calculation. 
2.7 INCOME TAXES AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
In Belgium, both the earnings and social security benefits are subject to income taxes and 
mandatory social contributions. Employer social contributions amount to 24.92 percent of 
the gross wage. Personal/employee social contributions include a 13.07 percent employee 
contribution on wage income, a 3.5 percent contribution on disability benefits and a 6.5 
percent contribution on conventional early retirement and unemployment benefits. While 
 
128 It is still possible to benefit from time credit benefits if there exist special rules in a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement within the sector (age 55 for one-fifth work reduction or age 57 for one-half work 
reduction). 
129 See Royal Decree of the 30st of December 2014 - Arrêté royal modifiant l'arrêté royal du 12 décembre 2001 
pris en exécution du chapitre IV de la loi du 10 août 2001 relative à la conciliation entre l'emploi et la qualité de vie 
concernant le système du crédit-temps, la diminution de carrière et la réduction des prestations de travail à mi-
temps, M.B. 31 December 2014. 
130 See Royal Decree of the 21st of January 2003 - Arrêté royal modifiant l'arrêté royal n° 50 du 24 octobre 1967 
relatif à la pension de retraite et de survie des travailleurs salariés, et l'arrêté royal du 21 décembre 1967 portant 
règlement général du régime de pension de retraite et de survie des travailleurs salariés, M.B. 3 February 2003. 
131
 See Royal decree of the 27th of February 2013 -  Arrêté royal portant exécution de l'article 122 de la loi du 28 
décembre 2011 portant des dispositions diverses et modifiant diverses dispositions en matière de périodes assimilées, 
M.B. 8 March 2013. 
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social security benefits are all capped by means of program-specific ceilings, no 
contribution ceilings are applicable. 
The Belgian personal income tax (PIT) applies to wage, old-age pension and other 
replacement income. The PIT liability is calculated using a strongly progressive rate 
structure with marginal tax rates from 0 to 50 percent from 2003 onwards. Before 2003, 
the tax rates were modified substantially over the years and could go as high as 70.8 
percent in 1988. Tax exempted income amounts vary according to the marital status and 
the number of dependent children of the taxpayer.  
There exist two types of tax deductions for social security benefits: a first one that is linked 
to the household situation and a second one that cancels the tax if the social security 
benefits is below a certain threshold.132 The combination of these deductions leads to an 
important fiscal exoneration for social security benefits.  
The first type of tax deduction is a set of ad hoc tax deductions for the various categories 
of replacement income. These deductions are effectively granting these types of income a 
preferential treatment as compared to wages and other types of income and are effectively 
excluding a substantial share of these benefits from taxation. The deduction amount is 
similar for the old-age pension system and unemployment but differs for the conventional 
early retirement scheme and disability benefits system. At first higher, the tax deduction 
for conventional early retirement benefits decreased in 1999 to equal the level of the 
deduction for the old-age pension system and unemployment insurance scheme. Since 
then, the deduction for the disability benefits is the highest (see figure 2.11). The 
differentiated deduction amount for one-earner households is abolished in 2004 for the 
 
132 See the appendix for a list of the tax deductions for replacement income. 
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old-age pension and disability insurance schemes, in 2005 for the conventional early 
retirement scheme and in 2009 for the old-age unemployment scheme.  
The second tax deduction reduces the total tax amounts to zero if a person’s income is 
exclusively composed of old-age pension or other replacement benefits below a given 
threshold, which has been increasing steadily over the years (see figure 2.12). The income 
thresholds for the second tax deduction are similar for old-age pension and conventional 
early retirement benefits (and unemployment benefits until 1988). The income threshold 
for unemployment benefits increased to the level of the threshold for disability benefits 
in 1989. Today, the income thresholds for the second social security tax deduction are the 
highest for disability and unemployment benefits.  





Source: National Finance Office, 1989 – 2019 
Figure 2.12: Evolution of the second deduction for replacement income 
 
Source: National Finance Office, 1989 – 2019 
Additional contributions exist for the old-age pension scheme. The solidarity 
contribution essentially taxes beneficiaries of higher pensions and varies between 0 to 2 
percent of the gross old-age pension amount of the first and the second pillar (see table 
2.5) and vary according to the household situation. The Health and Disability contribution 
is introduced in 1994133. It amounts to 3.55 percent of the gross old-age pension amount, 
 
133 See Law of the 30st of March 1994 - Loi portant des dispositions sociales, M.B. 31 March 1994. 
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vary according to whether the pensioner has dependent children and is only applicable 
for pensions that are above a certain threshold (see table 2.6).  
Table 2.5: Solidarity contribution rate (2020 rules) 








amount (2020 euros) 
    
0.01 and 2646.32 € 0 0.01 and 3059.47 € 0 
2646.33 and 
2728.15 € 
(A − 2646.32) × 0.5 3059.48 and 
3154.07 € 
(A − 3154.07) × 0.5 
2728.16 and 
2931.02 € 
A × 0.015 3154.08 and 
3353.03 € 
A × 0.015 
2931.03 and 
2961.55 € 
(A − 2931.02) × 0.5+ 43.97 3353.04 and 3387.95 € (A − 3353.04 ) × 0.5+ 50.3 
Superior to 
2961.55 € 
A × 0.012 Superior to 
3387.95 € 
A × 0.02 
    
Note: x = gross old-age pension benefits amount 
Source: National Pension Office at www.sfpd.fgov.be 
Table 2.6: Health and Disability contribution rate (2020 rules) 











    
Inferior to 1560.97 € 0 Inferior to 1849.97 € 0 
1560.97 and 1618.4 € (A − 1560.97 ) 1849.97 and 1918.04 € (A − 1849.97  ) 
Superior to 1618.4 € A × 0.0355 Superior to 1918.04€ A × 0.0355 
    
Note: x = gross old-age pension benefits amount 





This chapter presents a thorough review of the existing social security regulations and 
their evolution over the eighties until today. In particular, we describe the evolution of 
the benefit calculation parameters and eligibility rules of the four main labor force exit 
pathways for older Belgian workers: the old-age pension, the conventional early 
retirement, the unemployment insurance and the disability insurance. Additionally, we 
take a close look at the time credit scheme for older workers. 
We demonstrate the convolution of the Belgian social security system and the high 
potential for intertwined effects of its eligibility and calculation rules between different 
programs. Such complexity creates an opaque and incoherent system that makes it 
increasingly challenging for citizens and policy makers to gain an understanding of how 
benefits are calculated.  It is clear that complex social security rules are inevitable in 
today’s society as they reflect the historical evolution the Belgian labor market regulation 
and organization and serve to capture the specificities of different types of workers. 
However, the lack of cautious ex-ante and ex-post analysis of social security reforms 
creates an environment in which the intertwined effects between various social security 
programs are not fully understood, which might sometimes lead to reforms working in 
opposite directions. 
This work is relevant for policy makers and researchers alike.  On the one hand, it is 
crucial that decision makers have a good understanding of the current social security 
system in order to pave the way for the necessary sustainability reforms that lie ahead. 
On the other hand, even the tiniest detail in pension benefits calculation may well have a 
significant role to play in the computation of financial retirement incentives in the analysis 
of retirement behavior. Simplifying the calculation of old-age pension benefits might lead 
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to misleading theoretical benefits, and thus erroneous financial incentives measures and 
misinforming conclusions. Such a detailed review of the regulation of social security 
programs that are relevant for the analysis of the retirement decision is still missing up-
to-date, although some studies exist for some programs separately.  Further research on 
the potential intertwined effects of the various reforms presented in this chapter and their 
implications for the retirement behavior would be highly valuable and beneficial from a 
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2.A.1 EVOLUTION OF LUMP-SUM WAGES  
Every wage earner 
before 1955 (except coal 
miners) Annual amount 
White-collar workers from 1955 to 1957  
Daily amount for each day of work of (> 4 
hours) 
15104.97 € 
1955 4.9517 € 
1956 5.2747 € 
1957 5.6376 € 
 
 
Note: These amounts are expressed at the index 147.31 (1st of March 2020). Specific lump-sum 
wages exist for coal miners, flying staff, seasonal and workers who cross the borders to go to 
work. Details on these specific flat-rates wages can be found on the website of the National 













2.A.2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ASSIMILATED WAGE FOR PERIODS 








1955 3.7494 4.9517 
1956 3.9941 5.2747 
1957 4.2687 5.6376 
1598 4.4794 4.4794 
1959 4.6978 4.6978 
1960 4.8815 4.8815 
1961 5.1076 5.1076 
1962 5.3657 5.3657 
1963 5.6782 5.6782 
1964 6.1279 6.1279 
1965 6.6066 6.6066 
1966 7.1302 7.1302 
1967 7.5974 7.5974 
 
Note: These amounts are expressed at the index 147.31 (1st of March 2020). Specific lump-sum 
wages exist for assimilated periods of flying staff, coal miners, seasonal and cross border workers. 










2.A.3 VALORISATION COEFFICIENTS FOR A PERSON RETIRING IN 2020 







1968 5.373152 1994 1.521279 
1969 5.179091 1995 1.497951 
1970 4.984738 1996 1.473572 
1971 4.777162 1997 1.454396 
1972 4.530205 1998 1.43612 
1973 4.235628 1999 1.422694 
1974 3.758936 2000 1.396436 
1975 3.333413 2001 1.359149 
1976 3.053588 2002 1.335346 
1977 2.851011 2003 1.31622 
1978 2.729096 2004 1.295135 
1979 2.612206 2005 1.267641 
1980 2.449358 2006 1.245603 
1981 2.275798 2007 1.223973 
1982 2.093128 2008 1.174374 
1983 1.944172 2009 1.167487 
1984 1.864744 2010 1.148294 
1985 1.813752 2011 1.114204 
1986 1.790545 2012 1.085444 
1987 1.798437 2013 1.072141 
1988 1.777797 2014 1.067858 
1989 1.724215 2015 1.078333 
1990 1.666742 2016 1.05623 
1991 1.614887 2017 1.037086 
1992 1.576587 2018 1.019101 
1993 1.534303 2019 1.004379 


















01.01.1980 219.50 1.00 01.09.2000 430.37 2.00 
01.03.1980 223.89 1.02 01.06.2001 438.98 2.04 
01.07.1980 228.37 1.04 01.01.2002 107.3* 2.08 
01.11.1980 232.94 1.06 01.02.2002 109.45* 2.12 
01.01.1981 237.60 1.08 01.06.2003 111.64* 2.16 
01.04.1981 242.35 1.10 01.10.2004 113.87* 2.21 
01.09.1981 247.20 1.13 01.08.2005 116.15* 2.25 
01.11.1981 252.14 1.15 01.10.2006 118.47* 2.30 
01.02.1982 257.18 1.17 01.09.2007 118.47* 2.34 
01.05.1982 262.32 1.20 01.01.2008 120.84* 2.39 
01.08.1982 267.57 1.22 01.05.2008 123.26* 2.44 
01.10.1982 272.92 1.24 01.07.2008 123.26* 2.49 
01.12.1982 278.38 1.27 01.09.2008 125.73* 2.54 
01.04.1983 283.95 1.29 01.06.2009 125.73* 2.59 
01.09.1983 289.63 1.32 01.09.2010 128.24* 2.64 
01.01.1984 295.42 1.35 01.05.2011 130.8* 2.69 
01.05.1984 301.33 1.37 01.02.2012 133.42* 2.75 
01.08.1984 307.36 1.40 01.12.2012 136.09* 2.80 
01.01.1985 313.51 1.43 01.06.2016 138.81* 2.86 
01.06.1985 319.78 1.46 01.06.2017 141.59* 2.91 
01.10.1985 326.18 1.49    
01.06.1987 332.70 1.52    
01.11.1988 339.35 1.55    
01.08.1989 346.14 1.58    
01.02.1990 353.06 1.61    
01.11.1990 360.12 1.64    
01.03.1991 367.32 1.67    
01.12.1991 374.67 1.71    
01.11.1992 382.16 1.74    
01.07.1993 389.80 1.78    
01.12.1994 397.60 1.81    
01.07.1995 397.60 1.85    
01.05.1996 405.55 1.88    
01.10.1997 413.66 1.92    
01.06.1999 421.93 1.96    
Source: National Pension Office and Service paiements traitements du secteur public135   
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 * = Base 1996 



















1955 2.029 2.021 2.013 2.005 1.997 1.989 1.982 1.974 1.966 1.000 
1956 1.958 1.951 1.943 1.935 1.928 1.920 1.913 1.905 1.898 1.000 
1957 1.890 1.883 1.875 1.868 1.861 1.854 1.846 1.839 1.832 1.000 
1958 1.824 1.817 1.810 1.803 1.796 1.789 1.782 1.775 1.768 1.000 
1959 1.761 1.754 1.747 1.741 1.734 1.727 1.720 1.713 1.707 1.000 
1960 1.700 1.693 1.687 1.680 1.674 1.667 1.660 1.654 1.647 1.000 
1961 1.641 1.634 1.628 1.622 1.615 1.609 1.603 1.596 1.590 1.000 
1962 1.584 1.578 1.571 1.565 1.559 1.553 1.547 1.541 1.535 1.000 
1963 1.529 1.523 1.517 1.511 1.505 1.499 1.493 1.487 1.481 1.000 
1964 1.476 1.470 1.464 1.458 1.453 1.447 1.441 1.436 1.430 1.000 
1965 1.424 1.419 1.413 1.408 1.402 1.397 1.391 1.386 1.380 1.000 
1966 1.375 1.369 1.364 1.359 1.354 1.348 1.343 1.338 1.332 1.000 
1967 1.327 1.322 1.317 1.312 1.307 1.301 1.296 1.291 1.286 1.000 
1968 1.281 1.276 1.271 1.266 1.261 1.256 1.251 1.246 1.241 1.000 
1969 1.236 1.232 1.227 1.222 1.217 1.213 1.208 1.203 1.198 1.000 
1970 1.193 1.189 1.184 1.180 1.175 1.170 1.166 1.161 1.157 1.000 
1971 1.152 1.148 1.143 1.139 1.134 1.130 1.125 1.121 1.116 1.000 
1972 1.112 1.108 1.103 1.099 1.095 1.090 1.086 1.082 1.078 1.000 
1973 1.073 1.069 1.065 1.061 1.057 1.053 1.048 1.044 1.040 1.000 
1974 1.036 1.032 1.028 1.024 1.02 1.016 1.012 1.008 1.004 1.000 
1975 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 

















1958 2379.76* 2617.76* 1991 30954.94 
1959 2379.76* 2617.76* 1992 31707.02 
1960 2469.01* 2715.92* 1993 32580.35 
1961 2498.76* 2748.64* 1994 32859.53 
1962 2528.52* 2781.36* 1995 33371.67 
1963 2558.28* 2814.08* 1996 33923.29 
1964 2651.22* 2916.34* 1997 34371.26 
1965 2777.66* 3055.42* 1998 34808.09 
1966 2885.49* 3174.04* 1999 36155.2 
1967 2963.58* 3259.92* 2000 36835.37 
1968 4008.44* 4409.28* 2001 38678.5 
1969 4714.93* 5186.42* 2002 39367.7 
1970 5071.91* 5579.09* 2003 40898.3 
1971 5270.82* 5797.93* 2004 41564.11 
1972 5572.03* 6129.27* 2005 43314.93 
1973 7793.77*  2006 44081.27 
1974 9645.53*  2007 44994.88 
1975 11623.72*  2008 46895.18 
1976 13347.2*  2009 47171.84 
1977 14300.96*  2010 47960.29 
1978 14955.41*  2011 49773.66 
1979 15632.16*  2012 51092.44 
1980 16595.23  2013 52760.95 
1981 20697.62  2014 52972.54 
1982 22503.5  2015 53528.57 
1983 24228.12  2016 54648.7 
1984 25765.9  2017 55657.47 
1985 27020.1  2018 57602.62 
1986 27370.25  2019 58446.94 
1987 27795.38    
1988 28118.69    
1989 28992.19    
1990 29991.7    
Source: National Pension Office website137 
 
136 * only applicable to white-collar workers 





2.A.7 DIFFERENTIATED CEILINGS FOR ASSIMILATED PERIODS FOR WAGE-
EARNERS 
Year 
Differentiated ceiling  

























2.A.8 EARNINGS TEST FOR THE COMBINATION OF WORK AND OLD-AGE 
PENSION RECEIPT, 2020 (PIVOTAL INDEX 147.31) 
Eligibility conditions Family allowances 






Aged more than 65 
(with or without a 
survivor pension) 
N.A No earnings test No earnings test 
Career of more than 45 
years 
N.A No earnings test No earnings test 
Aged less than 65 and 
career of less than 45 
years 
OR 
Aged less than 65 and 
the spouse receives an 
old-age pension benefit 
at the household 
replacement rate 
No 8,393 6,714 
Yes 12,590 10,071 
Aged less than 65 and 
receiving a survivor 
pension only 
No 19,542 15,634 
Yes 24,428 19,542 
Aged more than 65 and 
a spouse that receives 
the old-age pension 
ebenfit at the household 
replacement rate 
Or 
Aged more than 65 and 
receiving a survivor 
pension only 
N.A 29,489 23,591 
Source: National pension office website (See ‘Puis-je encore travailler si je prends ma pension ou si mon 






2.A.9 CEILINGS FOR SICKNESS AND DISABILITY BENEFITS 




index at the 





















































2000 95.37 97.28 98.25 99.04 99.73 101.72 103.00 103.82 104.96 
2001 97.28 99.22 100.22 101.02 101.72 103.76 105.06 105.90 107.06 
2002 99.22 101.21 102.22 103.04 103.76 105.83 107.16 108.01 109.20 
2003 101.21 103.23 104.27 105.10 105.84 107.95 109.30 110.18 111.39 
2004 103.23 105.30 106.35 107.20 107.95 110.11 111.49 112.38 113.61 
2005 105.30 107.40 108.48 109.35 110.11 112.31 113.72 114.63 115.89 
2006 107.40 109.55 110.64 111.53 112.31 114.56 115.99 116.92 118.20 
2007 107.40 109.55 110.64 111.53 112.31 114.56 115.99 116.92 118.20 
2008 113.98 116.26 117.43 118.36 119.19 121.58 123.10 124.08 125.45 
2009 113.98 116.26 117.43 118.36 119.19 121.58 123.10 124.08 125.45 
2010 116.26 118.58 119.77 120.73 121.57 124.00 125.55 126.56 127.95 
2011 118.58 120.95 122.16 123.14 124.00 126.48 128.06 129.08 130.50 
2012 123.37 125.84 127.10 128.12 129.01 131.59 133.24 134.31 135.78 
2013 123.37 125.84 127.10 128.12 129.01 131.59 133.24 134.31 135.78 
2014 123.37 125.84 127.10 128.12 129.01 131.59 133.24 134.31 135.78 
2015 123.37 125.84 127.10 128.12 129.01 131.59 133.24 134.31 135.78 
2016 125.84 128.36 129.64 130.68 131.59 134.22 135.90 136.99 138.50 
2017 128.36 130.93 132.24 133.30 134.23 136.91 138.62 139.73 141.27 
2018 130.93 133.55 134.88 135.96 136.91 139.65 141.40 142.53 144.10 
2019 130.93 133.55 134.88 135.96 136.91 139.65 141.40 142.53 144.10 
2020 133.55 136.22 137.58 138.68 139.65 142.44 144.22 145.38 146.98 
Source: National Sickness and disability benefits Institute website138 
 
 




2.A.10 TIME CREDIT BENEFITS (MONTHLY NET AMOUNTS) 















2002 250.42 319.19 116.32 140.37 178.92 
2003 255.43 325.58 118.65 143.18 182.50 
2004 260.53 332.08 121.02 146.04 186.14 
2005 265.75 338.73 123.44 148.97 189.87 
2006 271.05 345.49 125.91 151.94 193.66 
2007 271.05 345.49 125.91 151.94 193.66 
2008 287.67 366.67 133.62 161.25 205.53 
2009 287.67 366.67 133.62 161.25 205.53 
2010 293.41 373.99 136.29 164.47 209.64 
2011 299.27 381.45 139.01 167.76 213.82 
2012 311.37 396.88 144.64 174.54 222.47 
2013 311.37 396.88 144.64 174.54 222.47 
2014 311.37 396.88 144.64 174.54 222.47 
2015 311.37 396.88 144.64 174.54 222.47 
2016 317.59 404.81 147.53 178.03 226.91 
2017 323.95 412.92 150.48 181.59 231.46 
2018 330.43 421.18 153.49 185.23 236.09 
2019 337.04 429.60 156.56 188.93 240.81 
2020 337.04 429.6 156.56 188.93 240.81 









2.A.11 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE FIRST TAX DEDUCTION FOR 
REPLACEMENT INCOME 




















1986 1551.6 1551.6 2488.5 2478.7 1551.6 1551.6 1561.5 1561.5 
1987 1574.7 1574.7 2521.6 2478.7 1574.7 1574.7 1930.1 1930.1 
1988 1530.0 1530.0 2478.7 2478.7 1530.0 1530.0 1883.3 1883.3 
1989 1271.7 1488.6 2243.3 2460.2 1271.7 1488.6 1642.3 1859.2 
1990 1271.7 1488.6 2243.3 2460.2 1271.7 1488.6 1642.3 1859.2 
1991 1381.9 1611.2 2346.1 2696.9 1381.9 1611.2 1779.8 2009.1 
1992 1420.5 1643.6 2568.5 2804.0 1420.5 1643.6 1830.1 2065.6 
1993 1478.8 1726.7 2677.6 2925.5 1478.8 1726.7 1898.2 2146.1 
1994 1478.8 1726.7 2677.6 2925.5 1478.8 1726.7 1898.2 2146.1 
1995 1478.8 1726.7 2677.6 2925.5 1478.8 1726.7 1898.2 2146.1 
1996 1478.8 1726.7 2677.6 2925.5 1478.8 1726.7 1898.2 2146.1 
1997 1478.8 1726.7 2677.6 2925.5 1478.8 1726.7 1898.2 2146.1 
1998 1478.8 1726.7 2677.6 2925.5 1478.8 1726.7 1898.2 2146.1 
1999 1492.9 1743.1 1492.9 1743.1 1492.9 1743.1 1916.4 2166.6 
2000 1509.6 1762.8 1509.6 1762.6 1509.6 1762.6 1937.8 2190.8 
2001 1550.0 1810.0 1550.0 1810.0 1550.0 1810.0 1990.0 2250.0 
2002 1590.0 1850.0 1590.0 1850.0 1590.0 1850.0 2040.0 2300.0 
2003 1612.3 1882.5 1612.3 1882.5 1612.3 1882.5 2069.6 2339.9 
2004 1638.0 1638.0 1638.0 1912.5 1638.0 1912.5 2102.6 2102.6 
2005 1672.2 1672.2 1672.2 1672.2 1672.2 1952.3 2146.6 2146.6 
2006 1718.9 1718.9 1718.9 1718.9 1718.9 2007.0 2206.5 2206.5 
2007 1748.7 1748.7 1748.7 1748.7 1748.7 2042.6 2242.0 2242.0 
2008 1781.3 1781.3 1781.3 1781.3 1781.3 2079.9 2286.6 2286.6 
2009 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 2389.5 2389.5 
2010 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 1861.4 2389.5 2389.5 
2011 1901.1 1901.1 1901.1 1901.1 1901.1 1901.1 2440.4 2440.4 
2012 1968.2 1968.2 1968.2 1968.2 1968.2 1968.2 2526.5 2526.5 
2013 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2598.3 2598.3 
2014 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2598.3 2598.3 
2015 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2598.3 2598.3 
2016 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2598.3 2598.3 
2017 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2598.3 2598.3 
2018 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2024.1 2598.3 2598.3 
2019 2066.9 2066.9 2066.9 2066.9 2066.9 2066.9 2653.2 2653.2 
Source: Service Public Fédéral - Mémento Fiscal (1989 – 2019) 
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2.A.12 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SECOND TAX DEDUCTION FOR 










1979 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1980 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1981 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1982 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1983 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1984 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1985 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1986 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1987 8373.6 8373.6 8373.6 9304.0 
1988 8586.3 8586.3 8586.3 9264.9 
1989 8871.2 8871.2 9794.2 9856.9 
1990 9213.9 9213.9 10189.0 10252.7 
1991 9091.7 9091.7 10479.5 10542.6 
1992 9711.4 9711.4 10724.1 10790.5 
1993 9824.2 9824.2 10850.4 10915.8 
1994 9969.5 9969.5 10997.5 11077.2 
1995 10168.7 10168.7 11230.0 11298.6 
1996 10256.0 10256.0 11324.9 11395.6 
1997 10412.7 10412.7 11498.9 11569.6 
1998 10531.3 10531.3 11631.2 11701.4 
1999 10686.6 10686.6 11803.9 11874.0 
2000 10958.7 10958.7 12105.1 12176.3 
2001 11849.0 11849.0 13023.7 13165.3 
2002 12008.0 12008.0 13197.7 13342.3 
2003 12206.4 12206.4 13415.3 13562.6 
2004 12452.1 12452.1 13686.5 13835.7 
2005 12618.1 12618.1 13819.2 14020.1 
2006 12797.0 12797.0 14250.9 14418.9 
2007 13546.8 13546.8 14876.2 15052.0 
2008 13881.6 13881.6 15391.3 15423.9 
2009 13974.0 13974.0 15491.0 15526.6 
2010 14498.0 14498.0 16072.0 16108.9 
2011 14914.7 14914.7 16538.9 16571.9 
2012 15443.1 15443.1 17477.1 17159.0 
2013 15518.5 15518.5 17569.5 17242.8 
2014 15518.5 15518.5 17569.5 17242.8 
2015 15518.5 15518.5 17569.5 17242.8 
2016 15568.1 15568.1 17631.1 17297.9 
2017 15568.1 15568.1 17631.1 17297.9 
2018 15615.9 15615.9 17681.7 17351.0 


















FINANCIAL RETIREMENT INCENTIVES IN 
BELGIUM: AN ANALYSIS OF FOUR DECADES OF 
CHANGE 
 










Previous studies have highlighted the decisive role of public social security schemes in 
explaining the retirement patterns and low labor force participation of the elderly in 
Belgium (see among others Pestieau and Stijns, 1999; Dellis et al, 2004 or Jousten and 
Lefebvre, 2013). A common feature of these studies has been that they relied on a cross-
sectional, micro-based and supply side approach. Relying on detailed modeling of 
individual retirement incentives in a given reference period, the papers documented the 
presence of strong retirement incentives stemming from the social security system and 
their importance in explaining observed labor supply and retirement patterns.   
The cross-sectional design of the research question of these papers however limits their 
ability to explain observed labor supply and retirement patterns of Figure 3.1. Since the 
start of standardized collection of labor force data by the Labor Force Survey (LFS) in 
1984, cohorts of older women have seen a steady upward trend in their employment rates; 
male employment has gone through a U-shaped pattern, with a first period of decreased 
employment (up to the early 1980’s) being followed by a period of stagnation (late 1980’s 
to late 1990’s) before finally contributing to the previously mentioned significant increase 







Figure 3.1: Employment rate of older workers (men and women, ages 55-64) 
 
Source : Eurostat Labor Force Survey (2017) 
The respective importance of individual incentives and institutional changes in 
explaining observed labor supply and retirement patterns over the last decades remains 
unclear. Expressed differently, the decomposition into age and year effects remains an 
important and so far understudied research question in the Belgian context. Jousten and 
Lefebvre (2016) delivered a first step towards filling this gap in the literature. First, they 
provided a summary of institutional changes over the last decades – with a focus not only 
on pension and early retirement schemes, but also unemployment, disability and time 
credit. Second, they provided a detailed macro-analysis of observed employment and 
retirement patterns, looking not only at trends in employment and labor force 
participation rates, but also at the changing intensity (e.g., more part-time work) and 
sectoral composition (e.g., a shift to service sectors) of employment in light of institutional 
changes.  
This chapter goes further as we systematically calculate the financial incentives to exit 
employment for typical workers, by age, year and sex – integrating changes both in 









































at assessing the incentives to retire for different subgroups of the population and link 
these incentives with their labor outcomes. The model allows us to separate age and year 
effects, incidentally also permitting us to take phased reforms and grandfathering 
provisions into account. The model also permits the study of an array of scenarios in terms 
of earnings level, earnings growth, mortality, as well as a simulation of modified system 
parameters.  
We focus our attention on the population of wage-earners, leaving aside self-employed 
and civil servants. We further focus our attention on single workers, hence staying clear 
of issues of joint or spousal retirement decisions139 as well as interactions between 
individuals participating in different schemes. The reasons for these restrictions are 
linked to the overall complexity of social insurance and retirement programs in Belgium 
combined with a lack of structured historical information on some of them. The wage 
earner scheme is by far the most important scheme in terms of enrolments and scope of 
coverage – encompassing all private sector workers and contractual workers in the public 
sector. Furthermore, it is the scheme with the most time-series information available on 
the applicable institutional setting and on the characteristics of participants. It is also the 
scheme that has been most extensively studied so far (see Jousten et al, 2012; 2016 and 
Jousten and Lefebvre; 2016 and 2017).140  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 documents the changes in observed 
retirement patterns in Belgium. Section 2.3 introduces the retirement incentive indicator, 
with a focus on singles. Section 3.4 explores the link between observed retirement patterns 
 
139 See Jousten and Lefebvre (2017) and chapter six for a study of the role of spousal retirement incentives 
in the Belgian case. 
140 The civil servant scheme displays a large heterogeneity, with only limited historical information 
available on institutional details as well as participants. The self-employed scheme is the least well 
documented, as the (substantially more limited) information on participants’ earnings histories has only 
recently been the subject of centralization efforts. 
115 
 
and incentives using a common standardized earnings profile combined with 
standardized tax parameters across time and countries. The common earnings profile and 
time-invariant tax parameters are chosen to allow for an easy international comparison of 
results. Section 3.5 deviates from this common profile by introducing specificities that are 
more relevant for understanding the Belgian case by using different and more realistic 
assumptions in terms of earnings levels, career profiles and taxation. It also discusses how 
benefit floors and ceilings affect incentives given these earnings histories. Section 3.6 
concludes.  
3.2 PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
In this section, we present the evolution of the pathways to retirement over the period 
1983 to 2015. Figures 3.2 to 3.5 show for each year, and by age group, the percentage of 
men and women recorded as beneficiaries of each program. On each figure, we see how 
the structure changed over time with the implementation of reforms in some programs as 
well as the introduction of new programs.  
Over our observation period, some pathways have gained or lost importance in the 
distribution of exits, reflecting the varying generosity in eligibility conditions. These 
figures document the connected vessels aspect of the various social security schemes. For 
men aged 55-59 we observe an increase in the proportion of recipients of unemployment 
and disability benefits since 2005, at a time when conventional early retirement rules were 
tightened. For men aged 60-64, the proportion of old-age pensioners has increased since 
2005. For women aged 55-59, the picture is similar than for men except for the fact that 
we observe an increase in the participation in pathways other than the old-age pension 
since the end of the nineties. Such increase is due to the increase of the old-age pension 
statutory eligibility age, hence delaying the mechanical rollover of disability, 
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unemployment conventional early retirement beneficiaries into the old-age pension 
program. 
Figure 3.2: Pathways to retirement – men, age 55-59 
 
Source:  National Pension Office (2019), Office National de l'Emploi (2021), 
National Institute of Incapacity and Invalidity (2020) 
Figure 3.3: Pathways to retirement – men, age 60-64 
 
Source:  National Pension Office (2019), Office National de l'Emploi (2021), 
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Figure 3.4: Pathways to retirement – women, age 55-59 
 
Source:  National Pension Office (2019), Office National de l'Emploi (2021), National 
Institute of Incapacity and Invalidity (2020) 
Figure 3.5: Pathways to retirement – women, age 60-64 
 
Source:  National Pension Office (2019), Office National de l'Emploi (2021), 
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3.3 MEASURING RETIREMENT INCENTIVES 
This section describes the simulation model used to quantify the retirement incentives 
created by the social security system. To observe the effect of changes and reforms over 
time, calculations are done for the different age cohorts in each year starting in the early 
1980’s.  
Given the life-cycle dimension of pensions, we define a synthetic earnings history of a 
cohort through time and scale it to reflect differences in socio-economic status. For each 
pathway and case, we calculate and aggregate the benefits the representative individual 
is entitled to at a given age in a given year. 
3.3.1 EARNING HISTORIES 
We consider two scenarios: a common scenario, with key assumptions based on 
international data used for all countries in the NBER ISS project and a Belgian scenario with 
assumptions based on Belgian data. We model earnings histories for two types of 
individuals: single males and single females. We distinguish stylized variants of low, 
medium and high earners. For each year of observation, each of these 6 cases is associated 
with specific earnings level, career length and lifetime earnings profiles. We detail the 
underlying calculations and assumptions below.  
First, we use the median income of full-time non-manual wage-earners in 2014 as reported 
by Statistics Belgium (2016) to define the median worker and attribute this wage to males 
aged 50 in 2014. We adjust the median wage at the anchoring age of 50 to each simulation 
year using a fixed deflator, which is the average wage growth rate of wage earners 
between 1980 and 2016. We then define low earners as persons earning 50 percent of the 
median and high earners as receiving 200 percent of the median earner’s income. We 
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assume that female median earnings are 7.6 percent below male median at age 50 for all 
years of study – with 7.6 percent corresponding to the average hourly wage gap between 
men and women in 2014 as reported by Statistics Belgium (2016). 
Second, we derive earnings histories for these 6 cases in the two scenarios. All earnings 
histories share a common assumption of no career interruptions – with any variation in 
career length simply translated into different starting dates. 
In the common scenario, we assume that the low earners start working at age 16, the 
median earners start working at 20 and the high earners start working at 25. Once these 
career lengths have been determined we derive lifetime earning histories for each case. 
The common earnings profile uses a time-invariant common synthetic earning profile that 
is differentiated for men and women and for the three income levels (see figure 3.6). The 
profiles are calculated with data from the US, Germany and Italy. 141 Figure 3.6 presents 
the patterns of the earning profiles – the same for all years concerned – each expressed as 
a proportion of the anchoring wage at age 50. 
In the Belgian scenario, we shorten the careers of men by 5 years in order to model more 
incomplete (but more realistic) careers. We further consider an average gap in career 
length between men and women of 6 years – in line with the results of a report from 
National Pension Office (2005). This assumption is plausible as the upper age for 
compulsory schooling has been set at 18 years for several decades, with numerous 
persons studying well-beyond. Also, other forms of work interruptions are not 
uncommon.142 The Belgian scenario thus assumes that male (female) low earners start 
 
141 See the US chapter of Börsch-Supan and Coile (2021) for details. 




working at age 21 (27), male (female) median earners start working at age 25 (31) and 
male (female) high earners start working at age 30 (36).  
In a second step, The Belgian specific earnings profile is built using the average gross 
monthly conventional wage of non-manual wage earners by age and is time and sex-
specific – but its shape does not vary by income level beyond the different starting ages.143 
Figure 3.7 presents the average of the time-specific Belgian earning profiles, again 
expressed as a percentage of the wage at age 50. Unlike the common profile – that assumes 
an important increase of the wage in the first years of the career (see figure 3.6), a decrease 
in the growth of wages until 50, and constancy thereafter - the Belgian-specific earnings 
profile displays a continuous and almost constant increase of the wage throughout the 
career and until age 60. Expressed differently, while the common profile captures an 
internationally more usual career-wage profile, the Belgian-specific pattern better fits the 
specificities of the Belgian wage-setting system with its automatic indexing of wages to 
changes in the Consumer Price Index and collective wage bargaining on wage growth 











Figure 3.6: Common earnings profiles 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on US Current Population Survey (CPS), German 








Figure 3.7: Belgian-specific earnings profiles 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using Statistics Belgium144  
Each scenario is accompanied by an assumption in terms of the applicable tax system. In 
the common scenario, we use the tax rules applicable in 2016 (in real terms) to all 
simulation years. The motivation for this approach is to clearly distinguish the pure effects 
of pension policy from those of general tax policy.145 In the Belgian scenario, we apply the 
tax rules as they were applicable year after year to reflect the changes in the entire tax-
benefit landscape as experienced by real-world workers.  
3.3.2 BENEFIT STREAM 
From these earnings profiles, we calculate, for each age-year cohort the after-tax benefit 
stream from each of the following program: old-age pension, conventional early 
retirement, unemployment insurance and disability insurance. For an individual i, 
defined according to his or her sex and the level of career earnings, we calculate the after-
 
144 See ‘Salaires mensuels bruts moyens’ at https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/emploi-formation/salaires-et-
cout-de-la-main-doeuvre/salaires-mensuels-bruts-moyens#figures 





, ) from the program k in time t for all ages a≥R, where R is the first 
year of benefit receipt. Once retired, we assume benefits remain constant in real terms in 
future years. 
We look at retirement ages ranging from 55 to 65 from year 1980 to 2016. Our simulation 
thus considers any potential cohort differences and changes thereto, as well as transitory 
and permanent changes over time (index t) and as a function of age (index a). The lack of 
eligibility for pathway k at an age a at time t conditional on retirement at R is modeled by 
setting F9,,(
, ) equal to 0.  
The simulation model allows for a rich set of scenarios in terms of individual 
characteristics. Also, it allows for simulations of counterfactuals and system reforms. For 
example, the common scenario of section 3.4 relies on a counterfactual assumption that 
only benefit rules have changed but no tax changes have occurred during the entire period 
of analysis. The motivation for this deviation from the empirically observed institutional 
setting is to separate out strictly retirement-related changes from broader tax policy 
changes affecting the wider population. The Belgian scenario of section 3.5 explores the 
role of tax policy changes, and provides also counterfactual analysis of benefits indexation 
rules and thresholds.  
3.3.3 SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH, ACCRUAL AND IMPLICIT TAX 
From the benefits, we calculate different indicators of the incentives created by the social 
security system. The key concept is the annual accrual of social security wealth. The SSW 
is the present discounted value of all future benefit flows from a given social security 
program for a given individual at a given age in a given year.  
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SSW for an individual of type i starting to claim benefits from program k at age R in time 
t is then given by: 
HH9,(
, ) =  F9,,I  J,K8ILMI  
Where F9,,I   is the after-tax benefit from pathway k at age R as calculated above. The 
formula sums up these benefits until the end of life T. Discounting is done allowing both 
for time preference and mortality adjustments: J, is the survival probability146 at age a 
for individual i and   is the time discount rate that we assume to be equal to 3 percent 
real. Since we assume real constant benefit once in the program, the amount stays the 
same in the forthcoming years if the person retires on old-age pension. In the case of an 
exit through unemployment, conventional early retirement or disability, the benefits 
change according to the age since at the statutory eligibility age the individual starts to 
receive old-age pension benefits instead of the other benefits – essentially splitting the 
right hand-side of the formula in two separate sums before and after the statutory 
eligibility age. 
Based on this SSW, we then compute a secondary incentive measure that represents the 
variation in SSW that is obtained by retiring one year later. Postponing claiming by one 
year has two effects on social security wealth. On the one hand, annual benefits F9,,(
, ) 
can vary with later claiming due to additional earnings entering the benefit formula (and 
possible actuarial adjustments). On the other hand, however, benefits are received one 
year later.  
 
146 Obtained from the average survival rates of the EU28 provided by Eurostat.  
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The accrual of social security wealth is then given by: 
 
N9,(
, ) = HH9,O4(
 + 1, ) − HH9,(
, ) 
The accrual can thus be positive, zero, or negative. If the accrual is negative, the social 
security system imposes an implicit tax on working longer. The implicit tax rate is the 
(negative) accrual of social security wealth divided by the after tax earnings during the 
additional year of work Yt+1,I : 
PQNR9,(
, ) = −N9,(
, )SO4,   
This last measure shows the tax on continued activity from retiring one year later. A 
positive value means that there is a tax on working longer, a negative value represents a 
subsidy for working longer. 
3.4 RETIREMENT INCENTIVES: COMMON PROFILE 
The present section presents the analysis of the incentive measures defined in the 
previous section for the 6 “common scenario” cases by sex and income level across time. 
To simplify the presentation, the general discussion of incentives at the level of the 
individual focuses on median earner profiles in the context of the old-age pension 
program. We only present ITAX measures for other benefit programs as they capture the 
essence of the incentive landscape. When discussing the impact of these individual 
incentive indicators for aggregate outcomes, all incentive measures are summed across 
programs and across earnings levels to one representative measure that is confronted 
with observed employment rates. 
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3.4.1 INCENTIVES BY PATHWAY 
In figures 3.8 to 3.11, we present the incentive measures for the old-age pension scheme 
for the median earners. Results are shown for both sexes and two age groups: age 55-59 
and age 60-64.  
For men aged 55-59, figure 3.8 displays very marked changes in the SSW. The SSW of 
median earners displays a generally increasing trend over the years thanks to the 
discretionary increases of ceilings for pensionable earnings147. Without such discretionary 
increases, the SSW would be flat – reflecting the crucial role played by the floors and 
ceilings in the system.148 This is particularly important in the early eighties when the ITAX 
is increasing rapidly. This is the -result of the combination of both upward changes of 
ceilings that are more important than in other years and the higher growth rate of median 
income. Moreover, given that workers receive a benefit of zero before they reach the early 
eligibility age of 60, the ITAX is negative for every year. 
The ensuing discrete jump of the SSW curves after 1990 can be attributed to the end of the 
pension penalty of 5 percent for exits before the statutory eligibility age149. This translates 
in a large peak of the accrual and the corresponding drop in the implicit tax as a result of 
the discrete jump in entitlements for all individuals claiming benefits at the early 
eligibility age – as is the case of individuals quitting the labor market between ages 55 and 
59.  
As mentioned in chapter two, the early eligibility age of both men and women gradually 
increased from 60 to 63 between 2013 and 2018. In our simulation, we consider that if a 
 
147 See chapter two for more information on ceilings for pensionable earnings. 
148 Implicitly, the discretionary increases – imperfectly – mimic wage-indexing of past earnings.  
149 See chapter two for more information on the pension penalty. 
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worker exits the labor market through the old-age pension before the early eligibility age, 
he/she receives a benefit of zero until he/she reaches the early eligibility age. Since median 
earners in the common scenario do not satisfy the long-career exception, they are affected 
by the reform150. Thus, an increase in early eligibility age translates into a decrease of the 
SSW because the worker starts receiving pension benefits one year later. Therefore, the 
downward trend in SSW as of 2013 is attributable to the increase in the early eligibility 
age and the associated career requirements. Accordingly, the ITAX at age 59 decreases in 
2013, because there is an incentive for the worker aged 59 to stay on the labor force until 
61 because the early eligibility age rises to 61 in 2014.  
Figure 3.8: Incentive measures – Old-age pension – men median earners, ages 55-59 
 
 
150 See chapter two for the historical evolution of the statutory and early eligibility ages of the old-age 






Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: RR, SSW, ACC and ITAX correspond to the replacement rate, the 




Figure 3.9 reports the social security incentive measures for female median earners 
retiring between ages 55 and 59. The results are similar to those of men except for the 
reform of 1987, which increased the early eligibility age from 55 to 60, adding a sharp 
discontinuity by replacing every potential year of benefits before 60 by zero.  Moreover, 
as the female statutory eligibility age was already set at 60 before 1997, women were not 
directly impacted by the end of pension penalty in 1991. In addition, other assumptions 
play out: as women are assumed to have the same career length as men with and only 
slightly lower median earnings, their higher life expectancies and shorter full career 
conditions (until 2009 only) lead them to have a significantly higher SSW. This effect is 
partially cancelled out between 1997 and 2009 because of the increase in full career 
conditions from 40 to 45 years. The resulting decrease in SSW during the latter period 
leads to an increased incentive to leave the labor market before each increase in career 
condition, and thus a positive ITAX at each step. 











Source: Authors’ calculations  
Note: RR, SSW, ACC and ITAX correspond to the replacement rate, the 




Figure 3.10 reports the social security incentive measures for men who retire between the 
ages of 60 and 64. The end of the pension penalty in 1991 is still visible but the older the 
person is when he retires, the less important is the jump of SSW because his pension 
benefits were less impacted by the pension penalty.151 In 2007, the flat-rate pension bonus 
was created for continued work after age 62 (or after 44 years of career). The program was 
discontinued in 2015, which translates into a fall in the accruals and an increase in the 
ITAX at ages 63 to 65 in 2014. In this simulation, the receipt of a pension bonus increases 
the pension to a level which is higher than the health and disability insurance contribution 
threshold for retirement ages of 65 in 2008 and of 64 and 65 starting from 2009 onwards. 
This additional health and disability contribution limits the increase in pension benefits, 
and thus the increase in SSW, due to the pension bonus at age 64 and 65. Since we assume 
that the median earner starts working at age 20 and works without career interruption, 
he is eligible for the long-career exception of the old-age pension scheme that allows for 
retirement at age 60 in 2013 and 2014, instead of 60.5 and 61, respectively.152 Thus, in 
practice, workers would only be affected by the reform if their career was insufficiently 
long – which is not the case for the common profile. At age 60, the SSW only starts 
decreasing in 2015 because in 2013 and 2014, median workers still had access to an early 
eligibility age of 60. In 2015, they fall out of these long career conditions that require 41 
years of career to access old-age pension benefits at age 60 and the early eligibility age is 




151 In figure 3.8, this is not the case as there is a maximum penalty of 5 years. 
152 See chapter two for the historical evolution of the early eligibility age of the old-age pension and 
associated career requirements. 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations  
Note: RR, SSW, ACC and ITAX correspond to the replacement rate, the 
social security wealth, the accrual and the implicit tax rate respectively.  
Finally, figure 3.11 depicts the social security incentive measures for women who are 
median earners and retire between the ages of 60 and 64. Logically, the 1987 reform that 
increased the early eligibility age of women to 60 has no impact on women who retire 
after 60. The effect of the increase in full career from 1997 to 2009 and the pension bonus 
from 2007 to 2015 for retirement ages between 63 and 64 are also visible. Moreover, 
similarly to men, the receipt of the pension bonus at age 65 also increases the pension to 
a level higher than the health and disability insurance contribution threshold, which 


















Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Note: RR, SSW, ACC and ITAX correspond to the replacement rate, the 
social security wealth, the accrual and the implicit tax rate respectively.  
For the other three pathways, we only present the implicit tax for each sex for reasons of 
brevity. Similarly, we focus on the age group 55-59 since it is the age-window where most 
changes in program parameters and employment have happened. Figure 3.12 and Figure 
3.13 show the evolution of the ITAX in the conventional early retirement scheme for each 
age. Contrary to our assumption on the old-age pension, we consider that individuals 
who lose benefits in the conventional early retirement program would still meet the basic 
conditions to unemployment benefits – a plausible assumption in the Belgian context. 
Hence, benefits are not reduced to zero in case of loss of eligibility, but rather replaced by 
the lower unemployment benefits. The implicit tax for most ages is on average largely 
positive; this means that there is a strong incentive to exit the labor market through the 
conventional early retirement. The peak at age 55 in 1986 for both men and women 
corresponds to the increase of the conventional early retirement eligibility age from 55 to 
57. There is an incentive to quit the labor market before the reform takes place in order to 
be able to access the conventional early retirement pathway at age 55 instead of 57. The 
same effect is observed at age 58 in 2008 when the eligibility age increased to 60. The ITAX 
at age 56 in 1986 is not impacted by the reform, the worker does not lose access to the 
conventional early retirement exit pathway if he or she works for one more year. In 1987, 
the increase in the eligibility to 58 creates a negative ITAX at 57 because the worker now 
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has an incentive to stay on the labor market for one more year to have access to the 
conventional early retirement program rather than exiting at 57 and remaining on lower 
unemployment benefits until the statutory eligibility age. Thus, from 1987 onwards, the 
ITAX at 55 and 56 is lower than at other ages because if workers exit before 58 they receive 
unemployment benefits until the statutory eligibility age. Since the unemployment 
benefits are less generous than the conventional early retirement benefits, it creates a 
smaller incentive to leave the labor force. The small drop in 2001 for every age is related 
to an increase of the median wage that is more important than in previous years and is 
thus not explained by any changing rules of the system. These changes in the growth of 
the median wage also explain the small variations we observe between 1987 and 2006 and 
especially the stiff increase of ITAX in 2009. The same will apply for the results presented 
below for unemployment and disability programs. In 2008, the increase of the headline 
entitlement age for conventional early retirement to 60 translates into an double effect: an 
increase in the ITAX at 57 resulting in an incentive to leave the labor force before the 
reform; and a decrease in the ITAX at 59 resulting in an incentive to stay on the labor 
market for one more year to receive conventional early retirement rather than 
unemployment benefits until the statutory eligibility age.153 In 2015, the headline 





153 Notice that the impact of the 2008 reform on the ITAX at 59 is less pronounced than the impact of the 
1987 reform on the ITAX at 57 simply because the period during which conventional early retirement 
benefits are replaced by unemployment benefits is longer. 
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Figure 3.12: Implicit tax of conventional early retirement benefits - men median earners, 
ages 55-59 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
From 2012 onwards, and for exits before age 59, longer periods on conventional early 
retirement are no longer fully credited at the last observed wage before entering the 
conventional early retirement program but rather at the legal minimum wage154. Though 
the eligibility age for the conventional early retirement is higher than 59 in the headline 
regime– the conventional early retirement pathway still is affected. The reason is that exits 
through unemployment as a fall back option remain possible, with unemployment 
benefits crediting in the earnings history effectively facing the same limitations as 
conventional early retirement benefits after the first year of unemployment. Therefore, 
workers in the headline regime are affected by the reform through the indirect channel of 
a decrease in the value of unemployment periods in their earnings history whereas those 
in special conventional early retirement programs (that allows for earlier exit) are directly 
affected – ultimately to the same effect. As a result, the reform of credited earnings in 2012 
 
154 See chapter two for more details. 
138 
 
for long periods of inactivity has led to a decrease of the ITAX at every age from 2012 
onwards. 
Figure 3.13 illustrates the evolution of the conventional early retirement ITAX for women. 
The impact of the gradual increase of the statutory eligibility age in old-age pension from 
1997 to 2009 is particularly visible. Each stepwise increase in statutory eligibility age 
translates into an immediate decrease in the ITAX because women receive one more year 
of conventional early retirement benefits before they are transferred into the old-age 
pension system. Therefore, an incentive to stay at work for one more year appears at each 
step.  
Figure 3.13: Implicit tax of conventional early retirement benefits - women median 
earners, ages 55-59 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
The implicit tax for unemployment also displays some changes, as illustrated in figures 
3.14 and 3.15. In 1985, the ITAX decreases sharply in a one-off fashion because of the 
introduction of the seniority supplement: there is an incentive to wait one more year in 
order to be eligible for the supplement rather than merely regular unemployment 
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benefits. This effect no longer plays out with the same acuity in the following years, where 
only the increased generosity of the system leaves its mark through a higher implicit tax 
rate. In 2015, the increase in ITAX at each age is the mirror image of that in 1985: namely 
the end of the supplement for seniority. For women, the increase of the old-age pension 
statutory eligibility age also translates into a markedly different incentive pattern at the 
conventional early retirement level. 
Figure 3.14: Implicit tax of unemployment benefits - men median earners, ages 55-59 
 








Figure 3.15: Implicit tax of unemployment benefits - women median earners, ages 55-59 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
Interestingly, as we already noted in chapter two, there has been little to no change in the 
benefit calculation in the disability program and the statutory incentives to retire have not 
been impacted beyond the obvious effect of the increase in the statutory eligibility age for 
women and the discretionary increases in ceilings for pensionable earnings155 (figures 3.16 
and 3.17). As mentioned before, and short of information of implementation rules at the 
level of the institutions managing the disability system, these incentive measures only 
capture changes in the laws and leave aside changes that could have arisen because of 









Figure 3.16: Implicit tax of disability benefits - men median earners, ages 55-59 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
Figure 3.17: Implicit tax of disability benefits - women median earners, age 55-59 
 




3.4.2 AGGREGATE INCENTIVES AND EMPLOYMENT 
To confront the stylized individual incentives with aggregate employment rates, a 
summary incentive indicator is derived. We rely on the administrative data of figures 3.2 
to 3.5 to calculate path-specific weights corresponding to the share of the population that 
is receiving either unemployment, conventional early retirement or disability benefits. 
The old-age pension takes the residual weight such that the sum of the weights is equal 
to one. These weights are obtained by year, age group (55-59 and 60-64), and gender. 
Finally, incentives are aggregated across income levels.  
Figures 3.18 to 3.21 present the results of these aggregate incentive measures for median 
earners by age, year and sex and include the major reforms that have influenced them 
since the eighties. Aggregate retirement incentives are heavily influenced by the default 
option, namely the old-age pension scheme. This is unsurprising as this scheme 
represents the largest weight (see figures 3.2-3.5) and also affects the benefit that is 
payable for the longest period of time (from early or statutory eligibility ages until death). 
Because of the high participation rate of men in the conventional early retirement scheme, 









Figure 3.18: Implicit tax for male median earners by age (55-59) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Figure 3.19: Implicit tax for female median earners by age (55-59) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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Figure 3.20: Implicit tax for male median earners by age (60-64) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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Figure 3.21: Implicit tax for female median earners by age (60-64) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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When aggregating across income levels and focusing on changes in retirement incentives 
over time, very distinct patterns can be observed. Figure 3.22 and 3.23 present the implicit 
tax for four reference years, separated by 10-year intervals each. While reforms during the 
first few decades have mostly focused on ages 55-59, there has been more recently a clear 
shift towards the age group 60-64. Results are, however, somewhat surprising: contrary 
to a general perception of an overall greater reward of longer working lives in the recent 
years, our results show that incentives are actually leaning heavily against longer working 
lives. Clearly, these results have to be read and interpreted with some caution: for 
example, the numerous special early retirement regimes that existed in addition to the 
headline conventional early retirement setup clearly affected the real-world incentives 
faced by individuals in ways that were sometimes quite different from the headline 
regime. Also, the weighting of the pathways remains somewhat contentious – with the 
residual weight on the old-age pension path likely overemphasizing its relevance.156 
Figure 3.22: Implicit tax for male median earners by year 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 




Figure 3.23: Implicit tax for female median earners by year 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
Similar caution should be applied when interpreting figures 3.24 to 3.27. In these, we 
relate the average ITAX indicator by age groups of 55-59 and 60-64 in a given year to the 
employment rate of the same age groups in that year. Overall a negative relationship 
appears between the employment rate and the ITAX but not in a very strong manner. 
Clearly, the averaging across ages and the chosen weighting are likely disputable. 
However, we believe that even when correcting for some of these concerns (for example 
using a different weighting of exit routes that does not put the default weight on the old-
age pension system) no stronger relation will emerge. This is likely due to the fact that 
individual incentives faced by real world Belgian workers are quite substantially different 
from those of the typical workers we have chosen. The real world is obviously less single, 
less complete career, with less stable earnings than our assumptions imply. On the other 
hand, it is also more diverse as employment, as defined by the labor force survey, also 




Figure 3.24: Employment rate and ITAX – men, ages 55-59 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Labor Force Survey 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Employment rate and ITAX – women, ages 55-59 
 







Figure 3.26: Employment rate and ITAX – men, ages 60-64 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations and Labor Force Survey 
 
 
Figure 3.27: Employment rate and ITAX – women, ages 60-64 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations and Labor Force Survey 
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3.5 RETIREMENT INCENTIVE: BELGIAN-SPECIFIC 
PROFILE 
In this section we present the incentive measures for the old-age pension for both sexes 
using the Belgian-specific scenario of earnings as described in Section 3.3. In addition to 
the median earner case, we also report the results of low and high earners since our 
assumptions on career length and earnings profiles may have important effects. For 
example, low income earners often qualify for the receipt of the minimum pension and 
some earnings of the median and high earners are replaced with the ceilings for 
pensionable income in the old-age pension benefit calculation.  
Figure 3.28 presents the SSW for the old-age pension scheme by sex for the age group 60-
64 for the three selected earnings profiles. The results are somewhat different from what 
we obtained with the common profile. We will emphasize three main points that explain 
the differences with real-world relevance in the country. 
First the Belgian-specific lifetime earnings profile assumes a continuous and almost 
constant increase of the wage throughout the career while the common profile assumes 
an important increase of the wage in the first years of career. Since old-age pension benefit 
are calculated on the average wage over the entire career, in the Belgian-specific scenario 
many more years with lower wages are included. In figure 3.28, this translates into lower 
SSW for all typical workers as compared to the results of the previous section. On the 
other hand, the use of the differently shaped Belgian earnings profile does not impact the 
build-up of SSW for low earners as they systematically benefit from the minimum pension 
under both scenarios.  
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Second, the Belgian-specific profile assumes shorter careers. In this scenario, each 
category of worker starts working at a different age: male low earners at age 21, female 
low earners at age 27, male median earners at age 25, female median earners at age 31, 
male high earners at age 30 and female high earners at age 36. Shorter careers are 
translated into lower lifetime SSW for every type of worker. This is also true for the low 
earners for whom the minimum pension is adjusted according to the length of career.  
Also, because we have assumed shorter careers in the Belgian-specific scenario, workers 
less often fulfil the career requirements for early retirement even if they reach the early 
eligibility age. Most notably, the reform that increased the career conditions for early old-
age pension claiming from 20 years in 1997 to 35 in 2005 now directly affects the SSW of 
low and median-earning women as well as high earners of both sexes. This reform 
translates into a decrease in SSW for those who do not reach the career requirements for 
early retirement because each year of potential benefits before the statutory eligibility age 
is replaced by a zero.157 Male low and median earners are not directly impacted by this 
reform as they have sufficiently long careers to retire at the early eligibility age. However, 
as a result of the general increase of the early eligibility age, and the increase in stringency 
of the long-career exception, low and median-earner men also lose access to old-age 
pension benefits at age 60 as of the year 2013. Hence, their SSW at age 60 starts decreasing 
 
157 More specifically: at age 60, low-earner women have 33 years of career and cannot access early 
retirement at age 60 from 2004 onwards: eligibility is age 61 in 2004, and 62 from 2005 onwards. Similarly, 
median-earner women have a career of 29 years when they reach the age of 60 and do not meet the career 
requirements for early retirement from 2002 onwards. High-earner men have a career of 30 years once 
they reach the age of 60 and hence do not meet the career requirement for early retirement from 2003 
onwards. Finally, high earners women count 24 years of career at age 60 do not meet the career 
requirement for early retirement from 2000 onwards. From 2004 onwards, male high-earners have to wait 




as of 2013 as a result of the increase in early eligibility age to age 60.5. Similarly, their SSW 
at age 61 starts decreasing in 2015 when the early eligibility age increases to age 61.5. 
Third, the impact of the pension bonus reform on individuals at different earnings levels 
can easily be identified on these graphs. The effect is comparable in absolute terms across 
income levels whatever the earnings level as the pension bonus is a constant amount 
given for any number of additional days worked above age 62 or after more than 44 years 
of career, independently of earnings levels and unaffected by pension ceilings. 
Finally, the Belgian-specific scenario allows for the taxation rules to vary over the years 
instead of keeping them constant using 2016 tax laws. The specific impact of taxes in 
explaining differences in SSW between the common and the Belgian-specific scenarios is 
only visible for high earners above the age of 60: given the relative brevity of assumed 
careers, no old-age pension pensioner actually has to pay the disability or the solidarity 
contributions on pensions or income tax; high-earner old-age pensioners merely start 
paying a small amount of taxes at older ages from the early 1990’s onwards; male median-
earner old-age pensioners start paying a small amount of taxes as of age 65 starting in 
1996; changes in the tax deduction for social security benefits are also mostly visible for 
high earners only, such as the 1998 decrease of the tax deduction for conventional early 
retirement benefits but remain trivial compared to the impact of eligibility reforms.158 The 
most important change in taxation happened for taxes on personal income, which has 
become less progressive over the years. Smaller taxes for high earners have increased their 
wage, which is translated into decreasing ITAX over the years. Once again the impact of 
such reform is fairly limited and mostly indistinguishable next to the eligibility reforms – 
hence confirming the general validity of results from the common scenario analysis. 
 
158 See chapter two for more information on the taxation of social security benefits. 
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Figure 3.28: SSW– Old-age pension – ages 55-59 
 




The Belgian labor market has undergone major changes over the last decades. While the 
country was long characterized by low employment and labor force participation rates of 
the elderly male population, there was a reversal of this trend as the country witnessed a 
continuous increase in employment rates of older men from the early 2000’s onwards. In 
this chapter, we explored the main institutional changes that have affected the retirement 
pathways of older workers from the 1980’s until today. We simulated the retirement 
incentives faced by several typical workers, differentiated by age, sex and level of 
earnings, for each retirement year between 1980 and 2016, retirement ages ranging from 
55 to 65 and for the 4 traditional labor force exit pathways. To do so, we used the concept 
of social security wealth and implicit tax on continued activity and we relied on two 
specific scenarios: a common one and a Belgian-specific one.  
The results show that the various reforms have affected the incentive to retire through 
one or another pathway at the micro-level. We found that the tightening of eligibility 
conditions and the greater variation in the generosity of some benefits translate into 
important changes of our incentive measures to retire. These in turns appeared to be 
correlated, although marginally, with variations in the employment rates at the macro-
level. 
However, these results are far from being clear-cut and the Belgian institutional landscape 
is likely to be more complex than the stylized view of the headline retirement and early 
retirement schemes we analyzed in this chapter. These first results open avenues for 
further research, better taking into account individual heterogeneity and the related social 
security generosity at the individual level. This would however require better information 
on eligibility of special or derogatory schemes – a nontrivial task. The results also show 
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that there is room for micro-econometric analysis exploring the large individual variation 
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Like many other European countries, Belgium has been exposed to a major 
transformation of its labor market environment over the last decades. At the same time, a 
large array of social security reforms has been implemented with the overarching goal of 
increasing the labor force participation through better work incentives – with a special 
focus on older workers. This chapter aims at assessing the role of those incentive-based 
reforms as an explanatory factor for the observed changes in older workers’ employment 
patterns.  
Previous studies for Belgium have already pointed at the role of social security incentives 
and institutional changes in explaining the labor force participation of the elderly (see i.e. 
Pestieau and Stijns, 1999; Dellis et al, 2004; Jousten and Lefebvre, 2013; 2019). However, 
they have generally covered much shorter time-spans and been unable to separate age 
effects from those of reforms.  
In the third chapter of the thesis, we propose a first analysis over a more extended period. 
We use a typical-worker simulation approach akin to Pestieau and Stijns (1999) to assess 
the role of social security incentives on employment outcomes over the last four decades. 
We suggest that policy reforms in Belgium over the recent decades have focused more on 
implementation measures rather than on changes in key policy parameters. Relying on 
these typical worker simulations, we document a rather marginal effect of reforms on 
employment outcomes at the macro-level. However, these results cannot be considered 
as definitive, as a typical-worker approach is unable to reflect the institutional complexity 
– and the associated retirement incentive heterogeneity – of a country like Belgium with 
its highly segmented institutional landscape. Only micro-simulation and micro-
estimation analysis can capture the prevailing degree of heterogeneity. 
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In this chapter we provide a contribution to fill this gap. We investigate how individual 
social security incentives and particularly their changes over time explain the retirement 
decision at the micro level. We focus on the population of wage-earners159. For a sample 
of Belgian wage-earners aged 55-64 and for a period going from 2004 to 2010, we 
systematically calculate indicators of benefit entitlement and financial retirement 
incentive measures and we relate them to the individual labor force participation. We 
estimate a series of econometric specifications and use the results to simulate 
counterfactual labor supplies under a reform scenario. 
The structure is as follows. Section 4.2 presents our dataset as well as the microsimulation 
approach we use to calculate financial retirement incentive measures. In Section 4.3, we 
show the results of a series of regressions using these financial incentive measures. Section 
4.4 provides the counterfactual simulation analysis to scope the effect of social security 
reforms. Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 INCENTIVE MEASURES CALCULATION 
Based on the institutional setup described in chapter two, we compute several individual-
level financial incentive measures that summarize the generosity of the different labor 
force exit pathways: the old-age pension, the conventional early retirement, the 
unemployment insurance and the disability insurance programs. Below, we first present 
the data and then detail the formulae used to calculate financial incentives for each 
individual. 
 




The analysis relies on a representative administrative panel dataset drawn in 2004 and 
coming from the “Datawarehouse Labor Market and Social Protection”. The data were 
provided by the Belgian Crossroad Bank for Social Security (CBSS)160. Information on 
individuals’ labor market status are retrieved from the administrative records of various 
social security institutions and personal characteristics are retrieved from the national 
registry. The panel includes information on a quarterly basis for cohorts born between 
1941 and 1949 for the period 2004 to 2010. For the purpose of this study, we use the 
calendar year as a period of reference, and hence merge the quarterly income data into a 
single yearly observation, using that status of the last day of the last quarter of each year. 
We use a subsample of the original population that satisfies the double condition of 
working and of belonging to the wage-earner scheme in 2004, the start of the observation 
period.161 Although we focus our attention on the population of wage-earners, our sample 
inevitably includes people who currently have mixed employment histories as wage 
earners, civil-servants or self-employed. Also, current pure wage-earners may have had 
earlier spells as civil-servants or self-employed. For the purpose of our study we select an 
initial sample of individuals aged between 55 and 64 who were in active wage-earner 
employment in 2004 (part-time or full-time).162 Moreover, in each of the following sample 
years 2005-2009, we add individuals aged 55 in the given sample year, who satisfy the 
 
160 This dataset was initially created for the EMPOV project (Employment and Poverty in a Changing 
Society), financed by the Belgian Science Policy Administration (BELSPO research project TA/00/45). 
161 A similar condition is applied to spouses in each year of analysis. 
162 The workers who are still actively employed but receive some forms of (retirement-related) social 
security benefit are included. Coincidentally, the sample includes no persons aged 64 in 2004. 
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double condition of having been in active wage-earner employment in 2004 and still being 
in this status. We follow each individual until 2010, age 65 or until retirement.163  
We obtain a sample of 86,666 observations with possible retirement ages ranging from 56 
to 65 in years from 2005 to 2010, which corresponds to 26,880 distinct individuals. Table 
4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the 26,880 individuals, as they appear in their first 
observation year. Based on the active employment condition at older ages that we impose, 
we obtain a sample with a stronger male component than for the Belgian population as a 
whole. In line with the wider population, women in our sample have shorter careers than 
men.164 The breakdown of the sample by region implies that older Flemish men are more 
frequently still at work than in other regions. The majority of individuals are married.  
Table 4.1: Main Characteristics of the individuals present in the sample, in their first 
observation year 
 All Men Women 
    
N 26,880 16,981 9,899 
Breakdown by Region    
Flanders 61.7% 63.9% 58% 
Wallonia 29.6% 28.5% 31.4% 
Brussels 8.7% 7.6% 10.6% 
Breakdown by Marital 
Status 
   
Married 72.8% 77.1% 62.7% 
Unmarried or single 28.2% 22.9% 37.3% 
Average years of career 33.3 34.6 31.1 
    
Note: Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
 
163 Individuals who die or transfer to civil servant or self-employed status are also withdrawn from the 
sample. 
164 Because of the activity condition at older ages that we imposed, the sample of women we have selected 
have relatively longer working careers than in the total population of Belgian women at older ages.  
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present the observed exit rates by age for years 2005-2010 at possible 
retirement ages 56 to 65. These exit rates correspond to the transition from paid 
employment to inactivity through one of the four main exit pathways (residual exits165 are 
included in the old-age pension pathway). Some key ages are important: the ages of 58 
(the early eligibility age for conventional early retirement), 60 (old-age pension early 
eligibility age and conventional early retirement eligibility age) and 65 (old-age pension 
statutory eligibility age) are modal labor market exit ages. For women the situation is 
slightly different at the upper end of the age spectrum as the statutory eligibility age of 
the old-age pension increased during our sample period from 63 to 65 (reform of 1997) 
hence limiting the pivotal role of age 65.  
Figure 4.4: Exit rates by age for men – all sample 
 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Author’s 
calculations based on CBSS data. 
 
165 These includes exits through social aid, professional diseases, work injury, etc. 
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Figure 4.5: Exit rates by age for women – all sample 
 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Author’s 
calculations based on CBSS data. 
4.2.2 BENEFITS CALCULATION 
For each individual in the sample and for each year of observation, we compute the after-
tax stream of benefits that he or she could claim in case of exit through each of the four 
exit routes applying the rules at this possible retirement age– also using tax rules as 
applicable in the possible year of retirement. Expressed differently, for each individual i 
of age a, we calculate the after-tax benefit F9,(
, ) from the exit pathway k in case of 
retirement at age R, where R ∈ U56, 65V. Benefits are equal to the benefit entitlement from 
exit pathway k for all ages a≥R.  
For exits through the unemployment and disability programs, no early entitlement ages 
exist. For conventional early retirement exits, we do not verify the eligibility conditions 
as there are many exceptions to these rules that we cannot validate with our data. Hence 
positive benefits are applied for all a≥R in the unemployment, disability and conventional 
early retirement exit pathways with automatic rollover into old-age pension at the 
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statutory eligibility age. For old-age pension exits, given strict eligibility conditions, zero 
benefits are imputed in periods t where the eligibility conditions are not yet met, 
applicable positive benefits are counted otherwise. Once positive benefits are claimed, we 
assume they remain constant in real terms in future years as long as benefits are payable.  
We apply the social security rules for eligibility and benefit calculations as they were 
applicable for each year of first entitlement based on each individual’s career history, 
marital status and occupation as well as the partner’s occupation. Because social security 
and taxation rules differ greatly according to the spouse’s occupational status, we 
combine information from the national registry and individual occupational status to 
identify one-earner and two-earner couples in order to calculate the social security 
benefits accordingly. 
To validate our old-age pension benefit simulator, we compute old-age pension benefit 
entitlements using our simulation tool and we compare them with the observed real-
world old-age pension entitlements that individuals in our sample, who retired before the 
end of our observation period, are granted as indicated in the pension administration 
administrative records. As shown in Figure 4.6, both distributions are very close. For 
individuals who belong to our sample and who retired between 2005 and 2010, we find 
an average simulated pension of 1417.7 euros and an average real pension of 1388.1 ( euros 
the first year of retirement).166 In total, 87.6% of our simulated pensions are less than 200 
euros from the corresponding observed real pension amount.  
 
166 The remaining differences between our simulations and the real pensions are plausibly caused by 
missing data on personal characteristics and special career histories. For instance, we lack information on 
years on self-employment before 2004, those years are used in the accessibility criteria for and calculation 
of the minimum pension, which leads to an underestimation of the amount of minimum pension received 
by some individuals.  
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of observed and simulated old-age pension benefits, old-age 
pension retirees in the sample 2005-2010 
 
Note: Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
4.2.3 INCENTIVE MEASURES 
From these annual benefit amounts by scheme, we calculate three aggregate indicators of 
incentives for each individual: the aggregate social security wealth (SSW), the aggregate 
accrual of SSW (ACC) and the implicit tax on continued activity (ITAX).167  
Figure 4.7 presents the average SSW for each exit pathway by age for every year of 
observation and separately for men and women. The conventional early retirement 
pathway is the most generous scheme in terms of benefits for men and women. The 
disability presents the second highest average benefits thanks to relatively generous 
benefits ceilings (at least as compared to the unemployment and conventional early 
retirement). The third most favorable exit pathway is the unemployment, which includes 
the seniority supplement from age 58 onwards, but has relatively low benefits ceilings. 
 




The receipt of these benefits is combined with continued pension accruals until the 
statutory eligibility age. The least favorable exit pathway is the old-age pension scheme 
that is only available from age 60 onwards. Thus, the SSW of the old-age pension exit 
pathway increases with age before 60 because we assume that individuals receive an 
income of zero until they become eligible for the old-age pension. From age 60 until the 
statutory eligibility age, individuals can access the old-age pension if they meet the 
minimum career requirement (34 years in 2004 and 35 years from 2005 until 2013) and the 
SSW decreases as age increases. This reversal in average SSW amounts is caused by the 
fact that delaying claiming now has an instantaneous cost in terms of benefits payable – 
the latter cost being effectively larger than the gain from adding one year of earnings to 
the old-age pension benefits calculation. At age 65, it is not possible to receive 
unemployment, conventional early retirement or disability benefits anymore and workers 
are automatically transferred to the old-age pension system. Thus, the difference in SSW 
between the old-age pension and the other exit pathways decreases as we get closer to 
age 65 because there are fewer years spent in the unemployment, conventional early 








Figure 4.7: Average SSW by exit pathway (in 2010 euros) 
 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Author’s 
calculations based on CBSS data. 
We then aggregate these scheme-specific SSW measures into one aggregated SSW 
indicator, which sums the previously scheme-specific incentive measures. We use an 
aggregation method that is similar to the one applied by Dellis et al (2004): For each 
pathway except old-age pension, we use the number of observed exits into each route 
from a certain age until the statutory eligibility age as a proportion of the total number of 
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employed individuals at each age as weights, and we further differentiate the weights by 
sex and year.168 The old-age pension scheme takes the residual weight.  
Figure 4.8 presents the aggregated SSW measure for men and women separately. The 
incentives are mostly driven by the SSW of the old-age pension and of the conventional 
early retirement (from age 56 to 60 only). The aggregated SSW of men and women 
increases at age 58 following an increase in the conventional early retirement participation 
rate, and then decreases until age 64 because of the growing influence of the SSW of the 
old-age pension. Unsurprisingly, the SSW is lower for women than for men because of 
lower average pension entitlements. 
 
168 See appendix for the weights used in the aggregation method. 
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Figure 4.8: Average aggregated individual SSW, by gender (in 2010 euros) 
 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Author’s 
calculations based on CBSS data. 
Figure 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the aggregated ACC and ITAX measures for both sexes.169 
The ITAX of men and women is negative for exits between 56 and 59. This is mainly due 
to the influence of the old-age pension system, which is not available at those ages. 
Individuals are imputed a pension of zero until the old-age pension system becomes 
available at the early eligibility age of 60 if they have a career that is long enough or at the 
 
169
 See Chapter three for a description of the accrual and the implicit tax on continued activity. 
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statutory eligibility age. The aggregated ITAX of men is less negative than that of women 
because of the larger influence of the conventional early retirement program, associated 
with large positive ITAX. From age 60 onwards, the ITAX turns positive for men as they 
have largely reached the old-age pension early eligibility age. As for women, since they 
are less likely to access the early eligibility age old-age pension because of career 
conditions, the ITAX generated by the old-age pension remains negative for the same 
reasons mentioned above. At age 65, the ITAX is only composed of benefits from the OAP 
pathway since other pathways are not available anymore.  
Figure 4.9: Average ACC, by gender (in 2010 euros) 
 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
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Figure 4.10: Average ITAX, by gender (in 2010 euros) 
 






4.3 REGRESSION RESULTS 
In this section we present the regression results we obtained from five different models: 
a standard linear probability model, the same model with fixed effects and random effects 
and a probit model with and without random effects.  
The dependent variable is retirement; it is equal to one if the individual exits employment 
through one of the four exit pathways within the year, and zero otherwise. It corresponds 
to the observed exit patterns presented in figures 4.4 and 4.5.  
We use the previously derived three incentive measures as explanatory variables, and 
control for a large set of personal and socio-demographic variables: being a female, having 
a partner, having an active partner, a dummy if the individual lives in Wallonia or 
Brussels (living in Flanders is the reference) and age (and its squared form). We control 
for the individual’s earnings and of his or her partner by including indicators of average 
lifetime earnings170 and the current salary (and their squared forms).  
We control for job related characteristics: part-time work, white-collar worker (with blue-
collar worker as reference) and two binary variables indicating if the individual works in 
the primary or the tertiary industry sectors (working in the secondary sector is the 
reference). Finally, we add an eligibility binary variable that indicates whether the 
individual has reached the statutory eligibility age  of old-age pension, set at age 65 for 
men and 63, 64, 65 for women between 2003 and 2005, 2006 and 2008 and after 2009, 
 
170 The average lifetime earnings for the reference person is calculated as WX Y (84Z)  and the average 
lifetime earnings for the partner is calculated as WX Y [7  because of a lack of data on the partner’s 
age (45 is the standard complete career). 
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respectively.171 For the probit regressions, we report marginal effects estimated at the 
mean. 
Table 4.2 presents the results of our five models using the total sample of individuals aged 
56 to 65 between the year 2005 to 2010.172 We report the results for models using the SSW 
and the ITAX measures of incentive in the body of the text.173 The marginal effect of ITAX 
is positive and significant in every model, which means that a larger tax on continued 
activity leads to higher probability of retirement. In all models except for the fixed effect 
model, the effect of SSW is positive and significant. The fixed effect model removes the 
impact of invariant unobserved individual characteristics such as demand for leisure and 
time preferences. It is likely that the SSW measure in the other models is positively 
correlated with these unobserved variables and thus captures their positive effect on the 
retirement probability. We are thus left with a negative and significant impact of the SSW 
on the retirement probability in the fixed effects model – a result that is in line with 
previous findings for Belgium (Dellis et al, 2004). The fixed effects results should, 
however, be read with caution as we only have a limited number of periods of observation 
for each person in our sample (3.33 on average) and some unobserved characteristics 
(health trends, e.g.) might also be age-varying.  
 
 
171 While age dummies are potentially well equipped to capture age-based focal points and bounded 
rationality concerns as in the behavioral economics literature on the subject (Seibold, 2017), eligibility 
variables also have their role to play as they capture factors going beyond age and financial incentives. 
This includes, for example, issues of liquidity constraints. In chapter six, we explore the effect of different 
age specifications  in details. 
172 Because of the dynamic setting of our dependent variable, we do not include the first observation year 
of individuals, as the dependent variable cannot vary at age 55 or in year 2004. 
173 The regressions that include the accrual measure as explanatory variable instead of the ITAX measure 
present very similar results and are presented in the appendix. 
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Table 4.2:  Retirement – Total sample  





      
ITAX 0.079*** 0.148*** 0.093*** 0.063*** 0.705*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
SSW/100,000 0.162*** -0.178*** 0.202*** 0.172*** 0.194*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Female -0.053***  -0.069*** -0.055*** -0.063*** 
 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 0.559*** 0.461*** 0.393*** 0.610*** 0.633*** 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Age squared -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEA 0.354*** 0.408*** 0.335*** 0.381*** 0.248*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) 
Partner -0.012*** 0.001 -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Active partner 0.000 -0.017*** 0.005 0.004 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Brussels -0.021***  -0.036*** -0.020*** -0.024*** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Wallonia -0.012***  -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Part-time 0.021*** -0.064*** 0.004 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
White collar -0.036*** -0.082*** -0.053*** -0.035*** -0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.024) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Primary sector -0.038***  -0.059*** -0.036*** -0.046*** 
 (0.014)  (0.023) (0.011) (0.016) 
Tertiary sector 0.003  0.020*** 0.001 0.002 




-0.195*** -2.001*** -0.254*** -0.213*** -0.243*** 
 (0.010) (0.144) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) 
Squared form 0.019*** 0.261*** 0.028*** 0.019*** 0.22*** 





-0.033*** -0.088*** -0.054*** -0.028*** -0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Squared form 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
















 (0.006) (0.022) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Squared form -0.011*** -0.014 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current salary 
of partner/1000 
-0.028*** -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Squared form 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 86,666 86,666 86,666 86,666 86,666 
      
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. For Probit regressions, the table reports marginal effects estimated at the 
mean. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Reaching the statutory eligibility age increases the probability of retirement. This effect 
hints at the existence of a corner solution for numerous individuals: employment 
legislation and social protection legislation are such that individuals face hurdles to 
continuing work after the statutory eligibility age. If individuals did not have to face such 
hurdles, their choices would likely be smoother with overall later retirement.  
Being a woman significantly decreases the probability of retirement. Being older increases 
the probability to retire but at a progressively decreasing rate. Having a partner has a 
negative and significant impact on retirement, except in the fixed effect model. Having an 
active partner decreases the probability of retirement in the fixed effect model. We 
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observe higher instantaneous retirement probabilities in Flanders than in Brussels and 
Wallonia. Working part-time significantly increases the probability to retire, except in the 
fixed effect model where the opposite prevails. Both results need not be contradictory. 
While the part-time variable captures a status in the other models (being a part-time 
worker), in the fixed effect specification it captures the transition into part-time status 
(shifting into part-time status). Being a white-collar worker and working in the primary 
sector (as compared to the secondary sector) decreases the retirement probability in every 
model. Higher average lifetime earnings and higher current salary decrease the 
probability to retire at an accelerating rate. Finally, the average lifetime earnings of the 
partner increase the probability to retire at a decelerating rate and the current salary of 
the partner decreases the probability to retire at an accelerating rate.  
In Table 4.3, we report regressions separately for men and women. We only present the 
results for the probit model in the body of the text for the sake of simplicity and because 
the probit model presents the best fit in terms of its predictions of retirement rates 
compared to the observed retirement rates.174 We find a positive and significant effect of 
ITAX and SSW for both sexes and the effect of ITAX and SSW is slightly stronger for 
women than for men. For the rest, the results are qualitatively similar to Table 4.2 and we 
observe stronger effects of age, reaching the statutory eligibility age and the region on the 
retirement probability of men. Having a partner significantly decreases the retirement 
probability of men but it significantly increases the retirement probability of women. 
However, having an active spouse decreases the retirement probability of men but it is 
not the case for women as it increases their retirement probability. This opposite effect on 
men and women explains the effect of having an active spouse in table 4.2 that is non-
significant. The positive effect of having an active spouse for men, and the negative effect 
 
174 All results are presented in the appendix. 
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for women would indicate that women follow their partner’s decision, while men do not 
follow their partner’s. Being a white-collar worker, working part-time and working in the 
primary sector (as compared to the secondary sector) significantly decreases the 
retirement probability of men but not of women (part-time work is only significant at the 
10% level for women). Interestingly, the effect of the average lifetime earnings and of the 
current earnings is stronger for women than for men. However, the effect of the average 
earnings and the current earnings of the partner is stronger for men than for women.  
Table 4.3: Retirement using the probit model – by sex 
  Male Female 
   
ITAX 0.061*** 0.075*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
SSW/100,000 0.158*** 0.247*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
Age 0.610*** 0.590*** 
 (0.037) (0.049) 
Age squared -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
SEA 0.470*** 0.269*** 
 (0.021) (0.026) 
Partner -0.028*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Active spouse 0.010** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Brussels -0.028*** -0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Wallonia -0.012*** -0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Part-time 0.028*** 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
White collar -0.051*** -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Primary sector -0.043*** 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.038) 
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Tertiary sector 0.008*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Average salary 
of the reference 
person/1000 
-0.201*** -0.309*** 
 (0.012) (0.021) 
Squared form 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 




 (0.004) (0.006) 
Squared form 0.003*** 0.011*** 





 (0.010) (0.007) 
Squared form -0.014** -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Current salary of 
the partner/1000 
-0.037*** -0.011*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
Squared form 0.002 0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Observations 56,377 30,289 
   
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 
2005-2010. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The table reports marginal effects estimated at 
the mean. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
4.4 SIMULATIONS 
In order to illustrate the effect of incentive measures on the probability to exit the labor 
market, we present the results of counterfactual simulations. In this exercise, we rely on 
the regression results of Table 4.2 using the probit model. Figure 4.11 plots separately the 
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actual exit rates and the predictions by the model – by sex and age. We find an increasing 
probability of retirement over age, that spikes at the statutory eligibility age of the old-
age pension system. However, our predictions do not fully capture the spikes that appear 
at the early eligibility age of the old-age pension (60). 
 
Figure 4.11: Retirement rate for men and women– actual and predicted baseline 
 
 
Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
In a second step, we use these predictions as a baseline for our counterfactual simulations. 
In this simulation, we predict the value of the incentive measures that would have 
prevailed if the social security schemes had remained unreformed and in their 2004 
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format. The reforms include the delaying of the statutory eligibility age old-age pension 
for women in 2006 and 2009, the one-year increase in the career conditions for the early 
eligibility age old-age pension in 2005 and the introduction of the pension bonus in 2007. 
All other covariates are kept at their actual value. The aim of such a counterfactual 
simulation is to eradicate all changes due to policy reforms and to examine what would 
have been the exit rate of older Belgian workers without the reforms that happened 
between 2005 and 2010. 
Figure 4.12 presents the average probability of retirement for the total population aged 
56-65 for years 2005 to 2010. We observe that the counterfactual is higher than the baseline 
for every year of observation, which means that the reforms implemented during these 
years have been efficient in decreasing opportunity to exit the labor market. However, 
these averages can hide different situations with respect to age. In the following figures 
we show the evolution of the exit rate by sex and year for certain key eligibility ages. 
Figures 4.13 shows simulated counterfactual exit rates for men aged 60 and 65. We see 
that for men aged 60, the counterfactual is higher than the baseline for every year of 
observation, indicating that the reform that increased the career conditions for the early 
eligibility of the old-age pension has fulfilled its role of closing the early exit through the 
old-age pension.175 Nevertheless, we observe an increase in the retirement rate of the 
baseline scenario starting in 2008, while the counterfactual simulation displays a 
decreasing retirement rate. This is due to the introduction of the pension bonus with an 
effective date in 2008, granted for continued work after age 62 or 44 years of career. The 
bonus directly increases the SSW with its strongly positive sign, leading to higher 
counterfactual exit rates through an income effect. The dynamic incentive effect through 
 
175 In 2010, the average years of career per worker aged 60 decreases in our sample compared to previous 
years, leading to a decrease in the simulated ITAX and thus a decrease in the predicted retirement rate of 
the counterfactual simulation. 
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a reduced ITAX that would lead to lower retirement rates remains moderate as we find 
that the SSW has a stronger impact on the retirement probability than the ITAX does (see 
table 4.3). For men at retirement age 65, while the counterfactual is higher during the first 
years of simulation, the baseline dominates in all later years due to the introduction of the 
pension bonus. This result contradicts the simulation of incentive measures in chapter 
three, in which the pension bonus was expected to create an incentive to stay on the labor 
market through a reduced ITAX effect. 
Figure 4.12: Counterfactual simulation – total population aged 56-65 
 
Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
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Figure 4.13: Counterfactual simulation– Men aged 60 and 65 - by year 
 
Note: The baseline is obtained from the regressions from Table 2 using the ITAX 
specification and the probit model. Due to the structure of the dataset, no one is aged 65 
in 2005. Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
Figure 4.14 presents the simulations of the baseline and the counterfactual scenarios for 
women at ages 60, 63, 64 and 65 where we vary the ITAX and the SSW measures and 
distinguish the effect of the statutory eligibility age changes. Ages 63 to 65 correspond to 
the statutory eligibility age for the successive cohorts under analysis. Looking at the 
simulation for women aged 60, we observe similar results as for men. The counterfactual 
simulation shows that the retirement rates would have been higher without the reform 
that increased the career conditions for the early eligibility for the old-age pension system. 
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Here however, the effect of the pension bonus is not as strong as it was for men because 
women have shorter careers on average and were thus less likely to satisfy the eligibility 
conditions for the pension bonus at age 60. At the age of 65, as for the men, we observe 
the impact of the pension bonus as a result of the increase of SSW.  
At ages 63 and 64, in addition to the ITAX and the SSW variable the statutory eligibility 
variable matters in the counterfactual simulation. When taking statutory eligibility age 
explicitly into the analysis, we document the key role of eligibility variables. There are 
important decreases in the retirement probability of women of the baseline simulation as 
compared to the counterfactual including the statutory eligibility age dummy at the age 
of 63 in 2006 and 64 in 2009. These simulations indicate that the 1997 reform that equalized 
the statutory eligibility age of men and women fulfilled its role of limiting the access of 
women to the old-age pension system before the statutory eligibility age, mostly through 
a gate-keeping logic rather than through financial incentives themselves in line with 
























Note: The baseline is obtained from the regressions from Table 2 using the ITAX 
specification and the probit model. Coincidentally, no sample-member is aged 65 in 2005. 
Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
Finally, in Figure 4.15, we present the employment survival curves according to the 
predicted probability of exit and our counterfactual simulation. These curves show the 
proportion of workers who remain in employment between ages 56 and 65 if we start 
with a fully employed population at age 56. We compare the situations in 2005 and 2010 
for which we have data with the counterfactual of 2010 in which no reforms happened 
between 2005 and 2010. We observe that the reforms have been effective in keeping 
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workers in employment since both the 2005 and the counterfactual display lower 
cumulative probability to be active. 
Figure 4.15: Employment survival curve 
 
Author’s calculations based on CBSS data. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we explore the link between social security incentives and labor supply 
using data from an administrative panel data set. Following a set of Belgian workers from 
the private sector for at most ten years, we calculate how the various reforms 
implemented during the period have affected the financial incentives to retire from the 
labor market.  
We consider both the wealth effect as captured by the Social Security Wealth and the 
dynamic incentive effect when changing retirement behavior at the margin (social 
security accrual and implicit tax on continued activity). Given the Belgian landscape that 
offers older workers several possibilities of exiting, we aggregate the social security 
scheme specific measures into one single incentive indicator. 
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Our general regression analysis shows that the effect of SSW and ITAX are positive, for 
example more generous measures induce higher retirement rates. When we consider men 
and women separately, we find a stronger effect of the dynamic incentive (ITAX) and 
SSW for women.  
Based on these results we perform a series of simulations in which we neutralize the 
various reforms that took place since the beginning of our period of observation. While 
the overarching guiding principle behind these reforms was to increase older workers’ 
labor force participation, they were rather different in their effects on incentive variables: 
the tightening of eligibility conditions unambiguously led to lower labor market 
retirement rates, the introduction of the pension bonus for continued work led to a 
positive wealth effect – hence increasing retirement hazards. Our results are ambiguous, 
with strongly incentivizing effects at lower ages and more mixed results at higher ages – 
particularly for men. From a policy perspective, the abolition of the pension bonus in 2015 
can be considered as a consistent measure if the primary aim of successive governments 
was the increase of the effective retirement age. Also, closing early entitlement routes 
remains a powerful policy tool – as illustrated by the lower retirement hazards in the 
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4.A.1. AGGREGATION WEIGHTS BY EXIT PATHWAYS FOR MEN (AVERAGED 
OVER YEARS) 
 
4.A.2. AGGREGATION WEIGHTS BY EXIT PATHWAYS FOR WOMEN 




4.A.3. REGRESSION RESULTS - TOTAL SAMPLE WITH ACCRUAL  





      
Accrual/ 
100,000 
-0.191*** -0.290*** -0.135*** -0.283*** -0.293*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) 
SSW/100,000 0.161*** -0.155*** 0.207*** 0.168*** 0.184*** 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
Female -0.059***  -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.065*** 
 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 0.588*** 0.482*** 0.428*** 0.622*** 0.642*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Age squared -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEA 0.362*** 0.422*** 0.347*** 0.386*** 0.251*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) 
Partner -0.012*** 0.000 -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Active partner 0.000 -0.017*** 0.005 0.004 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Brussels -0.021***  -0.036*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Wallonia -0.012***  -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Part-time 0.021*** -0.064*** 0.004 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
White collar -0.033*** -0.081*** -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.024) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Primary sector -0.037***  -0.056** -0.035*** -0.043*** 
 (0.014)  (0.023) (0.011) (0.015) 
Tertiary sector 0.004  0.020*** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Average salary 
of the reference 
person/1000 
-0.183*** -2.170*** -0.254*** -0.198*** -0.221*** 
 (0.010) (0.145) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) 
Squared form 0.017*** 0.293*** 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
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 (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Current salary 
of the reference 
person/1000 
-0.031*** -0.089*** -0.053*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Squared form 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 




0.067*** 0.060*** 0.089*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Squared form -0.010*** -0.014 -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 




-0.027*** -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.103*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Squared form 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 86,666 86,666 86,666 86,666 86,666 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. For Probit regressions, the table reports marginal effects estimated at the 



















4.A.4 REGRESSION RESULTS  - MEN WITH ITAX  





      
Accrual/ 100,000 0.075*** 0.146*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
SSW/100,000 0.143*** -0.226*** 0.179*** 0.158*** 0.182*** 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Age 0.578*** 0.643*** 0.471*** 0.610*** 0.654*** 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) 
Age squared -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEA 0.437*** 0.441*** 0.413*** 0.470*** 0.311*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) 
Partner -0.020*** -0.002 -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Active partner 0.006 -0.020*** 0.011** 0.010** 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Brussels -0.028***  -0.049*** -0.028*** -0.035*** 
 (0.006)  (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Wallonia -0.013***  -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Part-time 0.027*** -0.075*** 0.007 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
White collar -0.051*** -0.099*** -0.077*** -0.051*** -0.058*** 
 (0.004) (0.031) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Primary sector -0.044***  -0.067*** -0.043*** -0.055*** 
 (0.016)  (0.025) (0.013) (0.018) 
Tertiary sector 0.009***  0.031*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average salary 
of the reference 
person/1000 
-0.176*** -1.091*** -0.231*** -0.201*** -0.235*** 
 (0.012) (0.192) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) 
Squared form 0.017*** 0.175*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.002) (0.021) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Current salary of 
the reference 




 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Squared form 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 




0.087*** 0.008 0.118*** 0.090*** 0.104*** 
 (0.010) (0.046) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
Squared form -0.014** 0.002 -0.023*** -0.014** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Current salary of 
the partner/1000 
-0.038*** -0.030*** -0.050*** -0.037*** -0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Squared form 0.003** 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Observations 56,377 56,377 56,377 56,377 56,377 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. For Probit regressions, the table reports marginal effects estimated at the 











4.A.5. REGRESSION RESULTS - WOMEN WITH ITAX  





      
Accrual/ 100,000 0.096*** 0.159*** 0.117*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
SSW/100,000 0.256*** -0.060** 0.294*** 0.247*** 0.234*** 
 (0.009) (0.025) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
Age 0.494*** 0.126** 0.181*** 0.590*** 0.577*** 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.052) (0.049) (0.051) 
Age squared -0.004*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEA 0.255*** 0.322*** 0.203*** 0.269*** 0.169*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.014) 
Partner 0.022*** 0.062 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.049) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Active partner -0.027*** -0.014 -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.0233*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Brussels -0.012*  -0.018* -0.011* -0.012* 
 (0.006)  (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) 
Wallonia -0.010**  -0.013* -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Part-time 0.007 -0.043*** -0.003 0.008* 0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
White collar -0.010* -0.050 -0.012 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.038) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Primary sector 0.001  -0.010 0.010 0.008 
 (0.036)  (0.056) (0.038) (0.038) 
Tertiary sector -0.008*  0.001 -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Average salary 
of the reference 
person/1000 
-0.314*** -3.416*** -0.343*** -0.309*** -0.332*** 
 (0.022) (0.326) (0.031) (0.021) (0.024) 
Squared form 0.021*** 0.464*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.053) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Current salary of 
the reference 




 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Squared form 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.0011*** 




0.033*** 0.080*** 0.053*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.026) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Squared form -0.003 -0.017* -0.007* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.026) 
Current salary of 
the partner/1000 
-0.015*** -0.055*** -0.028*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Squared form 0.001** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 30,289 30,289 30,289 30,289 30,289 
Note: Full sample of person-year observations 2005-2010. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. For Probit regressions, the table reports marginal effects estimated at the 





























WORK, LABOR FORCE EXIT AND BENEFIT 
CLAIMING PATTERNS IN BELGIUM 








In the literature and in the public debate, the transition from employment to inactivity is 
often summarized into a binary decision: retirement. Said differently, the decision to retire 
is frequently equaled to simultaneously stop working and claiming (early-) social security 
benefits. This is the case in numerous studies that analyze the impact of incentives 
generated by the social security system on the retirement decision (see Diamond and 
Gruber, 1999; Blondal and Scarpetta, 1999; Dellis et. al., 2004, among others).  
Increasingly, however, individuals face more complex choice sets, that sometimes lead 
them to – optimally or not – disjoin labor market exit from social security benefit claiming. 
Few papers document the differences between the decisions to exit the labor force and to 
claim social security benefit. The standard definition of retirement is usually based on the 
working status of the individual and on the simultaneous receipt of social security 
benefits. Said differently, an individual is usually defined as retired once he stops 
working for pay and starts claiming social security benefits.  However, MacInnis (2009) 
reminds that retirement and retirement benefit claiming are two separate decisions that 
individuals often approach simultaneously. Coile et. al. (2002) illustrate that there exist 
substantial retirement incentives embedded in the US Social Security system that 
encourage people to optimally disjoin the labor force exit and benefit claiming decisions. 
In fact, part of the benefit of continued work on pension wealth is tied to delayed benefit 
claiming. Therefore, assuming that both decisions are simultaneous overstates the effect 
of labor force exit on pension wealth. Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) develop a structural 
model of benefit claiming, wealth and labor force exit that includes the option to reverse 
from states of lesser to greater work.  
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Research that focuses on a single binary decision yields an incomplete and biased view of 
how the social security system influences the behavior of older workers for three reasons.  
First, social security reforms can potentially affect the decision to exit the labor force and 
the decision to claim social security benefits differently – possibly disjoining them. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) and Benítez-Silva and Yin (2009) analyze the impact of 
social security reforms176 and find a differentiated effect of the reforms on full-time work 
and benefit receipt. In another paper, Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) study the impact of 
the elimination of an earnings test for work above the early eligibility age and find that 
the reform increased the employment rate of older workers but resulted in an earlier flow 
of benefit claiming. Further, they study the effect of an increase in the early eligibility age 
and find that it increased the employment rate but delayed the flow of benefit claiming. 
Haben (2010) studies the impact of the introduction of permanent benefit reductions for 
early retirees and finds that this reform delayed benefit claiming by an average of 14 
months and employment exit by an average of 10 months. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) 
study the impact of an increase in the early retirement age in Austria and find that it had 
a positive impact on the employment rate of high wage and healthy workers. However, 
they also find that it increased unemployment benefit claims of low-wage and unhealthy 
workers, who tend to use these benefits to bridge the newly created gap to the early 
retirement age. 
Second, the option of combining (part-time) work with social security benefits claiming 
influences labor market decisions at older ages, arguably encouraging some workers to 
stay in the labor force longer (Schmid, 1998). For instance, the time credit scheme allows 
 
176 Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) simulate the effect of an increase in the statutory and early eligibility ages of the old-age pension 
and the removal of the payroll tax after an individual has reached the statutory retirement age. Benítez-Silva and Yin (2009) analyze 
the impact of an increase in the statutory retirement age, the elimination of an earnings test and an increase in the delayed retirement 
credit on the benefit claiming decision and on the level of benefit receipt. 
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for part-time work and part-time unemployment benefit receipt at older ages177. Such 
program was implemented with the objective of keeping older workers on the labor force 
longer. 
 On the upside, Duval (2003) notes that because of the decreasing marginal utility of work, 
part-time work (with or without benefit claiming) can improve the welfare of older 
workers and be a valuable policy tool to reduce the incentives to leave the labor force 
early. Moreover, Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008) use US data and a duration analysis 
framework and find that the longer a worker who claims early old-age pension benefits 
stays on the labor force, the less likely he is to exit the labor force before the statutory 
eligibility age.  
On the downside, Albanese et. al. (2015) analyze the impact of the Belgian time credit 
scheme and find that this program has a positive effect on labor market participation for 
the first two (four) years of continuous benefit receipt for men (women), after which the 
opposite effect is observed. Nevertheless, once individuals become eligible for the early 
old-age pension, they find that the time credit scheme has a negative effect on work. 
Finally, using empirical data from nine OECD countries (including Belgium), Börsch-
Supan et. al. (2017) find that allowing for the combination of work and partial old-age 
pension benefits claiming has a small positive impact on total labor force participation 
but a negative impact on the total number of hours worked in the economy as some 
workers who would have remained employed full-time until retirement might now opt 
for part-time work.  
Third, distinguishing labor force exit from benefit claiming decisions and identifying both 
short-and long-run term fiscal costs of benefit claims are two issues of prime policy 
 
177 See chapter 2 for a detailed review of the time credit scheme. 
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importance in Belgium. The country has a highly complex landscape of labor force exit 
and benefit claiming options – that are not always fine-tuned. Indeed, the ubiquitous 
nature of partial or full labor force exit options – even at rather low ages – and the absence 
of penalty for early claimers of old-age pension benefits renders the short and the long-
term fiscal stakes particularly high. From a public finance point of view, periods of social 
security benefits receipt generate immediate costs through benefit payouts (e.g., 
unemployment benefits) but may also generate substantial future fiscal costs as most 
social security benefits are associated with uninterrupted pension accruals combined with 
an absence of contribution payments178. This is in sharp contrast to many other social 
security systems in Europe and beyond (e.g., Germany and the US) where the strict 
reliance on a Bismarckian insurance logic ensures that benefit accrual is conditional on 
contribution payment.179  
The purpose of this chapter is to document the evidence of the split-up of retirement into 
two distinct decisions: the exit of the labor force and the claim of social security benefits. 
Such distinction leads us to consider four different statuses of individuals, based on work 
and benefit claiming. We demonstrate the relevance of such classification by displaying 
descriptive evidence of each status using an administrative dataset of the Crossroad Bank 
for Social Security. Further, we analyze the determinants of both decisions separately and 
test the assumption that the combination of work and benefit claiming encourages older 
workers to stay on the labor force longer.  The aim of the chapter is to pave the 
groundwork for more refined future analysis of individual retirement behavior and to 
raise awareness on potential distinct impact of reforms on both decisions and on fiscal 
cost considerations of different types of workers. Such analysis will serve to inform and 
 
178 See chapter 2 for more information on the social security programs that allow for continued accruals in pension benefits: the 
conventional early retirement, the unemployment insurance, the disability insurance and the time credit schemes (among others). 
179 In Germany, as well as in large parts of Central and Eastern Europe, contribution payment by an individual or on his behalf is 
required for periods of activity or covered inactivity. In the US, benefit accrual is linked to earnings only, simply excluding periods 
on other types of (replacement) income from pension accrual. 
208 
 
facilitate the policy making process regarding the reforming of the old-age pension 
system.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section defines a 
classification of the population into four statuses that allows for the distinction between 
the labor exit and benefit claiming decisions and summarizes the key characteristics of 
the dataset. Section 5.3 documents the employment rates of older Belgian workers from 
2004 to 2010 and presents empirical evidence of the differences between labor exits and 
benefit claiming decisions. Section 5.4 introduces the methodology for section 5.5 that 
contains the analysis of the determinants of labor force exit and benefit claiming. Finally, 
section 5.6 concludes.  
5.2 KEY CONCEPTS AND DATA 
5.2.1 LABOR FORCE EXIT AND THE BENEFIT CLAIMING DECISIONS 
In the literature and in the public debate, the transition from work to inactivity at the end 
of working life is often summarized into a single decision: retirement, which involves 
both stopping to work and starting to claim some form of social security benefits. While 
such a view on transitions might have been appropriate in the past, this is not necessarily 
the case anymore when individuals face complex incentives generated by modern-day 
social security programs. 
The Belgian social security system clearly generates an environment where labor force 
exit and social security benefit claiming are no longer necessarily synchronized, be it 
optimally or de facto. There is a wide array of pathways from work into retirement, some 
of which allow for full or part-time periods of social security benefits claims combinable 
with (continued or new) streams of work income. As a result, four general statuses of 
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individuals emerge: (1) work and no claim, (2) work and claim, (3) no work and claim, (4) 
no work and no claim. 
1. The first status, work and no claim, includes individuals who work (full or part-
time) without claiming any type of social security benefits based on their own earnings 
records. It also comprises workers who receive derived old-age pension benefits, such 
as the survivor pension or those workers whose spouse receive the old-age pension 
benefit at the household replacement rate180. 
2. The second status, work and claim, includes individuals who work (full or part-
time) and claim social security benefits based on their own earnings records.181 For 
instance, older workers can claim time credit benefits or receive benefits from 
temporary or part-time unemployment insurance, part-time conventional early 
retirement, part-time disability insurance, etc.182 Individuals who receive old-age 
pension benefits can also work and receive an income, which is subject to an earnings 
limit.  
3. The third status, no work and claim, contains individuals who do not work but 
claim social security benefits based on their own earnings record. These social security 
benefits include benefits from the old-age pension program but also from programs 
that serve as early retirement pathways such as the disability insurance, the 
conventional early retirement and the unemployment insurance.182 Individuals in this 
status can combine social security benefits based on their own earnings records with 
derived old-age pension benefits (survivor pension for instance).  
 
180 See chapter 2 for information on the isolated and household replacement rates.  
181 Different social security institutes have different registration timing of their variables. For instance, the old-age pension office 
records the status information at the end of the period while the employment office records the information at the beginning of the 
period. Therefore, in order to avoid that individuals transferring from a status to another are classified in the status work and claim, 
we impose a condition of a minimum of two years in the status work and claim. In the case an individual is identified for only one 
year in the status work and claim, we transform the observation into the destination status. For example, if an individual is labelled as 
working (year 1) – working and receiving disability benefits (year 2) – receiving disability benefits (year 3), then we relabel the 
second year as receiving disability benefits only.  
182 Older workers can also receive (part-time) social assistance benefits, (part-time) work injury or (part-time) professional disease 
benefits but these programs play a less prominent role in the retirement analysis debate. 
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4. The fourth and last status, no work and no claim, includes people who neither 
work nor claim any benefits based on their own earnings records. Such individuals can 
either be financially dependent on their spouse or benefit from derived old-age pension 
benefits such as the survivor pension or have a spouse who receives old-age pension 
benefits at the household replacement rate. 
From these statuses, we define the labor force exit and the benefit claiming decisions (see 
figure 5.1). The labor force exit decision can be interpreted as a transfer from either of the 
two work statuses (work and no claim or work and claim), to either of the two non-work 
statuses (no work and claim or no work and no claim). The social security benefit claiming 
decision can be interpreted as a transfer from either of the two no claim statuses (work 
and no claim or no work and no claim), to either of the two claim statuses (work and claim 
or no work and claim). 
Figure 5.1: Classification of individuals according to their work and claim status and the 
labor force exit and benefit claiming decisions 
 




When introducing this classification, the idea is clearly not a pure accounting one. This 
type of grouping of individuals matters for real world policy problems. First, for 
researchers and policymakers interested in labor markets, it is key to know the 
characteristics of workers to gauge how they are influenced by different retirement 
options and to predict how labor might respond to policy changes. For example, when 
considering policies targeting a reduced tax wedge on labor, it is essential to understand 
what type of jobs are being created: are these new pure full-time jobs, or are they part-
time jobs that allow for the claim of social security benefits. If the latter, the beneficial 
effect of extra workers is likely somewhat lower than in the first case and any possible 
self-financing effects of labor tax wedge reforms might be severely hampered.183  
Second, for researchers interested in the long-term financial sustainability of the pension 
system or the broader social security system, the distinction between labor force exit and 
benefit claiming also matters. For example, while partial pension arrangements might 
induce some people to work longer (see Benítez-Silva and Heiland, 2008), they may also 
have large fiscal costs if benefits are not adjusted in (at least) an actuarially fair way. 
Indeed, in Belgium, benefit claiming is often not only associated with current fiscal costs 
but also with differed fiscal liabilities, as periods spent on benefits count towards the 
pension history, be it at the rate of the last wage or a lower lump-sum amount. In fact, 
differed fiscal costs can easily outweigh current costs because of non-linear accrual of 
future pension entitlements.184 
 
183 The analysis of Capéau et al (2018) on the self-financing nature of recent labor tax reforms in Belgium 
could be further strengthened by our classification.  
184 For example, as a result of pension accrual for periods of inactivity, individuals may pass some hurdles 
in terms of minimum pension eligibility. 
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5.2.2 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
We use a detailed administrative panel dataset retrieved from the Datawarehouse Labor 
Market and Social Protection of the Belgian Crossroad Bank for Social Security that 
combines data from various social security institutions and the national registry.185 The 
dataset initially contains quarterly information for the years 2004 to 2010 on the labor 
market status, social security benefit receipt status and personal characteristics of 150,000 
individuals aged between 51 and 63 in 2004. The dataset also contains detailed 
information on the earnings and social security benefit receipt histories. Finally, the 
dataset includes similar information for each partner186 of the sampled individuals, if 
applicable. 
From these initial cohorts, we select the observations of individuals aged between 55 and 
64 between 2004 and 2010 and we drop the observations of individuals after they die. We 
collapse the data into one single observation per year and per individual, using the 
information of the last quarter of each year. Similarly to previous chapters, we focus our 
attention on individuals in the wage-earner regime since they represent the majority of 
workers in Belgium and because of the sheer complexity and differences between the 
different working regimes.187 Therefore, we select only individuals who were working 
(full or part-time) as a wage earner188  in the first year of observation (year 2004 or age 55 
for those who were younger than 55 in 2004), regardless of their benefit claiming status. 
Further, we add the condition of a total minimum wage-earner career of 10 years (of at 
 
185 This dataset was initially created for the EMPOV project (Employment and Poverty in a Changing 
Society), financed by the Belgian Science Policy Administration (BELSPO research project TA/00/45) 
186 Married or legally cohabitating. 
187 See chapter two for a thorough explanation of why we focus on wage earner workers. 
188 Individuals with mixed careers, i.e. that have been affiliated with the civil servant or the self-employed 
regime in addition to their wage earner status are also included. 
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least one third of a full-time occupation189 each). Finally, we discard the observations of 
workers who transfer to the self-employed or civil-servant working regime before they 
retire or before the end of our observation period.  
Our final sample is composed of 27,666 individuals and 146,522 observations for years 
ranging from 2004 to 2010 and ages ranging from 54 to 64.190 In Table 5.1, we report key 
personal characteristics of our sampled individuals as they appear in the first year of 
observation. Unsurprisingly, our sample is composed of mostly males because of the 
career condition we impose on our sample. 
Table 5.1: Main characteristics of sampled individuals in the first year of observation 
 Number of observations Proportion of total sample 
Sex 
Male 10,215 36.92 % 
Female 17,451 63.08 % 
Region 
Flanders 16,121 58.247 % 
Wallonia 9,202 33.26 % 
Brussels 2,340 8.47 % 
Marital status 
Married 19,987 72.24 % 
Unmarried 7,679 27.76 % 
Source: CBSS dataset 
 
189 This corresponds to at least 104 working or assimilated days (ie. days spent on replacement income) in 
a year, which is the condition for a year of career to be taken into account in the early eligibility criteria of 
the old-age pension benefit. 
190 Because of the structure of the data, we do not have data on each age-year combination. We are missing 
information on individuals aged 55 in 2009 and 2010, aged 56 in 2010, 64 and 65 in 2004 and 65 in 2005. 
Thus, in section 5.3, we keep the number of observations constant for these missing cases, based on the 
closest year observable of the same age. We do this in order to present figures that are formed of the same 
number of cohorts for each year and age.  
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5.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR  
In this section, we first present a description analysis of the employment rates of older 
Belgian workers using our classification method that separates workers based on the 
benefit claiming status. Then, we document the retirement behavior of older Belgian 
workers before looking at the labor force exit and benefit claiming hazard rates separately.  
5.3.1 EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFIT CLAIMING  
The Belgian labor market has undergone profound changes over the last three decades. 
The employment rate of older men was declining until the mid-1990’s, after which it 
started to rise again, most importantly for the 55 to 59 age group. The employment rate of 
older women follows a long-term upward trend and has been growing at a faster pace 
than the employment rate of men. In line with Jousten and Lefebvre (2016), we find a 
general increasing trend of the employment rate between 2004 and 2010 for both sexes 
and age groups (55 to 59 and 60 to 64). Accordingly, we observe a decrease in the 
proportion of older individuals who are out of the labor force over the same period.   
In figure 5.2, we present the employment rates of older workers by age and its 
decomposition into our two groups differentiated by the benefits claiming status: work 
and no claim and work and claim. Predictably, the proportion of workers decreases 
continuously with age – particularly at age 58 and 60, mostly because of transfers to the 
conventional early retirement program at age 58 and to the conventional early retirement 
or old-age pension programs at age 60. Overall, we observe that about one-fourth of 
workers aged 55 to 64 claim some type of social security benefits: 28.8 (resp. 31.1) percent 
of working men (resp. women) aged 55 to 59 and 18.3 (resp. 19) percent of working men 
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(resp. women) aged 60 to 64 are benefits claimers. These benefit claims mostly include 
time credit, unemployment and disability benefits.  
Figure 5.2: Decomposition of employment rates by claiming status and age (men and 
women, period average 2004-2010) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset 
 
In figure 5.3, we decompose our two work groups, differentiated by benefit claiming 
status, by work intensity (part and full-time work) and by age. We find that part-time 
work at older ages is frequent in Belgium, particularly for women. In total, 68.7 (resp. 
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23.3) percent of working women (resp. men) aged 55 to 59 and 67.2 (resp. 25.8) percent of 
working women (resp. men) aged 60 to 64 work part-time, regardless of their claiming 
status. Furthermore, we observe that more than one-third of older workers work part-
time. Indeed, 30 (resp. 37.5) percent of men (resp. women) in the group work and no claim 
and 38.4 (resp. 56) percent of men (resp. women)  in the group work and claim work for 
less than 51 percent of the equivalent of a full-time job. Our results are concomitant with 
the work of the OECD (2017) that raises Belgium well above the OECD average of  21 
percent of part-time work for individuals between the ages of 55 and 64.191 Using labor 
force survey data, Jousten and Lefebvre (2016) find similar results for women, and 
attribute it partly to a pre-existing larger stock of part-time workers at younger ages - 
hence less an issue of increased transitions from full to part time employment later in life 
rather than the legacy of previously taken decisions. While male part-timers are mostly 
claimers, female part-timers are evenly distributed in both claim categories. Finally, we 
observe that the share of workers (full and part-timers) who do not claim benefits 







191 In the OECD, only the Netherlands and Switzerland have higher proportions of part-time work at older 
ages (OECD, 2017). 
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Figure 5.3: Decomposition of employment rates by claiming status, work intensity and 
age (men and women, period average 2004-2010) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset 
 
In the next figure, we decompose the claims of workers in the group work and claim into 
five main claims: time credit, disability, unemployment, old-age pension, and other 
claims.192 We find that part-time workers mostly claim time credit and old-age pension 
benefits (above age 60) while full-time workers mostly claim (temporary) unemployment 
 
192 Other claims include part-time conventional early retirement benefits, social assistance benefits, 
professional injury or disease benefits, etc. These claims are far smaller in terms of the number of claimers. 
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benefits. Overall, we find that there is a higher proportion of women who claim time 
credit benefits compared to men, a higher proportion of men who combine work and 
unemployment benefits compared to women and a similar proportion of men and women 
who work and claim disability benefits. Finally, we find that men are more likely to 
combine work and old-age pension benefits than women, which coincides with the results 
of the OECD (2017). 
Figure 5.4: Decomposition of claims in work and claim, by sex and work intensity 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset. 
Note: TC stands for time credit, DI stands for disability insurance, UI 
stands for unemployment insurance, OAP stands for old-age pension. 
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Between 2004 and 2010, we note an increase in the share of part-timers in the group work 
and claim for both men and women aged 55 to 59, caused by a rise in time credit claims. 
We also observe an increase in the share of part-timers in the group work and claim for 
women aged more than 59, mostly caused by a rise in disability benefits claims. Finally, 
and most importantly, we note a faster increase in the proportion of workers in the group 
work and claim (except for women above age 59) compared to the proportion of workers 
in the group work and no claim.  
In conclusion, the decomposition of work patterns into our different groups paints a less 
favorable picture than the mere aggregate employment trends that show an encouraging 
increasing trend in elderly employment in the last few years : not only have employment 
levels changed but also the types of employment. Thus, our results coincide with the 
findings of Aliaj et. al. (2016) that total employment in Belgium has increased over time 
but the average number of work hours per worker has decreased following a rise in part-
time work arrangements. In our case, full-time workers who do not claim any social 
security benefits only make up approximately 61 percent of total employment of men 
aged 55 to 59 and 62.7 percent of total employment of men aged 60 to 64. Most 
importantly, the same proportion drops to approximately 27.6 percent for employed 
women aged 55 to 59 and to 29.4 percent for employed women aged 60 to 64.  
5.3.2 LABOR FORCE EXIT AND BENEFIT CLAIMING HAZARD 
RATES 
In this section, we present the labor force exit and the benefit claiming hazard rates of 
older Belgian workers. We define the labor force exit hazard rate as the probability that a 
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worker (regardless of his benefit claiming status) exits the labor force at a given age.193 We 
find an average labor force exit age of 59 for men and 59.2 for women.194  
We define the benefit claiming hazard rate as the probability that an individual 
(regardless of his working status) starts claiming social security benefits at a given age.195 
We find an average benefit claiming age of 59.2 for men and 59.3 for women.194  
Figure 5.5 presents the labor force exit and the benefit claiming hazard rates by age for 
men and women. We observe a general increase in both the labor force exit and the benefit 
claiming hazard rates over the age and two major peaks at age 58 (the early eligibility age 
of the conventional early retirement) and 60 (the early eligibility age of the old-age 
pension). There is an additional increase in both hazard rates for women starting at age 
63 caused by the 1997 reform that raised their statutory eligibility age of the old-age 
pension from 60 in 1997 to 65 in 2009.196 We observe that the labor force exits and the 
benefit claiming hazard rates of women are generally lower than those of men, which is 
again caused by our sample selection method. For both men and women, we observe that 
the labor force exit hazard rate is slightly higher compared to the benefit claiming hazard 
rate above age 60, caused by a higher prevalence of transfers from the group work and no 
claim to the group work and claim compared to labor force exits. 
 
193 The labor force exit hazard rate is calculated as the number of labor force exits at a certain age over the 
employed population (statuses work and no claim and work and claim) at end of the precedent age. 
194 The relatively high average labor force exit and benefit claiming ages of women compared to men is 
plausibly caused by our sample selection method according to which we select working women who 
count at least 10 years of career as a wage-earner and who were still employed at an older age, which is 
not representative of the actual population of working women in Belgium. 
195 The benefit claiming hazard rate is calculated as the number of individuals who start claiming social 
security benefits at a certain age over the non-benefit claiming population (statuses work and no claim 
and no work and no claim) at the end of the precedent age. 
196 This reform has raised the retiring peak from 63 to 64 between 2006 and 2008 and from 64 to 65 starting 
from 2009. The same peak in labor force exit and claiming hazard rates would be observed at men’s 
statutory eligibility age (65), were it part of our observed ages. 
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If we look at the evolution of the hazard rates over time, we observe that the labor force 
exit hazard rate has decreased between 2004 and 2010 in both age groups and for both 
sexes, regardless of the initial claiming status (not graphically represented). Such a trend 
is caused by a lower number of transfers from the group work and no claim to the group no 
work and claim caused by a decrease in transfers to the conventional early retirement 
(before age 60), the unemployment programs (before age 60) and the old-age pension 
(after age 59).197 The benefit claiming hazard rate also displays a decreasing trend over the 
period 2004 to 2010 for workers aged 60 to 64 but it is increasing for workers aged 56 to 
59. The increase in benefit claiming hazard rate before age 60 is caused by a higher number 
of transfers from the status work and no claim to work and claim (caused by the time credit 
and part-time unemployment claims) compared to transfers from the groups work and no 









 We also observe a slight increase in the transfers to the conventional early retirement after age 59, 
which is not high enough to absorb the decrease in transfers to the old-age pension. 
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Figure 5.5: Labor force exit and benefit claiming hazard rates by age and sex (period 
average 2004 – 2010) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset 
 
In Figure 5.6, we present the decomposition of the labor force exit hazard rate into its two 
main components: the proportion of transfers from (i) work and no claim to no work and 
claim and (ii) work and claim to no work and claim.198 First, we observe that the proportion of 
 
198 The proportion of transfer from the status work and (no) claim to the status no work and claim is calculated 
as the number of exits to the status no work and claim over the number of individuals in the status work and 
(no) claim at the precedent age. Transfers to the status no work and no claim remain minor and are mostly 
confined to women. 
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labor force exit of workers who are claimers is higher than the proportion of labor force 
exit of workers who are not claimers at every age and for both sexes (except at age 64 for 
women). In particular, workers who are claimers are more likely to exit the labor force 
through the conventional early retirement, the unemployment insurance or to the old-age 
pension (after age 60 only) systems. Second, we observe that the difference of labor force 
exit hazard rates between our two claiming groups decreases with age for men.  
Figure 5.6: Decomposition of labor force exit hazard rates by claiming status, age and 
sex (period average 2004 – 2010) 
 




In figure 5.7, we present the decomposition of the benefit claiming hazard rate into its two 
main components: transfers from the statuses (i) work and no claim to no work and claim and 
(ii) work and no claim to work and claim.199 The proportion of transfer from status work and 
no claim to status work and claim fluctuates around 7.4 percent for men and 6.3 percent for 
women and decreases over the age for both sexes (except women aged 63 and above). 
Moreover, these transfers do not display the same peaks as the labor force exit hazard rate 










199 The proportion of transfer from the status work and no claim to the status (no) work and claim is calculated 
as the number of new claims in the (no) work and claim status from the work and no claim status over the 
number of individuals in the status work and no claim at the precedent age. Labor force exits to the status 
no work and no claim remain minor and are mostly confined to women. See above for an explanation of the 
transfers from the group work and no claim to the group no work and claim. 
225 
 
Figure 5.7: Decomposition of benefit claiming hazard rates by working status, age and 
sex (period average 2004 – 2010)  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset 
5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The previous section illustrated the relevance of separating workers by their benefit 
claiming status and to distinguish between the decisions of labor force exit and (early-) 
retirement benefit claiming. We now look at the determinants of each decision separately. 
We use an econometrics model to study the link between our dependent variable and a 
series of explanatory variables that we define below.  
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5.4.1 VARIABLE DEFINITION AND SUBSAMPLES 
We use three models, each with different dependent variables, one for the labor force exit 
decision and the other two for the benefit claiming decision. Each individual is observed 
for 1 to 7 periods between 2004 and 2010.200  
The labor force exit dependent variable takes a value of 1 in period t if an individual 
transfers from either of the two work statuses (work and no claim or work and claim) in period 
(t-1) to either of the two non-work statuses (no work and claim or no work and no claim) in 
period t.201 For this analysis, we use a subsample that includes individuals in the group 
work and no claim or work and claim in period t.  Following the previous literature (see Dellis 
et. al. (2004) and Jousten and Tarantchenko (2014)), we consider the decision to exit the 
labor force as absorbing. Therefore, the observations of individuals are dropped after they 
exit the labor force.202 We obtain a total of 88,217 observations for 27,351 individuals. 
\]% *%) A'
= ^1 * &%> '\'_  `%a (' − 1) \a  − &%> '\'_  `%a '0 'ℎ%&  
          ' = 2, … , 7 
The first benefit claiming dependent variable takes a value of 1 if an individual transfers 
from the status work and no claim in period (t-1) to either of the two claim statuses (work 
 
200 The number of observation periods per individual depends on the cohort they belong to and on 
whether they retire or die during our observation period.  
201 Because of the dynamic configuration of our dependent variables, the baseline period t=1, which 
corresponds to year 2004 or age 55, is not included in the analysis. 
202 Additionally, we do not include individuals who exit and reenter the labor force during our 
observation period as they only represent a minor part of the initial sample. 
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and claim or no work and claim) in period t.203 The second benefit claiming dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 if an individual transfers from the group work and no claim in 
period (t-1) to the group work and claim in period t. For this analysis, we use a subsample 
of individuals who are in the group work and no claim in period t. We drop the observations 
of individuals after they exit the labor force. We allow individuals to claim social security 
benefits and to revert to a non-claimer status as it occurs often in our data.204 We obtain a 
total of 59,998 observations for 19,808 individuals for the model using the first benefit 
claiming dependent variable and 52,560 observations for 17,944 individuals for the model 
using the second benefit claiming dependent variable.205  
c\d$
= e1 * &%> \a  )c\d '\'_  `%a (' − 1) \a )c\d '\'_  `%a '0 'ℎ%&                    
c\d$  &%> \a )c\d
= f1 * &%> \a  )c\d '\'_  `%a (' − 1) \a &%> \a )c\d '\'_  `%a '0 'ℎ%&            
We control for personal characteristics such as gender (1 if male), age (using a full set of 
binary variables to capture age-based focal points see Seibold (2017)), marital status (1 if 
married) and the region where the individual lives (Wallonia, Brussels or Flanders). We 
add partner characteristics such as the partners’206 employment status (1 if currently 
 
203 We leave aside transfers from the status no work and no claim because of its relatively small size. 
Moreover, we only observe a very low number of transfers to and from this status. See chapter six for the 
analysis of the retirement incentives faced by individuals in one-earner households.  
204 For instance, an individual might be considered as incapacitated following health concerns for a year 
and then start working again. We cannot differentiate between longer-term claims that are related to a 
retirement strategy and shorter-term claims. 
205 The difference of subsample between the two dependent variables comes from the fact that we exclude 
the claims in the group no work and claim when using the second benefit claiming dependent variable. 
206 Partners include married couples and legal cohabitants. 
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employed) and the partner’s social security claiming status (1 if claiming benefits). We 
add an interaction term between the employment and the claiming status of the partner, 
indicating if the partner is in the group work and claim. These partner characteristics 
variables are set to zero if the individual does not have a partner.  
We add job related characteristics variables as they were observed at the end of the 
previous observation period (t-1).207 We include the work category (1 if the worker is 
white collar, 0 if the worker is blue collar), the sector of activity of the worker (primary, 
secondary or tertiary), the sum of lifetime earnings that enter the old-age pension benefit 
calculation expressed in 100,000 euros (and its squared form)208 and the average number 
of assimilated days (days spent on unemployment, disability, etc.) per year during the 
individual’s wage-earner career. We add a variable that indicates the intensity of working 
hours: full time (reference category), part-time of less than or equal to 50% of a full-time 
equivalent (FTE) and part-time of more than 50% of a FTE.  
In the labor force exit model, we use two model specifications differentiated by the benefit 
claiming indicator. In the first specification, we add a benefit claiming variable (1 if the 
individual is claiming benefits209) and we interact it with the working intensity variable 
defined above. In a second model specification, we split the benefit claiming variable and 
distinguish between old-age pension, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, 
time credit and other claims210. 
 
207 Since our dependent variables indicate a status modification between the end of the precedent period 
(t-1) and the end of the current period t, we include the information at the end of period (t-1) as an 
indicator of the job characteristics at the beginning of period t, which supposedly influences a transfer in 
period t. 
208 Unlike other job characteristics variables, we use the lifetime earnings at the end of period t. 
209 This variable differs from the benefit claiming dependent variable: the benefit claiming explanatory 
variable indicates whether the individual is currently claiming benefits and the benefit claiming 
dependent variable indicates a transfer from a non-claim status to a claim status. 
210 The group “other” captures all of the other claims in the group work and claim that are not time credit,  
unemployment, disability or old-age pension benefits. Conventional early retirement claims are included 
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Following the findings of Jousten and Tarantchenko (2014) that program eligibility plays 
a major role in the retirement decision, we add eligibility variables for the early and the 
statutory eligibility age of the old-age pension system.211 Following our findings in 
chapter four, which indicate that the pension bonus does not lead to later retirement, we 
add an eligibility variable for the old-age pension bonus.212  
Finally, we add a series of variables indicating the year (2005 to 2010) in order to control 
for any secular changes in the legislation not directly modeled and to avoid spurious 
regression. 
We anticipate an important omitted variable bias in our model because of a lack of data 
on the health status and wealth (other than earnings-related) of individuals. However, we 
follow Albanese et. al. (2015) and add an indicator of the average number of days 
receiving a replacement income for a year over the worker’s entire career since we expect 
health problems and unobservable variables such as ability and motivation to work to be 
reflected by these career gaps. Furthermore, we expect unobservable characteristics such 
as productivity and preferences for leisure to be correlated with both the labor force exit 
and the benefit claiming decision. Indeed, Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008) expect 
workers who are more productive to have a lower probability to exit the labor force and 
to claim benefits later compared to less productive workers. Additionally, individuals 
 
in the other category because there are a very low number of conventional early retirement claims in the 
group work and claim. The combination of disability claims and work is in theory not allowed but is 
possible in certain situations (see the National Disability Office website at 
https://www.inami.fgov.be/fr/themes/incapacite-travail/salaries-chomeurs/Pages/reprendre-travail-
adapte-incapacite-travail.aspx) 
211 The early eligibility age of the old-age pension is set at 60 with at least 35 years of career as wage-earner 
for men and women between 2005 and 2010. The statutory eligibility age is set at 65 for men and 63 for 
women before 2006, 64 for women between 2006 and 2008 and 65 for women from 2009 onwards. See 
chapter two for more detailed information on the statutory and early eligibility ages of the old-age 
pension. 
212 An individual is eligible for the pension bonus if he is aged more than 62 or has more than 44 years of 
career after 2007. See chapter two for more information on the pension bonus. 
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who value leisure more have a higher probability to exit the labor force and to claim 
benefits early than individuals who value leisure less. We control for the effect of these 
unobservable variables using a correlated random effects model that we present in the 
appendix since the use of such a model does not alter our results significantly.  
Table 5.2 presents the mean values of our three dependent variables and independent 
variables differentiated by sex. We present the mean values separately for our two 
subsamples: the sample for the analysis of the labor force exit decision (groups work and 
no claim and work and claim) and the sample for the analysis of the benefit claiming 












Table 5.2: Mean value of dependent and independent variables by status and sex 
 
Groups work and no 
claim and work and claim 











Labor force exit 0.15 0.16 0.14    
Benefit claim 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.22 0.19 
Benefit claim in the group 
work and claim 
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.07 
       
Full time contract 0.60 0.77 0.32 0.75 0.94 0.44 
Part-time contract (≤ 50% of 
FTE) 
0.18 0.09 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.22 
Part-time contract (> 50% of 
FTE) 
0.22 0.14 0.36 0.15 0.04 0.34 
Claiming 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.03 1 0 
Time credit 0.18 0.15 0.23    
Unemployment 0.09 0.11 0.06    
Disability 0.01 0.01 0.01    
Old-age pension 0.01 0.01 0.01    
Other 0.04 0.05 0.03    
Working and claiming (≤ 50% 
of FTE)  
0.12 0.08 0.18    
Working and claiming (> 50% 
of FTE) 
0.12 0.11 0.13    
Male 0.62 1 0 0.63 1 0 
Age 58.5 58.53 58.42 58.49 58.50 58.45 
Married 0.72 0.78 0.62 0.72 0.78 0.61 
Flanders 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.51 
Wallonia 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.37 
Brussels 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.12 
Partner employed 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 
Partner claiming 0.59 0.64 0.50 0.58 0.64 0.49 
Partner working and claiming 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
White collar 0.61 0.56 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.70 
Primary sector of activity 0.3 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Secondary sector of activity 0.27 0.37 0.10 0.25 0.35 0.09 
Tertiary sector of activity 0.69 0.59 0.87 0.71 0.61 0.89 
Mean of assimilated days  24.32 22.45 27.43 18.02 16.02 21.40 
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Lifetime earnings/100,000 66.24 77.36 47.83 69.74 83.56 46.36 
Eligible EEA 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.13 
Eligible SEA 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 
Eligible pension bonus 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 
       
Number of observations 88,217 55,002 33,215 60,127 38,007 22,120 
Number of individuals 27,351 17,247 10,104 19,816 12,676 7,140 
5.4.2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
We use a probit model in order to study the determinants of the labor force exit and the 
benefit claiming decisions213. 
S∗ = g +  K h  +  K h +  K R84h + K ih + ∑  K \$ k Z[M7Z+  ∑  K l\% k mn4nMmnn7 + o              
Where S∗  refers to the latent probability of labor force exit or benefit claiming for 
individual i in period t. h  is a vector of time-constant personal characteristics, h   is a 
vector of time-varying personal and partner’s characteristic, R84h  is a vector of time-
varying job-related characteristics and ih  is a vector of time-varying social security 
eligibility variables. The observation period is 2005-2010 and each individual is observed 
for a maximum of 7 periods.214 o is the idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard 
errors at the individual level in order to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
 
213 Although the results of the Breusch-Pagan-Lagrange multiplier test indicate that panel data methods 
should be used, we choose not to use panel methods such as the standard fixed and random effects 
models because we find little variation of our variables within individuals (which may cause selection 
bias) and because we expect the individual heterogeneity to be correlated with our explanatory variables. 
We perform extension and validity checks by using a correlated random effect model (CRE). The results 
from this model essentially confirm our findings with the probit model. Since the results from our probit 
and CRE probit are very similar, we present the results of the CRE model in the appendix. 
214 The average number of observations per individual is 4.45 for individuals in the sample for the labor 





5.5.1 DETERMINANTS OF LABOR FORCE EXIT 
In this section, we present the results of our analysis on the determinants of the labor force 
exit decision.  Table 5.3 displays the average marginal effects differentiated by sex for our 
two model specifications. The first specification includes a binary variable indicating 
whether the individual is claiming social security benefits at the end of period t-1 and its 
interaction with the work intensity variable (full-time, part-time and less than or equal to 
50 percent of FTE and part-time and more than 50 percent of FTE). The second 
specification splits up the above-mentioned claiming variable into five different claims: 
old-age pension, unemployment, disability, time credit and other215. 
In the first model specification, we find that working part-time (regardless of the claim 
status) and claiming benefits (regardless of work intensity) significantly increases the 
probability of labor force exit for both sexes (with a stronger effect for men than for 
women). We find a negative sign for the interaction of working part-time and claiming, 
indicating that the combination of the two variables decreases the labor force exit 
probability of the distinct and separate effects of working part-time and claiming benefits. 
Overall, we find that men who are claimers and work part-time (regardless of the 
proportion of FTE) have the highest labor force exit probability among men (see figure 
5.8). Moreover, we find that women who are claimers and work full-time have the highest 
labor force exit probability among women. These results coincide with the empirical 
 
215 Other claims in the group work and claim mostly include conventional early retirement or work injury 
benefits and a smaller part of these claims include work disease and social assistance. Conventional early 
retirement claims are absent from this variable because these claims are very rare in the work and claim 
status. Thus they are very low and are thus included in the other category. In the second model 
specification, we do not include an interaction term between the types of claim and the work intensity 
because of multicollinearity concerns. 
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evidence of section 5.3.2 that showed higher labor force exit hazard rates for workers in 
the group work and claim compared to workers in the group work and no claim for both full-
timers and part-timers. 
Figure 5.8: Predicted labor force exit probability by claiming status, part-time work and 
sex 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset 
We take the analysis one step further in the second specification as we split up the 
claiming variable into five different types of claims. We find that the effect of benefit 
claiming on labor force exit probability varies according to the type of claim. Figure 5.9 
displays different predicted labor force exit probability by claiming status and sex. For 
men, it is mostly the time credit and the unemployment claims that lead to the highest 
predicted probability of labor force exit. For women, it is mostly the unemployment and 
the disability claims that have the highest predicted labor force exit probability. Our 
results thus coincide with the results of Albanese et. al. (2015) who find that time credit 
claimers who are eligible for old-age pension have a higher labor force exit probability 
compared to other workers. 
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Figure 5.9: Predicted labor force exit probabilities of workers in the group work and claim 
by types of claim and sex 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using CBSS dataset. 
Note: TC stands for time credit, DI stands for disability insurance, UI stands for 
unemployment insurance, OAP stands for old-age pension. 
We find that being a male corresponds to a lower probability of labor force exit. Living in 
Wallonia or Brussels significantly decreases the labor force exit probability compared to 
living in Flanders216. Being married does not have a significant impact on labor force exit. 
Nevertheless, having a partner who is employed significantly decreases the labor force 
exit probability of men. Having a partner who is claiming benefits significantly increases 
the probability of labor force exit for women but not for men. Having a partner who is 
working and claiming benefits increases the probability of labor force exit for men but not 
for women.  
For men, being a white-collar worker decreases the probability of labor force exit as 
opposed to being a blue-collar worker. Working in the primary (for men only) or tertiary 
 
216 This arises from the fact that the intensity of part-time work is not included in the model. Indeed, while 
the proportion of part-time work is only slightly higher outside of Flanders than inside, the intensity of 
work inside the group of part-timers differs largely, with part-timers in Flanders working for a higher 
proportion of a full-time equivalent compared to part-timers outside of Flanders. Therefore, the coefficient 
of Flanders becomes negative because it captures the effect of work intensity in the part-time category.  
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rather than in the secondary sector of activity decreases the labor force exit probability of 
workers. Higher lifetime earnings increases the probability of labor force exit, but at a 
decreasing rate. A higher number of average assimilated days per year increases the labor 
force exit probability, which might be an indicator of its correlation with health and 
unobservables such as productivity, demand for leisure, motivations, etc. 
As expected, being eligible for (early) retirement significantly increases the probability of 
labor force exit, which concurs with the findings of Jousten and Tarantchenko (2014) and 
Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008). Even after controlling for eligibility at the early and 
statutory eligibility ages of old-age pension, there are still peaks of the labor force exit 
probability at ages 58 and 60, the key eligibility ages in the conventional early retirement 
and in the old-age pension programs. There are two reasons that could explain this 
phenomenon. First, since we do not have access to the necessary job and career 
characteristics needed to build a “true” eligibility indicator for conventional early 
retirement, our age indicators might capture this “true” eligibility effect on the retirement 
decision of workers. Second, this result might be a representation of the age reference 
point theory according to which retirement bunching at the statutory eligibility age 
cannot only be explained by eligibility alone as this age also serves as a retirement 
reference point for workers (see chapter four and Seibold, 2017). Therefore, some 
individuals might exit the labor force at these ages, even though they are not eligible to 
claim early retirement benefits because the timing is endorsed by the government.  
Finally, we observe that the labor force exit probability generally increases with age, 
possibly because of a worsening of the individual’s health status, which is itself negatively 
correlated with age. Moreover, the labor force exit probability decreases with time, 
possibly indicating that the reforms aimed at reducing early retirement have fulfilled their 
role of closing early labor force exit pathways.  
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Male Female Male Female 
Part-time contract (≤ 
50% of FTE) 
0.035*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Part-time contract (> 
50% of FTE) 
0.039*** 0.039*** 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Claiming 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.023***    
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)    
Old-age pension (OAP)     -0.027*** -0.008 -0.093*** 
    (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) 
Unemployment (UI)     0.059*** 0.047*** 0.065*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Disability (DI)     0.033** 0.001 0.058*** 
    (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) 
Time credit (TC)    0.031*** 0.053*** 0.009 
    (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Other     0.019*** 0.021*** 0.006 
    (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
Male -0.007**   -0.008**   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   
Married 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Wallonia -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Brussels -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Partner employed -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.011 -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
Partner claiming 0.017*** 0.009 0.033*** 0.017*** 0.009 0.035*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Partner working and  0.011 0.026*** -0.014 0.011 0.025*** -0.016 
claiming (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
White collar -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.019*** -0.044*** -0.056*** -0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Primary sector of  -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.003 -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.002 
activity (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 
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Tertiary sector of  -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.040*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.038*** 
activity (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Mean of assimilated 
days 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lifetime  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
earnings/100,000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Eligible EEA 0.066*** 0.048*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.048*** 0.073*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Eligible SEA 0.265***  0.168*** 0.270***  0.178*** 
 (0.023)  (0.018) (0.022)  (0.018) 
Eligible pension  0.016*** 0.010* 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.009 0.022** 




      
Number of 
observations 
88,217 55,002 33,215 88,217 55,002 33,215 
Pseudo R² 0.0868 0.0874 0.0937 0.0887 0.0896 0.0979 
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the average marginal effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions contain age and year binary variables, not presented for space 
reasons. The first specification contains the interaction between the working regime and the claiming 
variable, not presented in the table. 
5.5.2 DETERMINANTS OF BENEFIT CLAIMING 
In this section, we present our analysis of the determinants of benefit claiming. Table 5.4 
displays the average marginal effects differentiated by sex for two dependent variables: 
one indicating a new claim in the work and claim or no work and claim groups, and the other 
indicating a new claim in the work and claim group only.  
We first look at the determinants of new claims in the work and claim or no work and claim 
groups. We find that working part-time with a work intensity of less than or equal to 50 
percent of a FTE significantly decreases the probability of benefit claim of women, 
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possibly because these women do not meet the eligibility criteria of the majority of early 
retirement programs (often based on a minimum number of years of career). Being a male 
slightly decreases the probability of benefit claiming. Living in Wallonia or Brussels 
decreases the probability of benefit claiming.  Being married does not have an impact on 
benefit claiming but having an employed partner decreases the probability of benefit 
claiming of men. Having a partner who is claiming benefits increases the claiming 
probability of women. Having a partner who is working and claiming benefits increases 
the probability of benefit claiming.  
Being a white-collar worker, working in the primary or tertiary sectors of activity 
decreases the probability of benefit claiming compared to being a blue-collar worker or 
working in the secondary sector of activity, respectively. Having higher lifetime earnings 
increases the probability of benefit claim at a decreasing pace and a higher number of 
average assimilated days per year increases the benefit claiming probability. Finally, we 
find that being eligible for old-age pension at the early or the statutory eligibility age of 
old-age pension increases the benefit claiming probability of both men and women. 
Once again, we find an increasing benefit claiming probability at some specific ages: 58, 
60 and 61. We do not find a decreasing benefit claiming probability over time, except for 
the year 2009, which has a significantly higher benefit claiming probability than the year 
2005.  
Using our second dependent variable, which indicates a new claim from the group work 
and no claim to the group work and claim, we mostly find similar results except for a few 
points, which we summarize below. We find that working part-time, regardless of work 
intensity, decreases the benefit claiming probability and this effect is stronger for women 
and for part-time work of less than or equal to 50 percent of FTE. Regarding the partner’s 
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characteristics, having a partner who works and claims benefits increases the benefit 
claiming probability of men but not of women. For women, the sector of activity and being 
eligible at the early eligibility age of old-age pension does not influence the claiming 
probability.  
Table 5.4:  Determinants of benefit claiming  
 
Dependent variable: new 
claims in group work and claim 
or no work and claim 
Dependent variable: new 






 Male Female Male Female 
Part-time contract (≤ 
50% of FTE) 
-0.045*** -0.027 -0.025*** -0.067*** -0.038*** -0.061*** 
(0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) 
Part-time contract (> 
50% of FTE) 
-0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.042*** -0.033*** -0.037*** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
Male -0.009*   0.000   
 (0.005)   (0.004)   
Married -0.001 0.009 -0.015 -0.002 0.007 -0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Wallonia -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Brussels -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.026*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Partner employed -0.023*** -0.019* -0.019 -0.009 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Partner claiming 0.012 0.013 0.025** -0.004 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Partner working and  0.031*** 0.035** 0.018 0.025*** 0.023** 0.018 
claiming (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
White collar -0.076*** -0.090*** -0.037*** -0.056*** -0.066*** -0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Primary sector of  -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.004 -0.018** -0.020** -0.007 
Activity (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) 
Tertiary sector of  -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.021** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.004 
Activity (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Mean of assimilated 
days 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lifetime  0.001*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** 
earnings/100,000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Eligible EEA 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.012** 0.018** 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Eligible SEA 0.318***  0.293*** 0.174***  0.152*** 
 (0.021)  (0.026) (0.018)  (0.021) 
Eligible pension  0.016** 0.016* 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.000 
Bonus (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Number of 
observations 
59,998 37,936 22,062 52,560 33,124 19,436 
Pseudo R² 0.0516 0.0593 0.0467 0.0477 0.0587 0.0330 
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the average marginal effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Nowadays, workers face ever more complex incentives for retirement generated by the 
historical evolution of the social security system and the variety of early labor force exit 
pathways that co-exist. Additionally, the lack of careful ex-ante and ex-post analysis of 
the impact of social security reforms and their intertwined effects between programs 
contributes to worsen the situation. Such a complex social security system sometimes 
leads workers to – optimally or not – disjoin labor force exit from (early-) retirement 
benefit claiming. In this chapter, we analyze the dissociation of the retirement decision 
into a labor force exit and a benefit claiming decision and we explore its impact for 
research on the retirement decision and for public finance concerns. 
First, we decompose the employed and retired groups of individuals into four subgroups 
based on their benefit claiming status: (i) work and no claim, (ii) work and claim, (iii) no work 
and claim and (iv) no work and no claim. We present the retirement and claiming trends of 
Belgian workers aged from 55 to 64 according to our classification using a detailed 
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administrative dataset from the Crossroad Bank of Social Security for years 2004 to 2010. 
Further, we document the differences between the labor force exit and the benefit 
claiming hazard rates and analyze the determinants of both decisions separately. 
Our results show that employment rates for older men (particularly between ages 55 and 
59) and women are overall increasing. These trends are concomitant with a wave of 
reforms that was aimed at tightening the eligibility criteria of various early retirement 
programs (mostly unemployment and conventional early retirement) and possibly 
indicate that these reforms have fulfilled their role of closing early labor force exit routes 
to increase the effective retirement age. However, once we decompose the employment 
trends by benefits claiming status, we note that the situation is not as encouraging as it 
seems. Indeed, an important part of the increase in employment rates is attributable to a 
rise in part-time work (mostly for women) and in the group of workers who are claiming 
social security benefits (mostly time-credit, disability and unemployment benefits). We 
also find that the proportion of workers who are claimers has been growing faster than 
the group of workers who are not claimers between 2004 and 2010. Most importantly, we 
find that workers who are claimers (resp. individuals in part-time working arrangements) 
have a higher probability to exit the labor force early compared to workers who are not 
claimers (resp. workers in full-time working arrangements). Therefore, our results might 
indicate that allowing for older workers to gradually reduce their working hours (through 
a program such as the time credit) does not lead to the desired policy effect, that of 
delaying retirement. Nevertheless, further research is needed on the direction of causality 
to reach such a conclusion.  
In conclusion, when assessing the financial sustainability of the pension system, the 
decomposition of employment and retirement trends according to the benefit claiming 
status proves to be of prime relevance. First, social security reforms have the potential to 
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influence both decisions separately because of the high complexity of the Belgian social 
security system and the intertwined effects between programs. Second, this richer matrix 
classification in terms of both retirement and claiming status provides a basis for a better 
understanding of recent labor market trends. Indeed, in light of the importance of the 
group of workers who claim social security benefits and their tendency to exit the labor 
force earlier, it is crucial that the mechanisms underlying their retirement behavior be 
studied carefully. Moreover, labor market decisions are influenced by the option to 
combine work and benefit claiming, arguably encouraging some workers to stay on the 
labor force longer, and such an option should be included in the choice set of individuals 
when analyzing their retirement behavior. Finally, from a public finance point of view, 
workers who benefit from social security benefits are likely to contribute less to financing 
social security than other workers. Indeed, on top of working fewer hours on average and 
receiving social security benefits, these workers represent an additional financial burden 
as the benefits they receive will be credited at the same rate as their last wage in the old-
age pension calculation – hence creating differed fiscal liabilities in addition to the current 
ones due to benefit payouts. Situations where workers are claiming some form of (early) 
retirement benefit and where old-age pension beneficiaries are continuing to work after 
age 65 are becoming increasingly common – rendering the borders between work and 
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5.A.1 CORRELATED RANDOM EFFECT MODEL 
As validity check, we perform the same analysis using a correlated random effect model. 
The results from this model essentially confirm our findings with the probit model. 
The correlated random effect (CRE) model was first introduced by Mundlak (1978) and 
further developed by Wooldridge (2010, 2019). This method unifies the fixed and the 
random effects approach and relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption of the random 
effect model. The CRE model thus allows for individual heterogeneity to be correlated 
with the explanatory variables through the addition of time-averaged versions of the 
time-varying explanatory variables, which capture such correlations.  
S = g +  K h  +  K h +  K R84h + K ih +   K \$ k Z[M7Z
+   K l\% k mn4nMmnn7 + hpppp + Rhppp84 + ihq  + r + o  
 
Where S refers to the latent probability of labor force exit or benefit claiming for 
individual i in period t. h  is a vector of time-constant personal characteristics, h   is a 
vector of time-varying personal and partner characteristic, R84h  is a vector of time-
varying job-related characteristics and ih  is a vector of time-varying social security 
eligibility variables. The observation period is 2005-2010 and each individual is observed 
for a maximum of 7 periods.217 In the correlated random effects model, we add the time-
 
217 The average number of observations per individual is 4.45 for individuals in the sample for the labor 
force exit decision analysis and 4.25 for individuals in the benefit claiming decision analysis. 
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averaged versions of the vectors h , Rh  and ih , namely ′pppp, R′q  and i′q . r is the 
individual unobserved heterogeneity and o is the idiosyncratic error term. We assume 
that both error terms are uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero. We 
cluster the standard errors at the individual level in order to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
While we think it is relevant to exploit the panel nature of our dataset, we find little within 
variation of our covariates and a small number of observation periods per individual. The 
results of the CRE model must therefore be analyzed with caution. 
Table 5.A.1 displays the results of our correlated random effects probit model for the labor 
force exit dependent variable using our two model specifications and differentiated by 
sex.  
 
In the correlated random effects probit model, the coefficients indicate the within effect 
of the covariates on the dependent variable.218  We find that transferring to a part-time 
contract of more than 50 percent of a FTE and starting to claim benefits significantly 
increases the labor force exit of men but not women (possibly because of a lack of within 
individual variation for the latter). The results concerning the other covariates are similar 
to that of the probit model. Using our second specification, we find an additional positive 
and significant effect of transferring to a part-time contract of less than or equal to 50 
percent of FTE for men on the labor force exit probability219. Interestingly, we find a 
negative effect of starting to claim time credit benefits on the probability of labor force 
exit for women, which might work in favor of the results of Albanese et. al. (2015) who 
 
218 The coefficients of time-varying explanatory variables can be interpreted as the within effect and the 
coefficients of the time average variables can be interpreted as the difference between the within and the 
between effects (Schunk, 2013).  
219 This is possibly caused by correlation between the detailed claiming variable and our part-time 
indicator, which captures this correlation in the first specification model. 
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find that women who claim time credit benefits have a higher probability to stay on the 
labor force in the first four years of claim. Additionally, we find that claiming 
unemployment benefits (for men), disability benefits (for women) and old-age pension 
benefits significantly increases the labor force exit probability.  
Table 5.A.1:  Determinants of labor force exit – correlated random effects probit model 






 Male Female Male Female 
Part-time contract (≤ 
50% of FTE) 
0.030* 0.045 -0.009 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.023 
(0.016) (0.032) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) 
Part-time contract (> 
50% of FTE) 
0.042*** 0.084*** -0.006 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.004 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
Claiming 0.014** 0.021*** -0.007    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.015)    
Time credit (TC)    -0.018* -0.008 -0.047*** 
    (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) 
Unemployment (UI)     0.024*** 0.029*** 0.019 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) 
Disability (DI)     0.046* 0.000 0.085** 
    (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) 
Old-age pension (OAP)     0.108*** 0.091*** 0.094** 
    (0.025) (0.033) (0.041) 
Other     -0.002 0.005 -0.019 
    (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
Male -0.013***   -0.015***   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   
Married 0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.004 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Wallonia -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Brussels -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Partner employed 0.009 0.002 0.017 0.010 0.003 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) 
Partner claiming 0.015 -0.019 0.061*** 0.016 -0.019 0.062*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
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Partner working and  0.013* 0.036*** -0.021* 0.013* 0.036*** -0.022* 
claiming (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
White collar -0.001 -0.016 0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.005 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.033) (0.024) (0.036) (0.033) 
Primary sector of  0.012 -0.009 0.041 0.012 -0.010 0.046 
activity (0.035) (0.041) (0.063) (0.035) (0.041) (0.063) 
Tertiary sector of  0.060* 0.035 0.107* 0.059* 0.034 0.110* 
activity (0.033) (0.040) (0.060) (0.033) (0.039) (0.060) 
Mean of assimilated 
days 
0.010*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lifetime  0.041*** 0.041*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.058*** 
earnings/100,000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Eligible EEA 0.211*** 0.215*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.211*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Eligible SEA 0.206***  0.099*** 0.206***  0.094*** 
 (0.020)  (0.024) (0.020)  (0.025) 
Eligible pension  0.292*** 0.293*** 0.276*** 0.291*** 0.293*** 0.273*** 
bonus (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) 
       
Number of observations 88,217 55,002 33,215 88,217 55,002 33,215 
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the average marginal effects. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 5.A.2 displays the results of our correlated random effects model for the benefit 
claiming decision. Unlike our probit model, working as a part-timer does not have an 
important impact on the probability of claiming benefits. This result reinforces our 
intuition that the negative correlation we found between part-time work and the 
probability of claiming benefits is caused by a lower probability of fulfilling the eligibility 
criteria of early retirement programs. We also find that being eligible at the early 
eligibility age and statutory eligibility age of old-age pension has a stronger and 
significant impact on the benefit claiming probability. This is also the case for the pension 
bonus, except for women in the case of a transfer to the work and claim group. 
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Table 5.A.2:  Determinants of benefit claiming –correlated random effects probit model 
 
Dependent variable: new 
claims in group work and claim 
or no work and claim 
Dependent variable: new 






 Male Female Male Female 
Part-time contract (≤ 
50% of FTE) 
-0.143 -0.269 -0.017 -0.233* -0.365 -0.090 
 (0.180) (0.315) (0.240) (0.132) (0.230) (0.178) 
Part-time contract (> 
50% of FTE) 
-0.083 -0.033 -0.063 -0.295*** -0.355*** -0.216 
 (0.131) (0.184) (0.195) (0.095) (0.134) (0.143) 
Male -0.060*   0.022   
 (0.033)   (0.024)   
Married -0.055 0.017 -0.150* -0.026 0.026 -0.097 
 (0.046) (0.057) (0.077) (0.033) (0.040) (0.060) 
Wallonia -0.103*** -0.089*** -0.150*** -0.012 0.001 -0.041 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.042) (0.018) (0.022) (0.034) 
Brussels -0.196*** -0.207*** -0.228*** -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.098* 
 (0.041) (0.054) (0.065) (0.030) (0.039) (0.051) 
Partner employed 0.079 0.122 0.050 0.056 0.150 -0.053 
 (0.128) (0.164) (0.209) (0.092) (0.114) (0.162) 
Partner claiming 0.056 -0.105 0.331 -0.006 -0.001 0.034 
 (0.136) (0.173) (0.224) (0.097) (0.119) (0.172) 
Partner working and  0.173** 0.279*** -0.036 0.123** 0.119* 0.077 
claiming (0.081) (0.102) (0.135) (0.057) (0.070) (0.104) 
White collar -0.060 -0.271 -0.261 -0.260 -0.362 -0.370 
 (0.272) (0.391) (0.395) (0.190) (0.268) (0.288) 
Primary sector of  0.436 0.865 -0.435 0.206 0.317 -0.009 
activity (0.448) (0.567) (0.761) (0.333) (0.418) (0.571) 
Tertiary sector of  0.749* 1.313** -0.511 0.478 0.657 0.031 
activity (0.431) (0.549) (0.719) (0.320) (0.406) (0.529) 
Mean of assimilated 
days 
-0.130*** -0.129*** -0.105*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.066*** 
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 (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Lifetime  0.532*** 0.480*** 0.878*** 0.334*** 0.309*** 0.595*** 
earnings/100,000 (0.013) (0.014) (0.033) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) 
Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Eligible EEA 1.482*** 1.515*** 1.708*** 0.303*** 0.375*** 0.436*** 
 (0.073) (0.094) (0.121) (0.057) (0.071) (0.101) 
Eligible SEA 2.567***  1.887*** 1.606***  1.674*** 
 (0.227)  (0.296) (0.178)  (0.241) 
Eligible pension  1.941*** 1.847*** 1.951*** 0.292*** 0.303*** 0.022 
bonus (0.083) (0.097) (0.169) (0.057) (0.064) (0.131) 
       
Number of observations 59,998 37,936 22,062 52,560 33,124 19,436 
       
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports the average marginal effects. *** 










































THE OLD-AGE PENSION HOUSEHOLD 
REPLACEMENT RATE FOR PENSIONERS IN ONE-
EARNER HOUSEHOLDS  
 







6.1 INTRODUCTION  
Public old-age pension systems have four central objectives. From an individual’s 
viewpoint, they should provide (I) a consumption smoothing mechanism over the life 
cycle and (II) an insurance against the uncertainty of life expectancy after retirement. 
From a public policy perspective, they should serve as (III) a poverty alleviation 
mechanism for old age and (IV) an income redistribution tool among the elderly (Barr and 
Diamond, 2006). However, faced with population ageing, the prime focus of many 
European governments in recent decades has been to reform their pension systems to 
ensure financial sustainability (Grech, 2013). Next to these pressing sustainability 
concerns, pension adequacy220  matters have traditionally been left aside in both public 
policy and research.  
In Belgium, the government has implemented numerous social security reforms over the 
last decade curbing incentives for early retirement with the aim of ensuring the 
sustainability of the country’s pension system. At the same time, the poverty rate of the 
country’s elderly population has been decreasing thanks to higher female activity rates 
and numerous discretional increases in minimum  and social pensions.  However, there 
remains a substantial gender poverty gap and the average old-age pension benefits of  
married women is still lower than that of single women (Hindriks, 2015).  
In this chapter, we take a closer look at the retirement incentives of workers in one-earner 
households, i.e. households composed of one earner and one partner who is financially 
dependent. We leave aside the study of the work (dis)incentives that are potentially 
associated with these benefits for the financial dependent spouse in the household. While 
 
220
 An adequate pension system provides a retirement income that prevents from old-age poverty and 
allows for consumption smoothing at older ages (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). 
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relevant, such analysis should be considered separately as the incentives faced by these 
individuals are very different from these faced by other types of workers. Married221 
workers in one-earner households are automatically granted a more generous 
replacement rate in the calculation of their old-age pension benefits, called the household 
replacement rate. In case of divorce or death, the replacement rate of the old-age pension 
is brought down to the isolated replacement rate for the main earner and some divorcee 
entitlements or the survivor pension are granted to the financially dependent spouse.222 
Following the rise of the two-earner household model and pension sustainability 
concerns, many European countries abolished these benefits and the Belgian Pension 
Reform Committee has recommended to remove the household replacement rate, except 
for minimum pensions (Pension Reform Committee 2020-2040, 2014). Specifically, we test 
whether the household replacement rate entails a work (dis)incentive mechanism 
promoting (harming) pension sustainability and furthermore, we analyse the role of the 
household replacement rate in ensuring pension adequacy from a public policy 
perspective.  
While contributing to the growing literature focusing on both pension adequacy and 
pension sustainability, this chapter provides valuable insights to guide evidence-based 
policy making on this policy challenge. In addition, we provide an ex-ante impact 
evaluation of policy changes - reducing the generosity or eliminating the household 
replacement rate benefits - on the retirement decisions and poverty measures among the 
elderly.   
Our analysis shows that in contrast to spousal characteristics, financial incentives have a 
significant effect on the retirement decision across all household types. Consistently with 
 
221 The household replacement rate is not granted to legally cohabiting partners. 
222 Evidence from our micro data demonstrates that divorces at older ages in our sample are scarce. 
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results from chapter four, we find a significant impact of our social security wealth and 
accrual variables, which work in opposite directions. Nonetheless, the overall incentives 
created by the household replacement rate do not confirm our expectations that the 
household replacement rate creates a work (dis)incentive as they are very limited. 
Overall, despite the positive poverty and distributional aspects of this policy, our analysis 
supports the reform proposal of removing the household replacement rate. 
In the next section of this chapter, we outline the role of the household replacement rate 
benefits in Belgium and review the relevant literature for our analysis (i) the retirement 
behavior of an individual in a one-earner household and (ii) the impact of additional 
benefits based on the dependent status of the partner on retirement incentives. In the third 
section, we present our empirical strategy including information on the dataset, the 
construction of financial incentive measures and our sampling methodology. Sections 6.4 
and 6.5 present the model, the results of our analysis and discuss them. Section 6.6 
concludes. 
6.2 CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION  
6.2.1 THE HOUSEHOLD REPLACEMENT RATE  
Belgium is one of the last few European countries that still (indirectly) compensates 
individuals for household and care work by providing additional old-age pension 
benefits to their spouse. In Belgium, the household replacement rate of 75 percent is 
granted to pensioners in one-earner households223, provided the couple is married and 
 
223 One-earner households are households composed of one earner and one partner who is financially 
dependent. Two-earners households where the lowest earner earns a very low wage, i.e. that is below the 
threshold for the household replacement rate, are also included in our one-earner household definition.   
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the earnings of the dependent spouse do not exceed a certain threshold.224 In comparison, 
pensioners who are single or in two-earner households223 are entitled to receive the 
isolated replacement rate of 60 percent. 
Many European countries have gotten rid of benefit programs for financially dependent 
spouses ensuing pension sustainability concerns, which call for a reduction in the overall 
generosity of the system. At the time of writing, only eight European countries still 
propose such programs or have recently removed them: Belgium, the United Kingdom 
(no new claims since 2010), France (no new claims since 2011), Portugal, Norway, the 
Netherlands (no new claims since 2015), Ireland and Cyprus.225 Nevertheless, these types 
of benefits are much more prominent outside of Europe as different variants exist in the 
USA, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Japan, 
Jordan, New-Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan and South-Korea, among others. 
Belgium is the European country with the highest proportion of pensioners receiving 
additional benefits for financially dependent spouse, the so-called household replacement 
rate benefits226. Indeed, although the proportion of male227 beneficiaries of the household 
replacement rate has been declining continuously in the last decades, it still amounts to 
27.3 percent of total pensioners in 2019 (see figure 6.2)228 (National Pension Office reports, 
1992-2019). In total, pensions paid at the household replacement rate account for 18.8 
 
224 See chapter two for detailed regulation of the program. 
225 See the appendix for a table describing the main features of these programs. 
226 See the appendix for an international comparison of the proportion of pensioners receiving additional 
benefits based on the financially dependent status of the partner. 
227 In 99.5 percent of cases, it is the man who is the earner in one-earner couples (Berghman, Curvers, 
Palmans and Peeters, 2007). 
228 Concurrently, the number of stay at home moms has been decreasing from approximately 1,222,000 in 
1986 to approximately 440,000 in 2016 (Statistics Belgium, 2015). 
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percent of total old age pension benefits (National Pension Office official statistics reports, 
2019). 
Figure 6.2: Evolution of pension benefits by replacement rate, marital status and gender 
(1992-2019) 
 
Source: National Pension Office annual reports (1992-2019) 
Figure 6.3: Proportion of pension by amount, replacement rate and gender (average 
2002-2019) 
 
Source: National Pension Office annual reports (1992-2019) 
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As a consequence of societal evolutions229, sustainability pressures and because of the 
program’s supposed work disincentive effect for dependent spouses, the Belgian Pension 
Reform Committee recommended removing the household replacement rate for 
individuals in one-earner households. Nonetheless, due to their enduring role as an 
important source of income for many poor households, a (long) transition period for 
minimum pensions is also recommended.  
Two arguments work in favour of keeping the household replacement rate in place. First, 
although pensioners in one-earner households have higher average pension benefits 
because of the more generous household replacement rate (see figure 6.3), households 
with an unequal distribution of earnings capacity generally have lower average income 
and are often concentrated in low qualified jobs with low wages (Pension Reform 
Committee 2020-2040 (2014), Hindriks (2014)).  
Secondly, while the trends in old-age pension benefits receipt confirm a decrease in the 
traditional male breadwinner household model (see figure 6.2), Höhn, Avramov, and 
Kotowska (2008) state that we are actually witnessing the rise of a modernized male 
breadwinner model, in which the husband remains the main earner and the wife often 
has an incomplete career because of household and care responsibilities.230 Similarly, 
Ciccia and Kotowska (2014) observe that childcare remains the responsibility of women 
across Europe and public child care services still generally assume a generalized 
traditional male breadwinner model. In fact, there still exists a vast disparity in terms of 
old-age pension benefits between men and women that are driven by the gender wage 
 
229 Rise of the two-earner household model, increasing number of divorcees, rise in legal cohabitation 
practices. 
230 In fact, Höhn et. al. (2008) mention that the modernized male breadwinner household model is more 
common than the two-earner household model in the Netherlands and is the second most common model, 
after the two-earner model, in Northern Belgium. Additionally, Mínguez (2004) reports that the traditional 
male breadwinner model is persistent in most of Southern Europe. 
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gap, longer life expectancy231, shorter careers232 and a higher prevalence of part-time 
work233, which are partly the result of household and care activities (Hindriks, 2015).234  
6.2.2 RETIREMENT INCENTIVES AND FINANCIALLY DEPENDENT SPOUSE 
In this subsection, we present a brief overview of the literature on the impact of having a 
financially dependent spouse on retirement incentives. We divide this impact into two 
effects: (I) the effect of spousal characteristics on retirement incentives and (II) the effect 
of additional benefits granted on the basis of having a dependent spouse.  
6.2.2.1 SPOUSAL CHARACTERISTICS 
A person’s retirement incentives are influenced not only by individual determinants but 
also by the characteristics of his or her partner such as age, income and activity status 
(Coile, 2015). Denaeghel, Mortelmans, and Borghgraef (2011) find that spousal 
characteristics influence retirement decisions but that individual determinants are 
stronger while Coile (2004) notes that women are as responsive to their own retirement 
incentives as men. Coile (2015) mentions that there exist three sources that cause the 
retirement decision of an individual to be influenced by his or her spouse: (i) common 
financial resources, (ii) similar preferences (i.e. time preferences) and (iii) 
 
231 The OECD (2020) predicts an average of 25.5 years in retirement for women and 21.1 years in retirement 
for men. 
232 In 2019, the predicted duration of working life for Belgian men was 35.4 years and 31.6 years for Belgian 
women (Eurostat, 2020). 
233 On average 42 percent of Belgian women and 9 percent of Belgian men aged 15 to 64 were working part-
time between 2004 and 2019, compared to 31.2 and 7.9 percent in Europe, respectively (Eurostat, 2020). 
Likewise, in chapter four, we find that 68.7 (67.2) percent of working wage-earner women aged 55 to 59 (60 
to 64) were working part-time from 2004 to 2010.  
234 In fact, 38.3 percent of female pensioners receive a pension benefit of less than 1,000 euros compared to 
only 27.1 percent of male pensioners. Only 0.1 percent of female pensioners receive a pension benefit of 
more than 2,500 euros, compared to 2.6 percent of male pensioners (OECD, 2016). 
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complementarities in leisure (an individual will enjoy leisure even more once his or her 
spouse is retired).  
Furthermore, both Coile (2004) and Baker (2002) find that there exists a spillover effect of 
the spouse’s retirement incentives on the individual’s own retirement behavior, caused 
by complementarities of leisure and joint decision-making. Coile (2004) finds that the 
inactivity status of the partner has a positive impact on the retirement probability of 
individuals because of complementarities of leisure. Similarly, Blau (1998) mentions that 
a spouse values retirement more once the other spouse is retired and both Blau (1998) and 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) find that a husband is more strongly influenced by having 
a retired spouse than a wife is. Finally, both spouses plan their joint consumption over 
their life cycle and try to even out their consumption in the best way possible through 
cooperative retirement decisions (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000). 
6.2.2.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE HOUSEHOLD REPLACEMENT 
RATE BENEFITS 
Inside the vast strand of the literature that looks at the effect of social security provisions 
on the retirement decision235, a smaller part of the literature looks at the impact of 
programs that provide (in)direct benefits to the financially dependent spouse. Blau (1998) 
uses data from the Retirement History Survey and a discrete time choice model to look at 
the impact of the US dependent spouse benefits on the retirement behavior of older 
married couples. He predicts that dependent spouse benefits have a small positive impact 
on the working probability of husbands and a small negative impact on the working 
probability of wives. Michaud (2003) provides evidence of the same work (dis)incentive 
mechanism and finds that the overall effect of the program on labor force participation is 
 
235
 See Stock and Wise (1990a), Stock and Wise (1990b), Gruber and Wise (1999), Gruber and Wise (2004) 
Börsch-Supan and Coile (2020), among others 
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negative.  Knapp (2014) uses a life-cycle model of household savings, labor supply and 
benefit claiming decisions on the 1992 Health and Retirement study US data and confirms 
that the US dependent spouse benefits program creates a work disincentive for the low 
income earner in the couple (usually the wife) and a work incentive for the high income 
earner (usually the husband). For the prime earner in the couple, this implies that the 
substitution effect (increased returns to work lead to lower demand for retirement) is 
more important than the income effect (higher benefits induce a higher demand for 
retirement). In fact, he tests the impact of abolishing the spouse and survivor benefits and 
finds that it would increase the labor force participation of wives by 1.27 years and 
decrease the labor force participation of husbands by 0.53 years.  Michaud and Vermeulen 
(2004) find almost no impact of the elimination of the dependent spouse benefits on labor 
supply at older ages, although they indicate that there exists a work disincentive effect 
associated with the program. Finally, Baker (2002) analyses the effect of the introduction 
of the spouse's allowance in 1975 in Canada and finds that it led to a decrease in the work 
incentives for both men and women because of the means-tested nature of the benefits.  
6.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
In this section, we first describe the dataset used in our analysis and our sample selection 
method. Then, we discuss our pension benefits simulation tool and its validation. Further, 
we define our classification method of households into one and two-earner types and we 
provide descriptive statistics of the final sample.  
6.3.1 THE DATASET 
In this chapter, we use the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
dataset. SHARE is a survey dataset that contains panel micro data on health, socio-
economic and family network of individuals aged 50 and over. It is a cross-national 
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project that covers 27 European countries and Israel. The data is collected biannually and 
is organized into waves from wave 1 collected in 2004/2005 to wave 7 collected in 2017. 
The target population of the survey is persons aged 50 and over at the time of the 
sampling who have their regular domicile in the country.236 Each wave follows the same 
baseline sample (born in 1954 in the case of Belgium) and adds a refreshment sample237 in 
order to ensure the representation of younger cohorts and to compensate for attrition.  
We use the Job Episode panel dataset of waves 3 and 7 for Belgian respondents, which 
contains working life and employment histories for 6,200 individuals (2,865 in wave 3 and 
3,333 in wave 7).238 This dataset includes a retrospective career and earnings history that 
was collected in 2008 or 2009 for wave 3 respondents and in 2017 for wave 7 respondents. 
The data also includes personal characteristics such as gender, age, a variable indicating 
whether the individual lives with a partner, the marital status, the occupation (in 
education, working, retired, unemployed, sick, homemaker, other239) and the year of birth. 
Available career information includes the first and last net wage of each new employment, 
the industry, the working regime (wage earner, self-employed or civil servant) and the 
working hours (full or part-time). The first old-age pension net amount received is also 
available if the individual was retired at the time of the survey. The retrospective career 
and earnings history of the partner is included for part of the sample.  
 
236 The sampling design also includes stratification based on the provinces and clustering based on 
municipalities.  Individuals are excluded from the target population if they are incarcerated, hospitalized, 
cannot be located or unable to speak the national language.  
237 The refreshment sample is composed of people born in 1956 in wave 2, 1960 in wave 4, 1962 in wave 5 
ad 1964 in wave 6. No refreshment sample was included in  waves 3 and 7.   
238 The job panel dataset is only available for waves 3 and 7. In case one individual is identified in both 
waves 3 and 7, we use only the information contained in wave 7. 
239 The other category includes individuals in training, travelling, volunteering or benefitting from a 
survivor pension only. 
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6.3.2 SAMPLING METHODOLOGY 
Because we are working with survey data, we first need to make several adjustments to 
the initial dataset that contains the life history of individuals. First, we discard 
information on years spent in education. Moreover, we dispose of individuals who do not 
report any wage240 at any point in their adult life and individuals with a reported spouse 
who did not participate in the survey. We drop the observations of individuals who report 
a monthly gross income or pension higher than 10,000 euros as we consider them as 
outliers or encoding errors.  
We keep the observations of individuals between the ages of 55 and 65241, who were aged 
younger than 55 in 1990242 and those who were still working at age 55. We drop the 
observations of individuals after they retire because we consider retirement to be an 
absorptive state. We are mostly interested in individuals who have a wage-earner career 
because social security rules for the other two working regimes vary considerably in terms 
of benefits calculation rules, pensionable wage floors, ceilings, etc.243 Therefore, we 
discard the observations of individuals who have a wage-earner career of less than 75 
percent244 of total career or individuals who are identified as civil servants or self-
employed workers after age 55. Furthermore, we drop individuals who have an estimated 
 
240 Because we are working with retrospective data, we are missing the career and earnings histories of some 
individuals who refuse to give this information or simply cannot remember. 
241 We follow the same methodology of the previous chapters where we consider the age range of 55 and 65 
as the range during which a worker is most probable to exit the labor force. Indeed, most early labor force 
exits pathways are not available before age 55 and wage-earners are encouraged to retire at 65. 
242 We restrict the period of our analysis to limit the survivor bias. Indeed, only individuals who have 
survived until 2008/2009 (wave 3) or 2017 (wave 7) have replied to the survey. As we expect that early death 
is correlated with health and socio-economic status, the longer the period between the last observation and 
the time of the survey, the higher the survivor bias. 
243 Besides, no household replacement rate exists in the civil servant scheme.  
244 We tested the robustness of our analysis by sampling only individuals with a 100 percent career as a 
wage-earner. It did not significantly alter our results but it decreased considerably the size of our sample. 
Therefore, in order to increase the sample size, we allow for mixed careers up to 25 percent of another 
working regime as it often happens that individuals start their career in a different working regime. 
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pension amount of less than 500 euros and individuals who have a total career of less than 
or equal to 15 years because we assume that the determinants of retirement for individuals 
with a low wage or low number of career years are potentially very different from those 
of individuals with a higher wage. Finally, we drop individuals who have an estimated 
pension higher than 3500 euros, since it is higher than the maximum pension benefit. 
We obtain a total of 3,392 observations for 716 individuals and 625 households. 
Observation years range from 1990 to 2016. Table 6.1 summarizes the main characteristics 
of sampled individuals. Since we are imposing a minimum career length condition, the 
proportion of men is higher than the proportion of women in our sample. 
Table 6.1: Characteristics of sampled individuals 
 Number of individuals Proportion of total sample  
Male 437 61.03 % 
Female 279 38.97 % 
French speaking 269 37.57 % 
Dutch speaking 447 62.43 % 
Without partner 176 24.58 % 
With partner 540 75.42 % 
Total 716 100 % 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE dataset 
6.3.3 RECONSTRUCTION OF EARNINGS HISTORIES AND 
CALCULATION OF PENSION BENEFITS 
We use the earnings histories that contain the first net wage of each new job to reconstruct 
complete earnings histories. From these reconstructed earnings histories, we estimate the 
old-age pension benefits each individual would be entitled to receive at each age between 
55 and 65. We detail the method for building our old-age pension benefit calculator below. 
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First, we transform the currency of wages into euros and we calculate gross wages from 
net amounts using the respective taxation rules in effect.250 We fill-in the partial wage 
information by adjusting the first wage of each new employment for inflation and average 
wage growth245 for each year of career. In case there is missing information on the first 
wage of a new job, we use the closest available wage in the individual’s earnings history, 
adjusted for inflation and wage growth. 
We use these reconstructed earnings histories to calculate the old-age pension benefits 
entitlements at each age between 55 and 65. First, we replace the wage with the 
corresponding pensionable earnings ceiling (floor)246, if the former is larger (smaller) than 
the latter. Second, we reevaluate past earnings into euros of the retirement year using the 
corresponding valorisation factor.247 Finally, we sum the valorized earnings over the 
entire career, divide the sum by the applicable complete career years248 and multiply it by 
60 percent for individuals in two-earner or single households and 75 percent for 
individuals in one-earner households (see section 6.3.5). We replace our estimated old-
age pension amount by the minimum pension where needed, adjusted for the proportion 
of a complete career.249 Finally, we calculate the net pension amount using the respective 
taxation rules in effect250 and we add the pension bonus whenever applicable.251 For each 
age between 55 and 65, we obtain an estimation of the net pension amount an individual 
 
245 We adjust wages to inflation using the historical evolution of Consumer Price Index. For wage growth, 
we use the historical evolution of average monthly salary for wage earners by age, which is differentiated 
by gender. See the appendix for the evolution of average wage growth. 
246 See chapter two for a list of pensionable earnings ceilings and floors. 
247 See chapter two for more detail on the valorisation factor. 
248 The complete career years in the old-age pension calculation are 45 years for men. For women they are 
40 years before 1997, 41 years between 1997 and 1999, 42 years between 2000 and 2002, 43 years between 
2003 and 2005, 44 years between 2006 and 2008 and 45 years from 2009 onwards. See chapter two for more 
information on complete career years. 
249 See chapter two for more information on minimum pensions. 
250 See chapter two for a historical evolution of taxation rules. 
251 See chapter two for more information on the pension bonus. 
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would be entitled to receive based on his reconstructed earnings history, were he to retire 
at that age.252  
We find an average estimated old-age pension of 1329.92 euros for men and 1074.17 euros 
for women (all years combined, in 2017 euros). Figure 6.4 displays the evolution of old-
age pension benefits by age and gender.253  
Figure 6.4: Evolution of estimated old-age pension amounts by age and gender (2017 
constant euros) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE dataset 
6.3.4 VALIDATION OF THE OLD-AGE PENSION BENEFITS 
CALCULATOR 
For each sampled individual, we compare our estimated pension amount at the effective 
retirement age to the corresponding observed amounts received, as reported in later 
survey waves (see section 6.3.1).254 We find a difference between the observed and the 
 
252 We convert every pension amount into 2017 euros using the Consumer Price Index. 
253 The important increase in average pension benefits at age 64 and 65 for women is caused by the fact 
that individuals with the highest earnings tend to stay on the labor force after the statutory eligibility age. 
254 We restrict the sample to individuals who were retired at the time of the survey (to have information 
on his or her observed old-age pension) and who never worked as self-employed or civil servants. If the 
old-age pension amount is not observable at the retirement age, we adjust it to the price levels of the 
retirement year using the pivotal index mechanism (see chapter two).  
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estimated pension amount of less than 250 euros for 50.2 percent of our observations and 
less than 500 euros for 79.8 percent of our observations. 
Figure 6.5 compares the real and estimated pension amounts by age for men and women. 
The estimation is quite accurate for men but less so for women. First, women more often 
have interrupted careers or part-time working contracts because of household and care 
responsibilities. For the same reasons, women exhibit more variations in wage growth 
and in earnings paths than men. Second, since we do not have precise information on 
work intensity during a specific career year255, we cannot truly verify the eligibility criteria 
for the minimum pension and we may grant it to individuals who would actually not be 
eligible based on their real career histories. This missing information thus has a stronger 
effect on the estimates for women for whom part-time work is much more prevalent (see 
chapter five). In fact, if we run a regression of the absolute difference between the 
observed and the estimated pension amount, using various personal and job-related 
characteristics as explanatory variables, we observe that gender and the education level 
(tertiary compared to secondary) both have a positive and significant coefficient. This 
result indicates that the average wage growth we use for the reconstruction of earnings 
histories is not as appropriate for women and individuals with tertiary education as it is 
for other types of individuals. Consequently, our estimation of financial retirement 
incentives is less accurate for women and individuals with tertiary education than other 




255 We have information on whether the individual has worked part-time during the year but nothing on 
how many days or full-time equivalent he or she has worked during that year. 
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Figure 6.5: Estimated and observed old-age pension benefits by gender 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE datasets – Modules Job panel 
(waves 3 and 7) and Employment and pensions (waves 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 
6.3.5 CLASSIFICATION INTO ONE AND TWO-EARNER 
HOUSEHOLDS 
In order to be identified as a one-earner household, the couple must be married and the 
household must include one earner and one financially dependent spouse. We classify an 
individual as a financial dependent spouse using two criteria: a status-based indicator 
and an earnings indicator. The status indicator labels an individual as a financially 
dependent spouse if he or she is identified as homemaker, in training or “doing nothing”. 
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The earnings indicator compares the individual’s earnings (from any of the three working 
regimes) to the corresponding earnings test thresholds256. We exclude individuals who 
qualify based on the earnings indicator but are identified as sick or unemployed because 
the household replacement rate cannot be granted to a pensioner whose spouse receives 
unemployment or sickness benefits. Since the household replacement rate is only 
available to married individuals, we exclude legal cohabitants from this definition.257 
Households with one spouse identified as a financial dependent using either of the two 
indicators is labelled a one-earner household.258 Households with two spouses working and 
earning an income above the wage indicator are labelled two-earner households and one 
person households are labelled single households. Finally, we only keep the observations 
of the earners in one-earner couples and discard the observations of the dependent 
spouse.  
We obtain a total of 129 individuals (760 observations) in one-earner households, 319 
individuals (1,820 observations) in two-earners households259 and 144 individuals (812 
observations) in single households. Table 6.2 summarizes the main characteristics of 
individuals by type of household. Predictably, there are more men identified as earners 
in one-earner households following the prevalence of the traditional male breadwinner 
model. The proportion of men in two-earner couples is also slightly higher than for 
women because of our sampling methodology that discards individuals with (very) short 
 
256 We use the 2017 earnings threshold that we adjust for prices. The monthly threshold (in 2017 euros) is 
1,013.5 euros for wage-earners or civil servants below age 65, 810.7 euros for self-employed workers 
below age 65, 1,971.4 euros for wage-earners or civil servants above age 65 or 1,899.1 euros for self-
employed workers above age 65. These thresholds correspond to the earnings test for the combination of 
work and old age pension benefits receipt. 
257 Unmarried individuals who satisfy the one earner household criteria are not used in this analysis. They 
only constitute a very minor proportion of the sample.  
258 If both household members fulfil the financially dependent spouse criteria, then the observations are 
dropped. 
259 It is possible that two individuals from the same two-earner household are selected into our sample. 
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careers or who are out of the labor force at older ages.  Interestingly, we note that the 
average retirement age is almost equal between single and two-earner households but is 
lower for one-earner households. Finally, we observe that there is  a lower prevalence of 
part-time work among individuals in one-earner households compared to other types of 
households. 
Table 6.2:  Main characteristics of sampled individuals by type of household 
Personal 
characteristics 



















       
TOTAL (individuals) 129 100 319 100 144 100 
Gende
r 
Male 113 87.6 176 55.17 77 53.47 





Primary 10 7.75 28 8.78 10 6.94 
Secondary 65 50.39 170 53.29 74 51.39 
Tertiary 




French 43 33.33 122 38.24 57 39.58 
Dutch 
86 66.67 197 61.76 87 60.42 
Average retirement 
age 
60.98 (2.81) 61.16 (2.93) 61.82 (2.79) 
    





















      
TOTAL (observations) 760 100 1,820 100 812 100 
Part-time work  48 6.32 314 17.25 129 15.89 
Full-time work 712 93.68 1,506 82.75 683 84.11 
       
274 
 
Sector of activity 
Primary  30 3.95 20 1.10 10 1.23 
Secondary 432 56.84 857 47.09 295 36.33 
Tertiary 298 39.21 943 51.81 507 62.44 
Proportion of career 
worked as wage-
earner 
97.80 (4.64) 97.77 (5.16) 97.24 (6.07) 
    
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE dataset 
Looking at the retirement hazard rates (figure 6.6), we see that the retirement hazard of 
individuals in single households is generally lower than other types of households at 
lower ages and present peaks at ages 60, 64 and 65. The retirement hazard rate of 
individuals in one-earner households is generally higher than other types of households 
before age 62. The only two exceptions are at ages 58 and 60, the eligibility ages for the 
conventional early retirement and the early eligibility age of the old-age pension benefit, 
at which the retirement hazard rates of individuals in two-earner households are the 
highest. At age 65, the retirement hazard rate of two-earner households is the highest but 









Figure 6.6: Retirement hazard rates by age and type of household 
 
Source: Author’ own calculations using SHARE dataset 
6.3.6 FINANCIAL RETIREMENT INCENTIVES  
From the estimated old-age pension benefits, we construct two measures of financial 
retirement incentives at the individual level: the social security wealth measure and the 
accrual. We define social security wealth (SSW) as the present discounted value of all 
future pension benefit260 flows for individual i at age a if he retires at age R261. 
HH(, \, 
) =   KY8LYMI tUFI()V  
 
260 Departing form the methodology of chapter four, we only consider the incentives stemming from the 
old-age pension program and no benefits from other labor force exit pathways because we have access to 
less detailed status information and we cannot verify most of the eligibility criteria for other programs. In 
fact, individuals who are marked as receiving disability, conventional early retirement or unemployment 
insurance after the age of 54 are not included in the sample (see section 3.4). Also, due to a lack of precise 
information on the individual’s wage, we do not construct the ITAX measure. 
261 We assume that the individual retires as soon as benefits become accessible. 
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where tUFI()V  is the expected after-tax benefit of individual i at age s for retirement at 
age R and received until the end of life T. Discounting is done allowing for time preference  
KY8 is the time discount rate that we assume to be equal to 3 percent real.  
 







⎪⎧ y() FI,Y()      *% $c
y() z()FI,Y() +  y() ;1 − z()@FI,Y()+;1 − y()@z()FI,Y{() *% '& − \%% ℎℎ    
y() z()FI,|{Y|() +  y() ;1 − z()@FI,Y()+;1 − y()@z()FI,Y{() *%  − \%% ℎℎ      
 
Where FI,Y() refers to the old-age pension benefit paid at the isolated replacement 
rate at age s if the worker retires at age R. FI,|{Y|() refers to the old-age pension 
benefit paid at the household replacement rate at age s if the worker retires at age R. 
FI,Y{() refers to the survivor pension paid to the spouse if the worker retires at age 
R and in case of the worker’s passing262. y() refers to the survival probability of the 
reference person at age s conditional on being alive at age a, and z() refers to the survival 
probability of the spouse at age s conditional on being alive at age a.263 
 
262 See chapter two for a detailed description of the survivor pension. 
263 The survival probabilities are based on age and gender specific survival tables retrieved from the 
Human Mortality Database and are similar to the ones used in chapters three and four. We assume that 
both spouses are the same age. 
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If the individual is not eligible for the old-age pension benefit at age a, then we compute 
his social security wealth by imputing an income of zero until he or she becomes eligible 
for old-age pension benefits at age R261. If the individual is eligible for old-age pension 
benefits at age a, then a is equal to R and we compute his SSW by imputing pension 
benefits starting at age a.  
Figure 6.7 shows the evolution of social security wealth by age. Similarly to the analysis 
in chapter three and 4, an individual’s social security wealth increases until the individual 
becomes eligible for the old-age pension benefit (age 60 in most cases) and then slightly 
decreases because the additional pension wealth gained through increased pension 
benefits is lower than the wealth lost because the individual foregoes one year of benefits 
(see chapter four).  
 
Figure 6.7: Evolution of social security wealth by age  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE dataset 
The accrual represents the variation in SSW that is obtained if the worker stays on the 
labor force for one additional year. A positive accrual represents an incentive to stay on 
the labor force because the pension wealth to be gained by working for one more year is 
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higher than the effect of losing one year of benefits. In the opposite case, a negative accrual 
represents an incentive to leave the labor force. 
N(, \) = HHO4(, \ + 1) − HH(, \) 
Figure 6.8 shows the evolution of accruals by age. Similarly to chapter three and 4 and to 
the literature (see Gruber and Wise, 1999), we find large positive accruals before benefits 
become available and smaller accruals thereafter. The accruals before age 60 (the early 
eligibility age of the old-age pension) are positive and thus indicate that there is an 
incentive for the individual to stay on the labor market before he or she can access old-
age pension benefits.  
 
Compared to the social security wealth and accrual measures presented in chapter four, 
these financial retirement incentives were calculated based on incomplete earnings 
histories that have been reconstructed assuming a constant and continuous increase in 
wages every year. Therefore, the longer an individual stays on the labor force before he is 
eligible for the early eligibility age of old-age pension, the higher the accrual because on 
top of the increasing conditional survival probability until old-age pension becomes 
accessible, the amount of pension benefits he is entitled to increases as well. This explains 
why the accruals increase between age 55 and 59. After age 60, the accruals turn negative 
because old-age pension benefits becomes accessible for most sampled individuals and 
the effect of losing one year of old-age benefit is larger than the increase in social security 







Figure 6.8: Evolution of accruals by age 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE dataset 
6.4 ANALYSIS 
In this section, we first define the model we use in our analysis, namely a discrete time 
logistic duration model. Then, we discuss censoring and truncation issues that arise with 
our data and which are common in duration model analysis. Finally, we define the 
explanatory variables we include in our analysis.   
6.4.1 THE MODEL 
We use a discrete time264 duration model to study transitions from employment into 
retirement.265 The use of such framework allows us to model the conditional probability 
 
264 Retirement occurs on a continuous timeline but since our data is grouped into annual intervals, discrete 
time duration models are more appropriate than continuous time duration models (Jenkins, 2004). When 
one has access to intervals grouped in months, continuous time duration models can still be used to 
analyse the retirement decision (see Aranki and Macchiarelli (2013))  for instance).  
265 See Diamond-Hausman (1984), Schils (2006), Wolthoff, Euwas and Vuuren (2006), Euwals- and 
Vanvuuren- and Wolthoff(2006), Lindeboom (1998), Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) and Aranki and 
Macchiarelli (2013) for duration models of retirement transitions. 
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that the employment spell will end during a certain period, given that it has lasted until 
the preceding period.  
We refer to the transition from employment to retirement as a failure event, which can only 
occur after the onset of risk, the individual’s first entry on the labor market. Failure can 
only happen once since we define the retirement decision as absorptive. We define T a 
discrete random variable that represents employment duration. Our time axis is divided 
into a number of non-overlapping continuous time intervals where the boundaries are the 
employment duration years \n, \4, \m, \},…., \9. Thus, the intervals are defined as U\84, \U with k ∈ ~1,2,3, … >.  
The survival function of interval \, S(\), is the probability that the employment spell will 
last until at least \. Said differently, it is the probability that no retirement occurs before \. The failure function, F(\), is the reverse of S(\) and is the probability of retirement 
before or during interval \.   
H;\84@ =  PrQ > \84 = 1 − F;\84@  (1)
 
H;\@ =  PrQ > \ = 1 − F;\@   (2) 
 
The probability of retirement during the interval U\84, \U is written as 




The discrete time hazard rate at interval \, ℎ;\@, is the conditional probability of 
retirement during interval U\84, \U, provided the individual was still employed at the 
end of interval \84, and is written as  
ℎ;\@ =  %\84 < Q ≤  \ | Q > \84 (4)  
We follow the methodology of Maes (2008) and Andriopoulou and Tsakoglou (2011) and 
we use a logistic discrete time hazard duration model in which the dependent variable is 
the logit transformation of the hazard rate at interval k266 (see 5).267  
In the logistic model, the log of the relative odds268 of failure during interval j, conditional 
upon having survived until the end of the interval (j-1), is the sum of a baseline hazard 
that is common to every individual and an individual-specific scaling factor.  
c$'(ℎ(k, R)) = log  ℎ(k, R)1 − ℎ(k, R) = *(k) + KhRh  
ℎ(k, R) =  11 + (8W()8)  (5) 
Where ℎ(k, R) is the scaled hazard rate for a certain individual in interval j. *(k) = 
c$';ℎn(k)@ is the baseline hazard specification, common to every individual. And R is 
 
266 Hereafter, since all intervals have the same length, we refer to interval \  as interval j. 
267 There exists two main hazard specification functions in discrete time models: the complementary log-
log and the logistic model. The main difference between the two models is that the complementary log-
log model assumes proportional hazards and the logistic model assumes proportional odds 
(Andriopoulou and Tsakloglou, 2011). In fact, the logistic model converges to the complementary log-log 
model as the hazard becomes increasingly small, which is the case in most applications (Jenkins, 1995).  
268 Therefore, the exponentiated coefficients of the logistic model can be interpreted as odds ratio, or the 
probability of failure over the probability of non-failure. We follow Maes (2008) and Wolthoff, Euwas and 
Vuuren (2006) and we present the marginal effects rather than the exponentiated coefficients for the sake 
of clarity and simplicity of interpreation. 
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the vector of household, personal and job characteristics for a certain individual, which 
can be time constant or time-varying.  
Because unobserved effects like ability, motivation, general attitudes towards 
employment or retirement and preferences for leisure might affect the retirement 
behavior (Maes, 2008), we control for individual heterogeneity using a random effects 
model where c is the unobserved individual-specific error term that we assume 
uncorrelated with vector X. 
c$'(ℎ(k, R)) = log  |(,)48|(,) = *(k) + KhRh + ) (6)                     
Jenkins (1995, 2004) shows that a discrete time duration model with panel data is 
equivalent to estimating a logit model using the failure event as the dependent variable 
and a set of explanatory variables representing duration.  
Therefore, we use the following binary response logit model 
l∗ =  KhRh + *(k) + ) + _ 
where l∗  is the latent probability for individual i to retire in interval j, Kh is the vector of 
coefficients associated with time-constant and time-varying explanatory variables Rh and 
*(k) is the baseline hazard specification of employment duration.  
6.4.2 CENSORING AND TRUNCATION  
One of the advantage of duration models lies in the fact that they effectively deal with the 
presence of right-censored and left-truncated data. Figure 6.9 summarizes the types of 
censoring and truncation issues we face with our data. 
Left truncation is caused by our sampling methodology, according to which we only keep 
individuals who are still employed at age 55 and leave aside individuals who retired 
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before that age. Therefore, our results are not valid for the portion of the population who 
is allowed to retire at a (very) early age.269 Another source of truncation is caused by the 
fact that we only observe individuals who are still alive at the time of survey. As 
mentioned above, we restrict our sample to individuals who were aged 55 or less in 1990 
and discard the observations of older individuals in order to reduce a potential attrition 
bias. 
Right censoring occurs because not everyone who replied to the survey in wave 3 and 
wave 7 have retired. Indeed, 28.77 percent of individuals in our initial sample were still 
employed at the end of our observation period (2008 or 2009 for wave 3 and 2017 for wave 
7). We assume that censoring is independent of the probability to retire since it is solely 
based on the year in which the survey took place. Moreover, because we use a logit 









 For instance, sailors, flying personnel, etc. have different old-age pension eligibility rules and are more 
likely to retire early. Since they might respond to different retirement incentives based on specific 
eligibility rules, they are left out of our analysis. 
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Figure 6.9: Illustration of standard observation, left truncation and right censoring in the 
data 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration 
285 
 
6.4.3 DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
Our dependent variable is a binary indicator of retirement, defined as a transition from 
employment status to the “retired from work” status270 during period interval j. 

'%d' = ^1 * &%>$  '%\c (k − 1) \a %'%a  '%\c k0 'ℎ%&             
We use our financial retirement incentive measures, the social security wealth measure 
and the accrual, as explanatory variables271. Maes (2008) mentions the identification issue 
of social security wealth, according to which social security wealth might capture the 
unobserved effect of individuals’ taste for work. Indeed, individuals with a high taste for 
work have higher average wages and social security wealth and will likely retire later 
than individuals with low taste for work. In fact, while the lifecycle theory suggests a 
positive effect of social security wealth on retirement, this omitted variable bias might 
lead to a negative coefficient for social security wealth. Coile and Gruber (2001) found 
that there was still substantial variation in the SSW and accruals even after controlling for 
lifetime and current earnings. Therefore, following the non-linearity in the relationship 
between SSW and earnings, we add a variable indicating the last net monthly wage272 
received by the individual as a proxy for the unobserved effect of taste for work.  
In additional to financial retirement incentives, we control for job characteristics including 
the sector of activity (primary, secondary or tertiary), part-time working contracts (at least 
one period of part-time work during interval j takes the value of 1) and the years worked 
 
270 The status Retired from work indicates the receipt of (part or full-time) old-age pension benefits. 
271 One unit change in the social security wealth and accrual variables is equal to a change of 100,000 
euros. 




as wage-earner expressed as a percentage of the career273. Next, we control for personal 
and household characteristics including gender, the year of birth274, the level of education 
(primary, secondary or tertiary), an interaction term between education and gender, the 
language spoken275, age difference with the partner (in absolute value), a binary variable 
indicating whether the spouse is older than the worker (1 if the spouse is older than the 
worker and 0 otherwise) and the retirement status276 of the partner (1 if the partner is 
retired from work and 0 otherwise). We add a variable indicating whether the individual 
is an earner in a one-earner household following our classification method detailed above. 
Finally, we add a set of variables representing the baseline hazard function of 
employment duration. We use a second order polynomial function of employment 
duration.277  
*(k) =  4k + mkm (6) 
Duration can be proxied by age itself (Maes (2008), Spataro (2002)), and it can thus become 
difficult to discern the difference between the effect of the duration variable and the pure 
age effects. Coile and Gruber (2001) note that they find very little difference in their 
coefficients when including the age dummies or another specification of age. We follow 
the methodology of Maes (2008), Meghir-Whitehouse (1997) and Lindeboom (1998) and 
 
273 One unit change in this variable is equal to a change of 10 percentage points. 
274 Since we merged two waves of the data (wave 3 and 7), we tested for the impact of belonging to one 
wave or another and have found no significant effect. 
275 French speakers live in a region that broadly corresponds to Wallonia and Flemish speakers live in a 
region that broadly corresponds to Flanders. The German speaking community is not included in the 
survey. 
276 To be identified as retired, the partner must have had a career. Therefore, not every dependent spouse 
in one-earner household is defined as retired. 
277 We tried various baseline hazard specifications: linear, dummies, dummies of 5 years, log, etc. All 
specifications yielded very similar results.  
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include employment duration and an age variable as we expect that individuals with the 
same employment duration and a different age can have a different retirement behavior.  
Regarding age, we use three different model specifications. Indeed, age is plausibly 
correlated with decreasing health, increasing preferences for leisure, social norms and 
eligibility conditions for various social security programs (Maes, 2008). We control for the 
correlation of age with unobservables by using a random effects model. However, age 
might still capture eligibility for social security programs, which should be captured by 
our financial incentive variables. We are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the use 
of a set of age dummies serves to capture non-linearity in the effect of age, but it avoids 
our financial incentive measures from capturing the eligibility effect of social security 
programs. On the other hand, the use of a non-linear function of age foregoes this latter 
issue but might not capture the social norms effect of reaching a certain age on the 
retirement probability. In view of these assumptions, we present three models with 
different age specifications: (i) a cubic form specification of age, (ii) age dummies and (iii) 
a cubic form specification of age and a set of social security eligibility variables. Therefore, 
in the third specification, we add a set of binary variables indicating eligibility to old-age 
pension at the early (EEA) and statutory (SEA) ages and eligibility to the standard 
conventional early retirement regime.278  
 
 
278 See chapter two for a historical description of the eligibility conditions for these programs. Since we do 
not have access to the days worked during each year of career, we consider that each year of the career 




In this section, we first present and discuss the results of our discrete time logistic duration 
model. Then, we present a simulation of the impact of a change in the generosity of the 
household replacement rate on predictions of the retirement probability and on poverty 
measures. 
6.5.1 REGRESSION RESULTS  
In this section, we present and discuss the results of our discrete time logistic hazard 
duration model divided into three models with different age and social security eligibility 
specifications (see table 6.3): (i) a cubic polynomial of age, (ii) age dummies and (iii) a 
cubic polynomial of age with social security eligibility variables.  
First and foremost, we take a look at the effect of our financial retirement incentive 
variables. Similarly to chapter four, we find a significant and positive impact of social 
security wealth on retirement in all three models. This result indicates that higher social 
security wealth leads to higher retirement probability, thus correctly predicting an income 
effect (Coile, 2004; Maes, 2008). As expected, the effect of our last net wage variable is 
negative and significant, and represents the negative relationship between taste for work 
and retirement. Similarly to Gruber and Wise (2004), we observe that part of the social 
security wealth effect is captured by the wage coefficient as the coefficient of the former 
decreases as the latter is added as a regressor. In the end, we find that a 100,000 euros 
increase in social security wealth would increase the retirement probability by 
approximately 6 percentage points.279 
 
279
 We find a social security wealth coefficient that is substantially lower than in chapter three. Several 
causes are at the root of this observation. First, we reconstruct complete earnings histories from partial 
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The effect of the accrual variable is negative and significant, thus correctly predicting a 
substitution effect (Coile, 2004). Indeed, a positive (negative) accrual indicates that there 
is a gain (loss) to be made in terms of social security wealth by staying on the labor force 
for one additional year. A negative accrual coefficient correctly predicts a decrease 
(increase) in the retirement probability following a positive (negative) accrual.  
We find that age is highly correlated with our financial retirement incentive variables 
because they all capture the effect of eligibility to social security programs. Once we allow 
for non-linearity in age (second model), the coefficients of both the social security wealth 
and the accruals become smaller because they no longer capture the effect of eligibility to 
social security programs. As a matter of fact, once we include social security eligibility 
variables (third model), the accrual variable becomes insignificant. 
Similarly to previous chapters, we find that both the age and the social security eligibility 
variables have a very strong effect on the retirement probability. In particular, in the 
second model, we find a significant effect of ages 58, 60 and 65, the standard eligibility 
age of conventional early retirement and the early and statutory eligibility ages of the old-
age pension regime, respectively. 280 Similarly, in the third model, we find a positive and 
strongly significant effect of our three social security eligibility variables.  
 
ones. Thus, our estimation of pension benefits is less accurate than in chapter four. Our social security 
wealth and accrual variables might be further from their true value and does not enable us to find similar 
correlation between our financial retirement incentive variables and the retirement behavior. Second, our 
sample size is significantly lower in chapter four and this limits the variation of our social security wealth 
and accrual variables. Third, because we are working with survey data and incomplete earning histories, 
we had to discard observations of individuals for whom the wage and pension benefits variables were too 
low or too high (because of encoding error in the dataset or because of a miscalculation of their pension 
benefits). This limits even further the variation of our financial retirement incentives.  
280 See chapter two for a list of the various eligibility ages for the old-age pension and the conventional 
early retirement.  
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Corresponding to the findings of Maes (2008), we do not find a significant effect of our 
employment duration variables.281 This result hints at the fact that there is low duration 
dependence and once eligibility criteria are accounted for (through the age or eligibility 
variables), employment duration does not influence the retirement decision. Moreover, 
most of the effect of omitted variables that are correlated with time such as health are 
captured by the age regressor. In fact, we expect a positive bias of age on retirement since 
age and health are negatively correlated and health is plausibly negatively correlated with 
retirement. 
We find that being a woman decreases the retirement probability by approximately 3 
percent. This counter-intuitive result might be explained by our sampling methodology 
according to which we only keep women with relatively long careers and thus high taste 
for work, high motivation, low demand for leisure, etc. The level of education does not 
significantly influence the retirement decision, except for women with tertiary education 
who have a significantly higher probability of retirement compared to women with 
secondary education. It is possible that our financial incentive measures capture the effect 
of socio-economic status, which leads to an insignificant effect of education.  
Unlike Coile (2004), Denaeghel et. al. (2014), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), we find that 
spousal characteristics do not have a significant impact on the retirement decision. 
Interestingly, if we include individuals with lower pension benefits, spousal 
characteristics become significant. First, having a retired spouse has a positive and 
significant impact on the retirement probability and the effect is lower for women than 
for men, which corresponds to the findings of Blau (1998) and Gustman and Steinmeier 
 
281 We tried several functional form for employment duration : linear, cubic polynomial, log, dummies, 
group of 5 years. All were insignificant. 
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(2000). Second, we find that having a younger spouse has a positive and significant impact 
on the retirement probability. 
Working in the primary sector of activity leads to lower retirement probability compared 
to working in the secondary sector of activity. In contrast with our results in chapters 4 
and 5, working part-time does not have an effect on the retirement probability. We tried 
interacting the part-time variable with gender but the effect remained non-significant. 
This result is potentially again caused by the sampling methodology that only allows for 
women with long careers and the way the part-time variable indicator is built (no 
information on work intensity for instance). The proportion of years worked as wage 
earner in total career does not have a significant impact on the retirement probability but 
following our sampling method, we only allow for a maximum of a 25 percent of non-
wage-earner career. Finally, we find a small negative effect of the year of birth, indicating 
that younger workers tend to retire later, which corresponds to our results from chapter 
four.  
We find no impact of being in a one-earner household on the retirement probability. It is 
important to note that part of the effect of being in a one-earner household is captured by 
the social security wealth variable because pension benefits are calculated using different 
replacement rates. Moreover, since we use a random effect model, we control for the effect 
of unobservables such as demand for leisure, taste for work, etc.  It is plausible that since 
individuals in one-earner households are the only providers for the household, they tend 
to tune their retirement decisions to determinants linked to financial retirement incentives 
rather than personal or spousal characteristics. We tried controlling for an interaction 
between our financial retirement incentives variables and the one-earner household status 
but the coefficients were not significant, indicating that the financial incentive measures 
have the same effect between the different types of household. In fact, the predicted 
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probability of retirement is higher for one-earner households, following the effect of social 
security wealth, which is higher for one-earner households.  
Table 6.3: Discrete time logistic hazard duration model with random effects - regression 
results 
 
(i) Cubic age 
polynomial 
(ii) Age dummies 
(iii) Cubic age 
polynomial and 
eligibility variables 
Social security wealth / 
100,000 
0.063*** 0.041** 0.081*** 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.025) 
Accrual / 100,000 -0.267*** -0.153*** -0.071 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.046) 
Last net wage (in 2017 €) -0.004* -0.003* -0.005** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Female -0.037** -0.033** -0.070*** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024) 
Primary school 0.027 0.020 0.046 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.036) 
Tertiary education 0.015 0.013 0.028 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024) 
French speaker -0.016 -0.013 -0.027 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.020) 
Retired partner 0.007 0.004 0.005 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.021) 
Older partner 0.003 0.002 0.008 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.026) 
Age difference with 
partner  
0.001 0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
One-earner household -0.024 -0.006 -0.033 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.033) 
Primary sector of activity -0.077** -0.073** -0.091 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.057) 
Tertiary sector of activity -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.020) 
Part-time 0.036 0.024 0.039 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.030) 
0.007 0.008 0.001 
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Wage-earner proportion (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) 
Birth year  -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age  10.111***  11.168*** 
(3.016)  (3.592) 
Age squared -0.170***  -0.185*** 
(0.050)  (0.061) 
Age cubic 0.001***  0.001*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
Age dummies    
56 
 -0.005  
 (0.016)  
57  -0.004  
 (0.017)  
58  0.046**  
 (0.021)  
59  0.023  
 (0.023)  
60  0.240***  
 (0.040)  
61  0.055  
 (0.040)  
62  0.063  
 (0.047)  
63  0.057  
 (0.052)  
64  0.072  
 (0.062)  
65  0.706***  
 (0.079)  
Eligibility EEA OAP   0.035** 
  (0.016) 
Eligibility SEA OAP   0.196*** 
  (0.033) 
Eligibility CER   0.143*** 
  (0.023) 
Employment duration 0.035 0.019 0.003 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.029) 





(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the mean. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Interaction effects 
are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
6.5.2 SIMULATION OF A CHANGE IN THE GENEROSITY OF THE 
HOUSEHOLD RATE BENEFITS 
In this section, we simulate the effect of a change in the generosity of the household 
replacement rate on the retirement probability of individuals in one-earner households 
and on various poverty measures. First, we estimate the impact of a decrease of 15 
percentage points of the household replacement rate to 60 percent, which is equivalent to 
abolishing the household replacement rate. Next, we look at the effect of increasing the 
household replacement rate in gradual steps of 5 percentage points starting from a 
replacement rate of 60 percent. This simulation allows us to get an insight on whether the 
household replacement rate leads to a work (dis)incentive282 and to put a figure on the 
role of the household replacement rate in pension adequacy. 
6.5.2.1 IMPACT ON THE RETIREMENT PROBABILITY 
In this section, we first analyse the change in retirement probability caused by the removal 
of the household replacement rate. Decreasing the household replacement rate to 60 
percent has two effects: (i) on the social security wealth and (ii) on the accrual. 
First, a decrease in the household replacement rate leads to a decrease in the social 
security wealth and thus a decrease in the retirement probability following the income 
 
282
 See Blau (1997), Knapp (2014) and Michaud (2003) for an analysis of the impact of other programs 
targeted at the dependent spouse on retirement. 
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effect observed in section 6.5.2. Indeed, the poorer the individual, the more likely he or 
she will stay in the labor force and the lower the retirement probability.  
Second, a decrease in the household replacement rate also generates a change in the 
accrual. In fact, before the individual is eligible for old-age pension, a decrease in the 
generosity of the system leads to a lower work incentive and thus a higher retirement 
probability (i.e. the positive accrual decreases), because there is less to be gained by 
working for one additional year. However, after the individual gains access to the old-
age pension regime, the reform creates a lower work disincentive and thus a lower 
retirement probability (i.e. the negative accrual increases) because there is less to be lost 
by working for one additional year. The total effect of the reform depends on whether the 
income or the substitution effect is higher and on whether the individual has access to 
old-age pension benefits.  
We predict the retirement probability of workers in one-earner households using our 
second model with age dummies. In figure 6.10, we present the change in retirement 
probability in percentage points in the case of a removal of the household replacement 
rate. Under the 60 percent replacement rate scenario, the average predicted probability of 
retirement decreases by an average of 1.2 percent at all ages. The impact is larger at ages 
60 and 64 with a decrease of the retirement probability of 2.1 percent at both ages.  We 
note that the decrease in retirement probability is smaller at lower ages, because of the 
effect of the household replacement rate on the accrual. Indeed, the decrease in accrual 
caused by the removal of the household replacement rate leads to higher retirement 
probability before the individual has access to the old-age pension regime and offsets 
some of the effect of the social security wealth. Therefore, on average, the removal of the 
household replacement rate has a small negative effect on the retirement probability (i.e. 
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a work incentive) and the effect is stronger once the individual has access to the old-age 
pension regime.  
 
Figure 6.10: Retirement hazard rates for workers in one-earner households – baseline (75% 
replacement rate) and suppression of household replacement rate (60% replacement rate) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE data 
In figure 6.11, we look at the average change in retirement probability in percentage points 
by age groups (ages 55-59 and ages 60-65) for several scenarios of change in the generosity 
of the household replacement rate compared to the baseline scenario (75 percent 
replacement rate). Again, we observe that the effect is overall quite small. We find that a 
decrease in the household replacement rate leads to a decrease in the retirement 
probability and the effect is larger at older ages. An increase in the household replacement 
rate leads to an increase in the retirement probability and the effect is also larger at older 
ages.   
In conclusion, we find that the removal of the household replacement rate would lead to 
a minor decrease in the retirement probability. In turn, an increase of the household 
replacement rate would lead to an increase in the retirement probability. Specifically, a 
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change of 5 percentage points of the household replacement rate leads to a change in the 
retirement probability of approximately 0.24 percentage points below age 60 and 0.51 
percentage points above age 59 and the effect is the largest at age 60. 
Figure 6.11: Change in retirement probability for individuals in one-earner households 
for different reform scenario of the household replacement rate 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE data 
6.5.2.2 IMPACT ON POVERTY MEASURES 
As highlighted in the introduction, the objectives of an adequate old-age pension system 
from a public policy perspective is poverty alleviation and income redistribution among 
the elderly (Barr and Diamond, 2006). The redistributive effect of the old-age pension 
program is embedded in the calculation of benefits through the minimum pension and 
the set of pensionable earnings minima and maxima, among other things. In addition, the 
household replacement rate serves as a redistribution mechanism between one-earner 
households and the rest of the population. Indeed, we test for the probability of being in 
a one-earner household using a probit model and we control for individuals and job-
related characteristics. We find that being a male, having secondary education, working 
full-time and a lower total number of years of career all increase the probability of being 
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in a one-earner household (see table 6.4). Most importantly, we find that being is a one-
earner household is associated a lower average wage, which corresponds to the findings 
of Hindriks (2014) and the Pension Reform Committee (2014) that individuals in one-
earner households are generally concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution. 
In this section, we present elderly poverty measures and we assess the impact of various 
reform scenarios of the household replacement rate on these same measures.  
Table 6.4: Probit model of the probability of being in a one-earner household 
 Probit coefficients 






















Age difference (absolute value) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
Primary sector of activity 
-0.533 
(0.373) 












Total years of career 
-0.050*** 
(0.018) 
Note: Table reports average marginal effects. Clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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First, we estimate the old-age pension benefits entitlements of spouses using the same 
benefit calculation rules as for our sampled individuals and express the benefits into 
constant 2017 euros. Then, we sum the estimated old-age pension benefit of our sampled 
individuals and that of their spouses at the effective retirement age of the reference 
individual to obtain an indicator of the household income based on old-age pension 
benefits entitlements at retirement.283 Finally, in order to take into account differences in 
household size and economies of scales within the household, we transform the 
household old-age pension benefits entitlement into the equivalized household old-age 
pension income for a one-member household using the OECD modified equivalence 
scales284.  
We observe that pensioners in one-earner households have slightly higher average 
equivalized household old-age pension income (1185.10 euros) compared to individuals 
in two-earner households (1169.53 euros). Besides, the average equivalized household 
old-age pension income is lower for individuals in one-earner and two-earner households 
compared to singles (1494.89 euros). There are two reasons that can explain why 
individuals in one-earner households have higher average old-age pension benefits even 
though they have a lower average wage and there is only one prime-earner in the 
household: (i) they are granted the household replacement rate and (ii) they have 
characteristics that are associated with higher wages (for instance, male and less part-time 
work). Finally, we note that there is less variation in household old-age pension income 
 
283 We restrict our sample to individuals who were retired at the time of the survey because we look at the 
old-age pension benefits they effectively receive at retirement and not their benefits entitlements. 
Therefore, we compute our poverty measures for a sample of 327 individuals. 
284 We use the OECD modified equivalence scale that assigns a value of 1 to the household head and a 
value of 0.5 to each additional adult. (OECD, n.d.) 
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for individuals in one-earner households than for other types of households (see figure 
6.12). 
Figure 6.12: Dispersion of equivalized old-age pension benefits by type of household 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE data 
We measure the poverty of individuals285 at retirement using the equivalized household 
old-age pension income by means of the headcount ratio and the average poverty gap 
from the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) measures of poverty and a relative poverty 
line set at 50 percent of the median equivalized household old-age pension income in our 
sample.286 In our baseline scenario, we find a headcount poverty ratio of 5.77 percent for 
the sample and 2.75 percent for individuals in one-earner households.  
 
285 Because of data limitations, we calculate the poverty rate of individuals based on their old-age pension 
benefits entitlements only. For a complete assessment of old-age poverty rates, one should include house 
ownership and other types of revenues. 
286 The Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) poverty measure is written as +Q(g) = 4  ∑ 8 M4 . Where 
X is the equivalent household income for individual i and z is the poverty line. We use a relative poverty 
line set at 50% of the median individual old-age pension at retirement in our sample, which is equal to 
648.67 euros (2017 euros).  If g = 0, then the measure indicates the headcount ratio, or the proportion of the 
sample that lives in a poor household. If g=1, then the measure indicates the intensity of poverty by 
adding up the relative difference between the household income and the poverty line.  
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Next, we look at the effect of increasing the household replacement rate in gradual steps 
of 5 percentage points starting from 60 percent. Figure 6.13 displays the average 
equivalized household old-age pension income (and its standard deviation) at retirement 
of individuals in one-earner households in each of these scenarios. For individuals in one-
earner households, the removal of the household replacement rate would lead to a 
decrease of their average equivalized household old-age pension income from 1185.10 to 
1010.34 euros, their headcount ratio would increase from 2.75 percent to 4.59 percent and 
their average poverty gap would increase from 0.79 percent to 1.33 percent of the poverty 
line. We observe that as the household replacement rate increases, so does the standard 
deviation, meaning that inequality between individuals in one-earner households 
increases.  
Figure 6.13: Average equivalized old-age pension benefits by type of households 
under different reform scenarios of the household replacement rate 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using SHARE data 
Figure 6.14 displays the headcount ratio and the average poverty gap for each household 
replacement rate reform scenario. We note that the decrease in both the poverty 




Figure 6.14: Headcount ratio and average poverty gap of one-earner households under 
different household replacement rate reform scenarios 
 









In this chapter, we study the retirement incentives of workers in one-earner households. 
Pensioners in one-earner households are granted the more generous household 
replacement rate for the calculation of their old-age pension benefits, which takes the form 
of a 15 percentage point increase of the standard replacement rate. While one-earner 
households are generally concentrated at the lower end of the income distribution, their 
average pension benefits is generally above those of individuals in two-earner or single 
households because of the household replacement rate. However, we find that pensioners 
in one-earner households have the lowest average equivalized old-age pension benefits 
in our sample.  
We use a discrete time logistic duration model to study the transitions from employment 
to retirement using a sample of older Belgian workers from the survey dataset SHARE. 
We construct financial retirement incentive measures (social security wealth and accruals) 
and find that they have a significant effect on retirement. Firstly, we find that the higher 
the social security wealth, the higher the retirement probability. This result thus correctly 
predicts the income effect of social security benefits according to which an individual with 
higher social security wealth will leave the labor force earlier. Since pensioners in one-
earner households have higher average social security wealth thanks to the household 
replacement rate, the income effect of social security benefits is larger for them than for 
other types of households. Secondly, we find that the lower the accrual, the higher the 
retirement probability. Thus correctly predicting the substitution effect of social security 
benefits according to which the higher the returns of an additional year of work, the lower 
the retirement probability. After controlling for financial retirement incentives, we find 
that the effect of being a worker in a one-earner household on the retirement probability 
is insignificant. Moreover, we find that the effect of the financial retirement incentives on 
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the retirement probability is not significantly different according to the type of household 
the worker lives in.  
We estimate the effect of a change in the household replacement rate on the retirement 
probability of individuals in one-earner households. We start by comparing our baseline 
scenario (75% replacement rate) to a scenario in which the household replacement rate is 
set to 60 percent, which is equivalent to suppressing it. We find that such a reform would 
create a work incentive because of the ensuing decrease in social security wealth. The 
impact of the removal of the household replacement rate on the accruals is slightly more 
complex. In fact, before the individual is eligible for old-age pension, a decrease in the 
generosity of the system leads to a lower work incentive (i.e. the positive accrual 
decreases), because there is less to be gained by working for one additional year. 
However, after the individual gains access to the old-age pension regime, the reform 
creates a lower work disincentive (i.e. the negative accrual increases) because there is less 
to be lost by working for one additional year. We find that the total effect of removing the 
program would have a negative effect on the retirement probability, which would be 
more important at older ages. Similarly, we find that an increase in the household 
replacement rate would lead to a limited increase in the retirement probability of 
individuals in one-earner households. Unsurprisingly, increases in the generosity of the 
household rate benefits lead to substantial decreases in the poverty measures among the 
elderly. However, this effect becomes smaller as the replacement rate increases 
In view of these results, we advocate in favour of the recommendation of the Belgian 
Pension Reform Committee to remove the household replacement rate except for 
minimum pensions. Since households with asymmetrical working arrangements are 
often at the lowest part of the income distribution, the substantial effect of the household 
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replacement rate on poverty measures is motivating. Moreover, we have found only low 
working incentives imbedded in the program.  
Despite the continued need for income redistribution among the elderly to avoid the 
persistence of income inequality into old age, such redistribution need not be targeted at 
financially dependent spouses, especially given that we are witnessing an increase of the 
modernized male breadwinner model and a rise in divorces and durable legal 
cohabitation arrangements. Indeed, pensionable earning minima, minimum pension 
benefits and the pension benefits calculation accounting for periods spent on replacement 
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6.A.1 HOUSEHOLD RATE BENEFITS AROUND EUROPE 








supplement is paid for a 
dependent adult if the 
earnings from work are 
below a specified amount. 
16.000 individuals or 
0.2% of 12.980.800 
pensioners in 2106 
76.700 individuals in 
2006 or 0.7% of total 
11.734.100 number of 
pensioners287 
New claims are 
no longer 
possible. The 
payment of the 
supplement will 
cease in April 
2020 
France Dependent’s supplement 
for a spouse older than age 
65 (or 60 in case of 
disability), who does not 
receive any social security 
benefits or personal 
resources that exceed 833€ 
monthly 
105.540 individuals in 
2015 or 0.8% of 
13.041.056 total 
number of pensioners 
288 






for younger partner: the 
pensioner must be aged 65 
or older and the partner 
younger than age 65 with 
income from employment 
less than €1,324.46 a month 
(or income from benefits 
less than €734.41 a month). 
The allowance is paid until 
162.454 at the end of 
2015 or 4.8% of 
3.371.258 total 
pensioners in 2015289 
313.374 at the end of 
2012 , or 10.4% of 
3.016.955 total 
pensioners 














the younger partner is 65. 
An earnings test on the 
household income exists. 
Belgium A supplement of 15% of the 
average past 45 years of 
career is granted if the 
spouse receives a work 
income or social security 
benefits below a certain 
threshold.  
307.261 individuals in 
2016 (305,626 men 
and 1636 women)290 , 
or  15.2% of total of 
2.015.338 pensioners 
349.766 individuals in 
2006 or 20% of 
1.747.111 total 
number of pensioners 
 
Norway Income tested dependent’s 
supplement for a dependent 
spouse who does not 
receive an personal OAP 
benefits 
3 063 individuals in 
2009 or 0.5% of 
647 388 pensioners 
2028 or 0.2% of 889043 
total pensioners291 in 
2015 
 
Ireland Dependent’s supplement is 
paid for a dependent spouse 
with an income below a 
certain threshold, varies 
with the dependent 
spouse’s age. 
3162 individuals or 
0.6% of 95.570 total 
number of recipients 
of non-contributory  
state pension in 2014 
292 
72.193 individuals or 
13.8% of 522.244 total 
number of pensioners 
in 2011 
 
Portugal Dependent’s spouse 
supplement 
  
Cyprus Dependent’s spouse 
supplement increases the 
basic pension to 80% of the 
average past earnings 
  
 








Isle of Man    
Changes in minimum or maximum pension 
Italy Increase of minimum 
monthly OAP benefits if the 
annual income of the 
household is below a certain 
threshold 
  
Spain Increase of minimum and 
maximum monthly OAP 
benefits if the annual 
income of the household is 
below a certain threshold 
  
Sweden Higher social pension if in a 
couple. 
  
Austria Higher social pension if in a 
couple. 
  
Greece Increase of minimum 
monthly OAP benefits if the 
annual income of the 












6.A.2 EVOLUTION OF MONTHLY GROSS SALARY BY AGE (AVERAGE 1999 – 
2017) 
 



























Rapid population ageing and the influx of baby boomers arriving at the age of retirement 
is generating a considerable threat for the financial sustainability of Belgium’s pay-as-
you-go old-age pension system. Indeed, the steep increase in the old-age dependency 
ratio is predicted to be translated into a rise in gross public pension expenditures of 6.6 
percentage points of GDP between 2016 and 2070. In addition to these demographic 
trends, Belgium counts with relatively low elderly labor force participation rates and a 
low average effective retirement age.   
The necessary reforms to safeguard the level of old-age pension benefits in payment are 
essentially composed of three measures: increased contributions and tax financing, 
lowered benefits and increases in the effective retirement age. In Belgium, the government 
has implemented various reforms with the objective of delaying the effective retirement 
age. On the one hand, access to early labor force exit routes outside of the old-age pension 
system has been tightened. On the other hand, efforts have been made to reduce the 
incentives of early claim of old-age pension benefits. Although the elderly employment 
rates have been increasing since the mid-1990’s, this trend is not enough to absorb the 
negative effect of population ageing and efforts to improve the financial sustainability of 
the country’s old-age pension system should be actively pursued. 
Next to pressing sustainability matters, it is also important that pension reforms take 
account of pension adequacy measures, or the ability of the system to provide a 
replacement income that prevents individuals from old-age poverty and allows for 
consumption smoothing at older ages. While elderly poverty rates have been decreasing 
over the last few years and are now comparable to those of the general population, they 
are relatively higher than most neighbouring countries.  
The conjunction of the increase in elderly labor force participation and the wave of 
reforms that tightened the coverage and generosity of the social security system has 
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spawned a vast literature on the link between the retirement decision and financial 
retirement incentives stemming from the social security system. The objective of the thesis 
is to update past studies and to shed further light on the mechanisms that determine the 
retirement behavior of older workers. We use detailed social security eligibility and 
benefit calculation rules and their reforms from the nineteen eighties until today to 
compute measures of financial retirement incentives and we study their impact on 
retirement using Belgium as a case study.  
7.1 KEY FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, we summarize key findings of each chapter and we link them to our policy 
recommendations. 
Chapter two - Historical evolution of the Belgian social security landscape for older workers 
The second chapter presents a thorough review of the Belgian social security landscape 
relevant for the study of retirement. We demonstrate that the system has become 
increasingly complex and sometimes fragmented, because of a lack of long-term planning 
and reforms piling on top of one another with little coherence, which brings about a 
particularly challenging situation for the analysis of its effects on the retirement decision. 
Because of such complexity, it is essential that the effect of sustainability reforms is 
assessed in terms of both sustainability and adequacy and that any potential intertwined 
effect between programs or reforms is considered. For instance, the 1997 reform that 
increased the statutory eligibility age of women from 60 to 65 had the expected effect of 
delaying their retirement age, which improved the sustainability of the pension system as 
a whole. However, the period of benefits receipt of certain replacement income programs 
(e.g. conventional early retirement) also increased as beneficiaries of these programs are 
automatically rolled over to the old-age pension regime at the statutory eligibility age. On 
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top of this direct fiscal cost, this reform also created differed fiscal liabilities and led to an 
increase of social security wealth for women receiving these benefits as periods spent 
receiving a replacement income count towards the pension history, be it at the rate of the 
last wage or a lower lump-sum amount. Since access these benefits generally requires a 
minimum number of years of career, one can plausibly assume that the reform also 
generated a rise in social security wealth inequality between women with short or part-
time careers and other women. However, the same reform might have improved social 
security wealth inequality between healthy and unhealthy women by extending the 
period of disability benefits that can be included in the calculation of old-age pension 
benefits. In light of such a complex effect of reforms, there is a need for cautious ex-ante 
and ex-post analysis and for policy makers to have a good grasp of the overall current 
social security system and its evolution over time. 
Chapter three - Social security incentives in Belgium: an analysis of four decades of change 
The third chapter of the thesis examines the evolution of financial retirement incentives 
generated by the Belgian social security system from the eighties until the present day. 
More specifically, we construct a microsimulation model aimed at assessing the incentives 
to retire for different subgroups of the population (differentiated by their sex, level of 
earnings, marital status) for each retirement age between 55 and 65, retirement years from 
1980 to 2016 and for each of the four traditional labor force exit pathways. We show that 
the social security reforms that occurred in Belgium have had a significant impact on the 
financial retirement incentives of older workers. More specifically, we observe that 
Belgian workers face an implicit tax on additional work above age 60, and sometimes as 
early as age 58. Therefore, we find that the wide array of (early) labor force exit pathways 
does create a situation in which certain older workers would be better off (in terms of 
social security wealth) by leaving the labor force early.  
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Chapter four - Trends in social security incentives in Belgium 
The fourth chapter of the thesis explores the empirical link between financial retirement 
incentive measures and the retirement behavior of older Belgian workers. We use an 
administrative panel dataset for years 2004 to 2010 to construct various financial 
retirement incentive variables and test their correlation with the retirement decision of 
workers at the micro level. We find that there is a positive and significant income effect 
and a negative and significant substitution effect of financial retirement incentives on the 
retirement probability, which is slightly higher for women than for men. Namely, higher 
pension wealth leads to earlier retirement and higher marginal returns to work lead to 
later retirement, respectively. Moreover, we simulate the impact of various reform 
scenario on the retirement probability and we find that reforms that tightened the 
eligibility conditions of (early) labor force exit pathways had a relatively large effect on 
the financial retirement incentives compared to reforms of benefit calculation rules (e.g. 
pension bonus).  
In view of these results, it appears that reforms tightening the eligibility rules of social 
security programs are a powerful policy tool and are central in ensuring the long-term 
financial sustainability of the pension system. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, the 
abolition of the pension bonus can be considered as consistent as its removal effectively 
leads to later retirement through a decreased income effect. Finally, we find slightly 
different results between men and women and thus advocate for a separate analysis of 
the impact of social security reforms on the retirement between men and women. 
Chapter five - Work, labor force exit and benefit claiming patterns in Belgium 
The complexity of the Belgian social security system sometimes leads workers to – 
optimally or not – disjoin labor force exit from (early) benefit claiming decisions by opting 
for the time credit program for instance. The fifth chapter of the thesis documents the 
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dissociation of the retirement decision into a labor market exit and a benefit claiming 
decision and explores its impact from a research and a public policy point of view. Such 
a dissociation leads us to consider workers and retired individuals differently according 
to their benefit claiming status. We use a detailed panel administrative dataset to study 
the retirement and benefit claiming trends of older Belgian workers. Once we decompose 
the recent increase in elderly employment rates, we note that an important part of it is 
attributable to a rise in part-time work (mostly for women) and in the group of workers 
who are claiming social security benefits (mostly time-credit, disability and 
unemployment benefits). Moreover, we find that the proportion of workers who are 
claiming benefits has been increasing faster than other types of workers over the last 
decade. Finally and most importantly, we find that workers who are claimers (resp. 
individuals in part-time working arrangements) have a higher probability to exit the labor 
force early compared to workers who are not claimers (resp. workers in full-time working 
arrangements).  
In conclusion, when assessing the financial sustainability of the pension system, the 
decomposition of employment and retirement trends according to the benefit claiming 
status proves to be of prime relevance. 
First, social security reforms can potentially influence both decisions differently – possibly 
disjoining them - and the impact evaluation of a reform should include its effect on both 
decisions separately. As a matter of fact, we study the determinants of both decisions 
independently and find that they are influenced by distinct factors. 
Second, the option of combining (part-time) work with social security benefits claiming 
influences labor market decisions at older ages. In fact, some authors argue that this 
combination might encourage some workers to stay on the labor force longer. We show 
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that workers who are claiming social security benefits (e.g. time credit benefits) tend to 
retire earlier compared to workers who are not claiming any benefits. Moreover, while 
some of these programs might indeed lead workers to retire later, they might also induce 
some workers who would have stayed employed full-time to retire partly. Therefore, our 
results indicate that allowing for older workers to gradually reduce their working hours 
(through a program such as the time credit) does not lead to the desired policy effect, that 
of delaying retirement. Consequently, the effect of such work arrangements or programs 
and the direction of causality should be examined in more detail before access to gradual 
retirement programs is made more or less tight. 
Third, distinguishing labor force exit from benefit claiming decisions and identifying both 
short-and long-term fiscal costs of benefit claims are two issues of prime policy relevance 
in Belgium. The country has a highly complex landscape of labor force exit and benefit 
claiming options and the ubiquitous nature of partial or full labor force exit options and 
the absence of penalty for early claimers of old-age pension benefits render the short and 
the long-run fiscal stakes particularly high.  Consequently, in pension sustainability 
prediction analysis, workers who are claiming social security benefits should be 
considered separately from other workers and their current and differed fiscal costs 
should be analyzed carefully.  
Chapter six - The old-age pension household replacement rate for pensioners in one-earner 
households 
Pensioners in one-earner households are granted the more generous household 
replacement rate for the calculation of their old-age pension benefits, which takes the form 
of a 15-percentage point increase of the standard replacement rate. In the sixth chapter, 
we examine the retirement incentives of workers in one-earner households, and we look 
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at the impact of the household replacement rate of the old-age pension system on pension 
sustainability and adequacy measures.  
We use a discrete time logistic duration model to study the transitions from employment 
to retirement using a sample of older Belgian workers from the survey dataset SHARE. 
Specifically, we test whether the program generates higher (lower) work (dis)incentives 
through its impact on our financial retirement incentive measures. We find a positive 
effect for our social security wealth measure, correctly predicting that higher social 
security wealth leads to earlier retirement, and a negative effect of the accrual, correctly 
predicting that higher marginal return to work leads to later retirement. Overall, we find 
that the household replacement rate leads to slightly earlier retirement because the 
income effect generated by its impact on social security wealth is larger than the 
substitution effect generated by its impact on accruals. Moreover, we find a substantial 
effect of the household replacement rate on poverty measures of individuals in one-earner 
households, which slows down as the generosity of the household replacement rate 
increases.  
Since households with asymmetrical working arrangements are often at the lowest part 
of the income distribution, we advocate in favour of the recommendation of the Belgian 
Pension Reform Committee to remove the household replacement rate, with the exception 
of minimum pensions. Indeed, despite the need for income redistribution among the 
elderly to avoid the persistence of inequality into old age, such redistribution need not be 
targeted at financially dependent spouses, especially given the rise of the modernized 
male breadwinner model and an increasing number of divorces or durable legal 
cohabitation arrangements. Indeed, pensionable earning minima, minimum pension 
benefits and the pension benefits calculation accounting for periods spent on replacement 
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income effectively serve the income redistribution goal and do not favour a certain type 
of household over another.  
7.2 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In this section, we detail some of the limitations of our analysis (e.g. caused by the data 
structure) and we give some insights into some of the research topics that appear 
stimulating and valuable for future analysis in view of our results. 
Because of data limitations, we focus on the analysis of the retirement determinants of 
wage earners and leave aside the self-employed and civil servant working regimes. 
Indeed, there is only a limited amount of available information for self-employed workers 
(e.g. the income information is missing) in the administrative dataset retrieved from the 
Crossroad Bank of Social Security that we use in chapters 3, 4 and 5. In addition to data 
limitations, information on the evolution of the social security rules for self-employed and 
civil servants is scarce. Furthermore, there exists a wide array of sub-systems in the civil 
servant regime, each with specific eligibility and benefit calculation rules, which makes it 
a particularly challenging regime to study. We suppose that the retirement decision of 
self-employed workers (resp. civil servants) and wage earners are influenced by different 
factors, as the later have access to a substantially less (resp. more) generous social security 
system and are thus plausibly less (resp. more) influenced by financial retirement 
incentives. Further analysis on the way financial retirement incentives influence the 
retirement determinants of self-employed and civil servant workers would be an 
extremely valuable input into the current literature. However, this analysis should 
imperatively be done separately for the different regimes because of the vast disparity 
that exists in terms of social security eligibility and benefit calculation rules. 
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In the first chapter, we summarize the evolution of benefit calculation and eligibility rules 
of the main early labor force exit pathways for older Belgian workers. Research papers on 
how these reforms have interacted with one another and their impact in terms of both 
pension sustainability and adequacy is infrequent. Future research on the intertwined 
effects of reforms and between early labor force exit pathway programs would be 
desirable and provide an insightful tool in the public policy debate. Such additional 
analysis would inevitably serve to reinforce our conclusion that the Belgian social security 
system has become increasingly convoluted, which complexifies the study of retirement 
and of the sustainability of the pension system. 
In the fourth chapter, we find that the impact of our financial retirement incentives differ 
slightly between men and women, with our SSW and ITAX measures having a higher 
significant impact on the retirement probability of older women compared to older men. 
Additionally, we find that the impact of our social security eligibility age indicators is 
slightly higher for older men than for older women. Further analysis on the root causes 
of such differences and the way social security reforms influence the retirement behavior 
of men and women separately would be a valuable upgrade for the literature. 
As far as the computation of financial retirement incentives is concerned, we advocate for 
the inclusion of as many social security calculation rules as possible in future research 
papers. Indeed, some calculation or eligibility rules that appear trivial may well have an 
important impact on financial retirement incentives (e.g. taxation) while other programs 
have only a limited impact on such incentives (e.g. pension bonus). Besides, there still 
exists gender differences in social security eligibility rules and it is imperative that such 
specificities are included as parameters for the model to account for the actual incentives 
faced by workers. It is difficult to predict how such an upgrading would have influenced 
our financial retirement incentives measures as the inclusion of any additional parameter 
could in principle influence our measure both ways. 
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For data limitation reasons, we were not able to generate a “true” eligibility indicator for 
some of the programs. For instance, we could not capture true eligibility to the 
conventional early retirement system, as there are too many special regimes with specific 
eligibility rules (for workers in companies in distress, in arduous jobs, etc.). This 
undoubtedly affects our computation of financial incentive measures and the analysis of 
the effect of our eligibility indicator on retirement. Indeed, the work disincentives 
associated with some early labor force exit programs are a lot higher compared to the 
disincentives created by the old-age pension system. We can thus assume that our 
financial incentive measures are biased downward because we were not able to include 
some of the incentives created by these programs.  
Moreover, the lack of detailed information on eligibility to some of the early labor force 
exit programs prohibits us from computing an improved aggregation mechanism of 
financial retirement incentive, in which the aggregated measure would only be influenced 
by the incentives originating from the social security programs the worker has access to. 
Owing to data limitations, we did not include a health indicator in our regression 
analyses. We expect the health status to play an active role in the determination of 
retirement. Therefore, we assume that our regressions suffer from an omitted variable 
bias. While there is a wide array of research that looks at the impact of health on 
retirement, our analysis would have benefitted from the inclusion of health as a covariate. 
In general, further research on the intertwined effect between the financial retirement 
incentives and health would be worthwhile.  
Further research on the impact of part-time work and the combination of work and benefit 
claiming on the retirement behavior would be profitable. Indeed, while these work 
arrangements might entice some workers to stay on the labor force longer, they might 
also induce some workers to opt out of a full-time employment without claiming benefits 
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to retire partially through these programs. Overall, our results from chapter five seem to 
indicate that allowing for the combination of work and benefit claiming at older ages 
might not lead to the expected effect of encouraging older workers to stay on the labor 
force longer. Besides, following the important proportion of older women working part-
time, a differentiated and detailed analysis of the effect of such programs on retirement 
between men and women would be extremely valuable. Finally, further research is 
needed to establish the direction of causality between part-time work at older ages and 
retirement. From a methodological point of view, our analysis could have benefited from 
a nested structure approach that would have included the many different retirement 
pathways that are available for older Belgian workers. Leaving aside methodological and 
data impracticalities of this approach, this model upgrade could have had substantial 
impact on our results as we would have been able to better represent the actual choice set 
of the worker.  
Finally, a large-scale analysis of the retirement behavior of individuals in one-earner 
households would be beneficial. Indeed, our sample size was rather limited owing to the 
fact that we were working with survey data. Likewise, the analysis of the impact of the 
household replacement rates on the work incentives of the financially dependent spouse 
(typically the woman) in a one-earner household is also a relevant topic to examine and 
remains understudied to this date.  
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